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This thesis studies the corporate governance features of publicly-traded, 
family-controlled companies and the impact these have on firm performance and foreign 
investment decisions. Although family control and public listing seem to conflict, they 
co-exist in many East-Asian countries, including Taiwan. Given this phenomenon within 
Asia, traditional corporate governance theory, based on the Principal-Agent relationship 
seems out of context. 
Based on the system prevalent in the West, previous research has advocated that 
controlling families tend to abuse their position within firms, and this thesis confirms this 
view. However, the thesis also reveals that the resources provided by the controlling family 
are crucial for corporate development, particularly in a developing country such as Taiwan. 
Moreover, this thesis supports the view that institutional investors are effective in restraining 
the controlling family from appropriating the benefits due to minority shareholders. 
In addition, this thesis extends the discussion of corporate governance in an international 
context and tests how this impacts on strategic decisions relating to foreign investment. 
Results show that the financial resources provided by the controlling family are critical in the 
firm's decision to undertake foreign expansion. However, when the family dominates the 
managerial board, the firm may act rather conservatively with respect to international 
expansion, although domestic and foreign financial institutional investors have the opposite 
effect. 
Finally, in the location choice for foreign investment, the thesis finds that the controlling 
family consistently plays a significant role in the decision to develop a portfolio of locations 
that include both low-risk, secure and high-risk, competitive markets. However, there is also 
evidence that the controlling family tends to invest in locations where there are close family 
contacts and familiar environments. There is also a preference for investment in tax-haven 
countries. These tendencies can be related to the self-interested motive of families to 
entrench the benefits of control, and to facilitate the intergenerational transfer of family 
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This study investigates elements of corporate governance, with particular reference to listed 
companies in Taiwan. Thus far, the theoretical framework for the vast majority of corporate 
governance research is underpinned by the Berle and Means model (1932) and examines the 
problems that may arise from the separation of firm ownership and control. In contrast, the 
system of corporate governance in Taiwan is characterised by the fact that most public trading 
companies are under the control of one family that collectively owns the largest number of 
shares. Thus, this thesis considers the role of corporate governance in an environment where 
there is an established system of family control. 
The influence of families in listed firms is a common phenomenon in most developing 
and emerging countries and several developed countries. In comparison with a structure 
where share ownership is widely dispersed, family controlled businesses present a specific set 
of challenges when dealing with disputes that arise between the major shareholder and outside 
owners. This thesis aims to study this principal-principal relationship in companies listed on 
the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE), and to discuss the effectiveness of specific governance 
mechanisms in reconciling the interests of all shareholder groups. 
Prior to this thesis, some research has examines the nature of corporate governance in 
East Asia, of which Taiwan is part. However, before the financial crisis of 1997, most of 
these studies were based on case-study methods, and focused on the governance system that 
existed within a particular business group. After the crisis, attention has turned to examining 
whether governance characteristics can explain the economic downturn prior to the crisis, or 
at least the vulnerability of firms in the region (for example: Johnson et al, 2000; Mitton, 
2002). However, these studies adopt a single model of corporate governance in East Asia, 
and use pooled data from a number of countries in the region. But the likelihood of a single 
corporate governance model being appropriate is small, since there are significant differences 
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between these countries in terms of culture, business custom and practice and economic 
development. In order to avoid confusing the different characteristics of countries in East 
Asia, this is a single country study. Taiwan is a good example of an East Asian country with 
high levels of family control within listed companies and which, while not totally unscathed, 
did not suffer unduly from the 1997 crisis. 
Apart from a central focus on corporate governance and the resulting impact on firm 
performance, two other related issues are addressed: the decision outcomes of 
internationalisation strategies and FDI location choice. This is a unique feature of the 
research. Taiwan relies heavily on overseas markets. Increasing numbers of firms have 
engaged in foreign investment and transferred a proportion of business activity to overseas. 
It is therefore interesting to examine how the models of governance that exist in 
family-controlled firms accommodate expansion strategies, particularly when these are 
cross-border. 
To examine the role of corporate governance on the decision process is useful as a way 
of identifying the causal relationships between strategy and internationalisation. A number 
of papers have studied the effects of various models of corporate governance on specific 
strategy outcomes, such as anti-takeover activity and corporate diversification, although the 
link to FDI has not received a great deal of attention. To link the fields of corporate 
governance and international business and explore possible relationships between them is the 
main contribution of this thesis. 
Research Objectives 
Governance-Performance Relationship 
The first section of the thesis examines the characteristics of the system of corporate 
governance in Taiwan, particularly the factors relevant to family control, and their effects on 
firm performance. There are a number of studies of family control many of which are 
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concerned with how this can lead to abuse of managerial power, although these do not 
generally provide direct evidence in support of such an argument. Furthermore, a series of 
financial scandals in recent years have revealed that many professional managers in western 
firms have performed poorly, and in some cases, violated positions of trust and been 
prosecuted in the courts. Thus, it is not necessarily the case that replacing controlling 
families by professionals is a guarantee of enhanced efficiency. In fact, the experience in 
East Asia supports the view that controlling families play a critical role in providing a 
foundation for corporate competitiveness, and thus it would be rash to conclude that this 
system is necessary inappropriate and not part of a model of good corporate governance. 
The governance effect that arises from a controlling family and the subsequent impact on 
firm performance is the first research objective of this thesis. With a pyramid shareholding 
structure, the family in East Asia does not necessarily need to hold a great proportion of 
shares to achieve efficient corporate control (Claessens et al., 2000). This may lead to a the 
separation of the interests of corporate controllers from the motive of maximising the value of 
the firm and highlight the potential agency problems. On the other hand, many companies in 
developing countries in East Asia have difficulty accessing external finance, and therefore 
depend on internal resources to fund development. Within the context of Taiwan, this study 
examines how the controlling family reconciles the potential of the abuse of managerial 
power with the aim of promoting firm growth, and considers how this model compares with 
the system of professional managers in western businesses. 
An additional factor is that, in recent years, the financial markets in Taiwan have 
undergone considerable liberalisation to encourage the participation of both domestic and 
foreign institutional investors. Despite the relatively short history of the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange, the professional expertise and neutral position of such investors places them in an 
excellent position to counter the activities of the controlling family. This group will be seen 
as important in the empirical chapters of the thesis. 
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The Role of Corporate Governance in FDI Decisions 
The second part of this thesis explores the role of corporate governance in the 
internationalisation process of Taiwanese firms, particularly with reference to two aspects of 
the foreign investment decision. First, the research tests the role of corporate governance 
variables in the decision to invest overseas activities. To reveal the multiple roles of 
corporate governance in the investment decision, three models measuring different forms of 
decision outcomes are introduced: 
" whether or not the company has engaged in foreign investment 
" the extent of that investment. This is measured by the cumulative number of foreign 
investment projects and distinguishes various levels of internationalisation for these 
firms. The higher the total number of foreign investment projects, the higher the level 
of internationalisation in the firm. 
" the capital commitment to foreign investment. This is measured by the ratio of the 
cumulative value of investment as a proportion of total issued capital. This is designed 
to capture the importance of foreign investment activity for the firm, and to reflect the 
willingness of senior managers to accept the risks of uncertainty that arise from 
international competition. 
The second aspect of the foreign invest decision relates to the spatial distribution of 
corporate foreign investments. This part of the thesis focuses on how the firm-specific 
features of corporate governance impact upon the decision outcome. 
The Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis consists of eight chapters plus a conclusion. Chapter one provides the contextual 
foundation of the research. The economic and cultural context is important and this chapter 
discusses the history of Taiwan's economic development, its commercial and business 
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customs, its financial markets and its growing international economic performance. 
Chapter two introduces the institutional setting in which corporate governance in Taiwan 
exists, which is elemental to this study. The governance characteristics of Taiwanese firms 
reflect the particular institutional environment of the country. Thus, it is necessary to 
understand the local institutional system before the research hypotheses can be formulated 
and the analysis conducted. Chapter three describes the data and methodology. This 
includes an explanation of sample selection, the collection of data from public sources, and 
the construction of the variables. It also outlines the models used in the econometric 
estimation. 
These are followed by a review of the relevant literature, which is divided into two 
chapters. The first focuses on theoretical approaches to corporate governance, and the 
second on international business and internationalisation studies. These include numerous 
empirical studies that examine the efficiency of particular governance mechanisms, and thus 
link the governance characteristics to specific strategic decisions of firms. These two 
chapters form the theoretical foundation to support the research questions and methodological 
approach. 
Chapters 6,7 and 8 are the main empirical chapters. Chapter 6 discusses the 
performance determinants, including corporate governance factors, in firms with family 
ownership and control. Chapter 7 tests the role of the corporate governance factors in the 
FDI decision, and Chapter 8 examines the role of the corporate governance factors in the 
spatial decisions related to FDI. These latter two chapters empirically link corporate 
governance factors with multinational strategy, and thus advance the discussion to an 
international dimension. This is a crucial feature and the major contribution of the thesis. 
Chapter 1- Context of Study 
Chapter One: Context of the Study 
Introduction 
6 
Despite its relatively small population, scarce natural resources and limited geographical area, 
Taiwan has become a model for newly emerging economies. Its high level of economic 
development could never have been foreseen 50 years ago, when the local infrastructure was 
seriously damaged in WWII and hyperinflation resulted from civil war with China. By the 
mid 1980s, the average GAP growth rate was approximately 7.3%, and nominal per capita 
GNP had risen to US$6,000 (Statistical Year Book of the Republic of China, 1990). 
Moreover, according to the government statistics of the Customs Directorate (Trading 
Statistical Reports, December, 1990), Taiwan had become the 13th largest trading nation in the 
world by the end of the 1980s,. A shift in emphasis during the 1990s changed the focus of 
production in Taiwan from a so-called toy products nation to one that was on the frontier of 
information technology, ranking third in the world after the US and Japan. The Ministry of 
Economic Affairs has reported that, for every 2.5 notebook computers in existence, one was 
made in Taiwan. Clearly, Taiwan is one of the major successes with respect to economic 
development. 
However, despite the prosperity, there were signs of localized inflation. Between 1986 
and 1991, property prices in Taiwan rose by 300%, increasing the level of inequality between 
rich and poor. At the same time, surplus capital from trading and property appreciation 
rushed into the immature, less-regulated local market, encouraging short-term opportunistic 
behavior by both investors and corporate managers. Speculative trading only emphasizes 
short-term returns without considering the underlying fundamentals, allowing companies to 
attract finance easily from the market and expand as much as they can. Inevitably, this 
sometime reckless expansion can result in failure and an over-dependence on financial 
leverage that can cause serious loss of wealth for minority investors. Much of the 
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opportunistic behavior by managers in recent years has been related to foreign investment. 
According to media reports (BBC, 6th/November/2002) some corporate controllers in Taiwan 
secretly transferred assets to overseas areas to engage in private investment, particular in 
mainland China and some tax haven countries. Then, after these assets have been 
successfully transferred overseas, these companies would declare bankruptcy in Taiwan with 
little regard to the interests of minority shareholders and their liabilities to local banks. 
There is thus considerable evidence that a more robust system of governance is necessary in 
the areas of corporate management, equity trade and foreign investment if the Taiwanese 
successful story is to continue. 
This chapter provides a review of the context for the thesis. The first section 
summarise the general economic situation in Taiwan, including the historical background to 
economic development, and the establishment of the current industrial structure. The 
following section summarises the organisation and commercial environment of Taiwan. The 
third section focuses on the financial markets, and in particular, the role of institutional 
investors as this is especially relevant in the empirical chapters. Finally, the 
internationalisation of Taiwanese firms will be discussed, including sections on trade and 
foreign investment. 
The Economic Situation of Taiwan 
The Economic History of Taiwan prior to WWII 
Until the late 150' century, Taiwan was undeveloped and, except for the aboriginal populations, 
only Chinese and Japanese pirates inhabited the south-west coast of the island. At this time, 
the anarchical status of Taiwan was largely due to the isolation policy of the Chinese Empire 
against pirates (Lee and Liu, 1998), which had prohibited all kinds of emigration from China 
to Taiwan since 1387. The Chinese Empire was confined to a single continent and there was 
no tradition or interest in governing a small and unimportant off-shore island that would 
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depend heavily on the mainland and only cause a burden to the coastal provinces. Thus, 
China neglected any serious consideration of Taiwan until the very end of the 19th century 
when there was an increased interest in expanding colonial ambitions, although the Empire 
had official ruled the island since 1684. 
But Taiwan had been a focus of international attention since 16th century. In 1583, a 
Portuguese vessel sighted Taiwan and named the island Formosa and, in 1626, a Spanish 
vessel landed on Taiwan. Following their successful colonisation of the Philippines, the 
Spanish were determined to increase their presence in the region, hoisting the flag of Castile 
over the port of Keelung in north Taiwan, naming it San Salvador, and three years later, 
established the port of San Domingo in the northeast (Du, 2002). At that time, the 
Portuguese were attempting to monopolise trade with China from their base at Macao and 
both Spanish and Dutch traders were expanding trade links with Japan. Furthermore, the 
Dutch did not want to further lag behind in the contest for trade in the Far East (Song and Shi, 
2003). To compete with their Spanish and Portuguese rivals, the Dutch were determined to 
secure an island in the region, and Taiwan was the target. 
In 1624, the Dutch occupied Taiwan, established a capital on the south coast and, fifteen 
years later, expelled the Spanish and took control of the island. Labour was imported from 
China. The number of Chinese inhabitants rose from a starting level of 25,000 to 100,000 
by 1650 (Heyns, 2002). The Dutch introduced ranching practices from the East Indies and 
cultivation of sugar cane. During the Dutch occupation (1624 to 1662), the Dutch East India 
Company administered most sections of the island. 
Strategically, the primary reason for Dutch settlement in Taiwan was to serve as 
operational base to conduct trade between Mainland China, Japan and the Dutch East Indies - 
principally Java (Cheng, 1996). In particular, silk cloth, raw silk, gold and ceramics were 
imported from China and then exported to Japan, the East Indies and Holland. Similarly, 
spices, pepper, linen, cotton and opium were imported from the East Indies and then exported 
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to Japan and China. Moreover, deer products (such as hides, meat and horn) sugar and rice 
of Taiwan were exported to Japan, China and even Persia. At the same time, trade between 
the Dutch and the local residents increased steadily. The Dutch considered their possession 
of Taiwan as a highly successful venture. 
However, events in China were to seal the destiny of the Dutch adventure in Taiwan. In 
1662, the old Chinese Empire was overturned by the Manchu from the north, resulting in a 
mass exodus overseas. One leader of this group, named Cheng Cheng-kung, but known in 
the west as Koxinga, left for Taiwan and ended Dutch control on the island. Koxinga was 
the son of a pirate leader, based in Taiwan before the Dutch administration, and together they 
owned the finest fleet in the East Asian area. They controlled much of China's trade, and the 
family was extremely rich and powerful (Xia and Zhang, 1992). Koxinga brought a large 
number of scholars and religious officials, as well as their dependents, to Taiwan and Chinese 
culture became established on the island. After Koxinga defeated the Dutch, immigration 
from China to Taiwan accelerated markedly despite the policy by the new Chinese Empire to 
isolate Koxinga from the mainland (Cao, 1961). The new Chinese immigrants developed 
agriculture, and brought skilled farmers from China to exploit the island. The increasing 
amount of cultivated land allowed the island to become self-sufficient in food and, despite the 
loss of trade with China, the local economy of Taiwan flourished. 
In 1684, the Chinese Empire successfully took over Taiwan from Koxinga's grandson. 
From then until 1886, Taiwan was a prefecture of Fujian province, just across the Taiwan 
Straits. However, despite several attempts to prevent sedition against the central government, 
Taiwan was largely ungoverned during this time. In order to reduce the governance cost on 
the island, immigration to Taiwan was prohibited, although this continued illegally (Chen, 
1990; Xu, 1988). According to Japanese estimates, the Chinese population in Taiwan at the 
beginning of the 19th century was two million, concentrated in the western coastal plains (Lee 
and Liu, 1998). Taiwanese commerce during this period relied almost exclusively on 
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agriculture. In order to finance and develop agricultural production on Taiwan, a land tenure 
system was developed in which wealthy Chinese investors provided capital and protection 
from hostile aborigines to settlers who cleared and farmed the land in return for a perpetual 
lease payment of a fixed amount (Chen, 1995). This system of ownership acquired another 
level as the original settlers in turn subleased all or part of their land to subtenants. The 
result was a three-tiered land tenure system that included cultivators, tenant cultivators and 
landlords. 
However, the Western powers had not given up and again turned their attention to 
Taiwan in the 19th century. During the 1839-42 Opium Wars between China and Britain, 
British ships attacked Taiwan. The trade ban imposed by China since 1387 was repealed and 
Taiwan was again open to international trade. The great Western colonial import-export 
houses, such as Jardine & Matheson and Dent & Co., established subsidiaries there so as to 
utilize the potential of Taiwan for conducting trade in East Asia 1. Moreover, the British 
Imperial Court exploited the natural resources of Taiwan. Other foreign powers targeting the 
island were the American Navy's Indian Ocean fleet in 1874, and the French in 1884. The 
French occupation suffered from the violent resistance of the local Chinese, and from the 
well-calculated neutrality of Britain, which prohibited the access of French vessels to ports 
under its controls. Paris formally renounced its claims on Taiwan in 1885. 
By 1886, the Chinese Empire was finally aware of the importance of Taiwan and 
elevated its status to that of a province. At that time, the island had 2.5 million inhabitants 
(Chen, 1990). The political and commercial centre had moved from south to north Taiwan 
and in 1882, the prefecture of Taipei was established. As the first governor of Taiwan 
province, Liu Ming-Chuan launched vast projects to develop the infrastructure of the island. 
These included the first railway line and the first mechanical mine. 
1 See "International Traders in Taiwan", Investigation and Research Department, Chang-Hwa Commercial Bank, 
Taiwan, 1972. 
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Once Taiwan had reopened to international trade, sugar, tea, lumber, camphor and coal 
were the major exports and opium, cotton and woollen goods the principal imports2. 
Finished goods were imported rather than raw materials, because Taiwan had no real 
manufacturing facilities at that time. Chinese traders operating junks between Taiwan and 
mainland China supplemented the trade conducted by Western traders (Chen, 1991). The 
Chinese Empire did little to modernise or diversify the Taiwanese economy, and many 
officials sent from Beijing were incompetent, corrupt and uninterested in improving the 
economic conditions (Tang, 1988). Only in the very late 19th century, did the Chinese 
Imperial Government attempt to improve the local infrastructure, leaving the island 
economically backward by world standards at the start of the 20`h century. 
Defeat for China in the Sino-Japanese war resulted in Taiwan being ruled by the 
Japanese between 1895 until the end of WWII. This half-century of Japanese occupation left 
profound marks on the way of life, culture, and even on the mentality of the Taiwanese. 
During this time, the economy of Taiwan improved considerably'. Most importantly, the 
infrastructure was enhanced and the local economy changed from subsistence agriculture to 
one that benefited from foreign trade with mainland Japan. Railways, roads, irrigation and 
flood control barriers were constructed, a police force established, electricity and a tax system 
were introduced. In terms of foreign trade, imports from Japan were mostly textiles, 
fertilisers and industrial goods, while exports from Taiwan included rice, sugar and processed 
food, and industrial capacity increased. Some heavy industries were created and small and 
medium sized industries flourished, such as shipbuilding and refining major activities. 
Unfortunately, during the Second World War infrastructure and industry were seriously 
damaged and the economy of Taiwan was in a perilous state when the island was returned to 
2 The estimation is based on "Tables of Taiwanese Trade (1896-1948)", Statistic and Accounting Department, 
Taiwan Province Government, Taiwan, 1960. 
3 See "Features of Taiwanese Economy in Japanese Occupied Period", Financial Research Center, Bank of 
Taiwan, Taipei, 1957. 
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China in 1945. 
The Economic History of Taiwan after WWII' 
After the war, the disputes on mainland China between the Communists of Chairmen Mao 
and the Nationalists of Chiang Kai-shek again had a major impact on Taiwan. The 
Nationalists withdrew to Taiwan, not only leading to the de facto creation of the state of 
Taiwan but also altering the demographic structure: two million mainlanders followed the 
Nationalists to Taiwan. Unlike the previous Chinese immigrants, the origins of these people 
were not limited to the southern provinces but came from all over China with diverse 
backgrounds and skills. 
The Nationalists faced an incredible challenge to establish a government in Taiwan. To 
resist the Communists and even to fight for the return of the mainland, military expenditure 
accounted for between 80 and 90% of total government expenditure through the 1950s (Liu 
and Wang, 1992). At the same time, the influx of refugees created a huge burden on local 
industrial and agricultural capacity. The original economy of Taiwan, which was structured 
to depend on trade with mainland China or Japan in terms of exports of agriculture, foods and 
imports of finished goods, collapsed and new trading partners were necessary as well as a 
plan for economic developments. 
Three crucial issues account for the recovery in the first phase of economic recovery and 
development in Taiwan (Sun, 1995). Firstly, American assistance from 1950 injected 
considerable capital and other resources into the island, largely to repair the war damage. 
Second, a series of land reforms were introduced. These had three components: rent 
reductions, the sale of public land and a scheme to redistribute land from landlords to tenant 
4 The statistical data in this section is taken from the "Economical Yearbook of Republic of China", 1990 edition, 
Directorate General of Budget Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Central Government of Taiwan. s See "Post-War Taiwanese Economy", monographs published in a series of Taiwan study, no. 4, Taiwan 
research center of Xia-Men University, Xia-Men, Fujian, China, 1982. 
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farmers. The last of these was not surprisingly controversial, but it resulted in increased 
productivity, with landlords compensated and encouraged to begin to develop industrial 
capacity (Xiong, 1989). Finally, import-substitution policies were introduced and import 
tariffs, import quotas and currency controls were used to increase domestic production. In 
particular, the government imposed strict foreign exchange control. From the mid-1950s, 
the domestic output of Taiwanese industries met local market demand in many products, such 
as textiles, bicycles and flour, with annual growth rates of GDP around 7.6% for this period. 
The next major phase of economic development was between 1960 and 1986, during 
which time the economy shifted from one based on import-substitution to one that was more 
export-driven, largely based on the argument that an import-substitution strategy was 
impossible on the island with such a small domestic market and low per capita income (Sun, 
1991). This reversal was highly successful and between 1962 and 1972, the annual rate of 
exporting growth was consistently greater than 30% and GDP growth of 9.1%. 
With the exception of the devalued New Taiwanese Dollar (NTD) and the strict exchange 
control, the success of the export-driven policy can be ascribed to the government policy of 
providing low cost capital and tax incentives to exporters, and duty-free imports of raw 
materials used for further exports. Export cartels were also formed under government 
encouragement and the amount of imported consumer goods was constrained to save capital 
and foreign exchange for intermediate goods. At the time too, the native Taiwanese business 
community began to evolve and expand (Chen, 1998). Native Taiwanese entrepreneurs, who 
had been educated in Japan and were used to dealing with foreign investors, came to dominate 
the private sector of the economy. They had the advantage of being able to communicate 
with Japanese businessman, and to set up networks and alliances. The foreign cooperation 
between the Taiwanese and the Japanese or the Americans enhanced the local economy and 
resulted in increased savings, investment and trade. 
To consolidate the advantages of this phase of economic development, a new plan was 
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launched in 1988 to make the transition from a local to a modern, developed economy and to 
encourage the more capital-intensive, high value-added industries (Wu, 1994). This plan 
included the liberalisation of many sectors and research and development expenditure on 
technology and innovation. Finally, in an effort to stimulate industrial performance, tariffs 
were reduced, import controls were lifted, and restrictions of foreign companies entering 
certain sectors were eliminated. 
Industrial Transformation6 
During the process of industrialisation, domestic manufacturing gradually shifts from 
consumer goods to capital products (Lavigne, 1995). Fifty years after the Second World War, 
industrialisation of the Taiwanese economy was complete and reflected in the structure of 
manufacturing change, measured by the proportion of consumption goods to capital goods 
(see Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1). For Taiwan, consumption goods include food, beverages, 
textiles, leather, clothes and furniture, while capital products are generally chemicals, 
chemical materials, metal and metal materials, machines, transport and plastics. 
6 For reference see: Kuznets, S., "Growth and Structural Shifts", Economic Growth and Structural Change in Taiwan: the Postwar Experience of the Republic of China, Galenson Walter eds, Cornell University Press, 1979. 
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1971 72457 60703 1.19 84 923145 1285239 0.72 
72 97065 76828 1.26 85 928240 1301168 0.71 
73 129592 106166 1.22 86 992791 1454760 0.68 
74 157371 142837 1.1 87 1043573 1623359 0.64 
75 174799 149324 1.17 88 1006010 1837782 0.55 
76 216719 196612 1.1 89 1043898 1973545 0.53 
77 249013 239588 1.04 90 1032263 1980960 0.52 
78 290417 324302 0.9 91 1110362 2201009 0.5 
79 319562 436940 0.73 92 1063031 2257127 0.47 
81 723678 1027626 0.7 93 1024445 2352452 0.44 
82 731054 1005256 0.73 94 1059383 2618483 0.4 
83 780327 1141506 0.68 95 1073959 2940716 0.37 
(Unit: Million NT$) 
Note: Consumption goods include food, beverages, textiles, leather, clothes and furniture; Capital goods include 
chemicals, chemical materials, metal, metal materials, machines, transport and plastics; Ratio is consumptive 
products value to capital products value. 
Source: Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1996, Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan, 
Central Government of Taiwan. 









71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 
Note: Horizontal axis indicates specific year 1971-95; Vertical axis indicates the annual ratio of output value 
between consumption goods and capital goods in Taiwan. 
Source: Table 1.1 
As shown in Table 1.1, the ratio of the value of output of consumption goods to capital 
goods fell from 1.19 in 1971 to 0.37 in 1995. The improvement is even more evident in 
Figure 1.1 as the speed of the downturn accelerates from 1975 to 1980, indicating that this 
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period was decisive in the transition of the economy. 
The Nature of Commercial Customs in Taiwan 
A number of aspects of Taiwanese business practice reflect culture, tradition and the 
importance of family and religion, some of which will explored in the following sections. 
Confucianism and Guanxi 
While not technically a religion, Confucianism has both consciously and unconsciously 
influenced the attitude and behavior of the business community in most Chinese-based 
societies including Taiwan (Huang, 2000). Confucianism developed from a set of ethical 
rules taught by Confucius and defines a moral and ethical code that is appropriate to maintain 
a relationship with others. This classifies human relationships into the five categories and 
accordingly sets the principles to harmonise these relationships. Confucianism teaches that 
each person has a place in a hierarchical society and the preservation of this hierarchical order 
is of paramount importance for social harmony. Within this Confucian society, relationships 
between members are mostly vertical rather than horizontal. 
Confucianism has been adopted for over two thousand years in mainland China, but has 
spread though emigration and general communication between countries and is now popular 
in many neighbouring countries such as Japan, Korea and South-East Asia. Although this 
closed and rigid structure of hierarchies can restrain individuality, other ethics such as the 
stress on societal harmony, discipline, and a respect for work, have attributed to the economic 
success of many Asian societies over the last century (Yeung and Tung, 1996). 
The citizens in most Confucian societies, including Taiwan, emphasize and utilize 
personal relationships to demonstrate individual social position. Moreover, individual 
relationships are commonly involved in commercial activities in action. The personal 
relationship able to effectively interfere in the commercial consideration is usually called as 
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Guanxi, which is the Chinese word for relation. 
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In Chinese style commerce, the special 
relationship between two people, which is referred as the Guanxi, usually allows each to 
demand special consideration, benefits and favours from the other (Kipins, 1997). In most 
cases, the strongest Guanxi exists between blood relations, followed by the relations between 
classmates and residents of same town or province (Fan, 2002). Particularly, the Guanxi 
relationship is reciprocal - each person in the relationship is obligated to offer favours to the 
counterpart, and meanwhile, is owned favours from the other (Hwang, 1987; Liu, 1983). 
Guanxi relationships have operated in Confucian societies for many centuries, and have 
created extensive personal networks of mutual dependence amongst local businesses, thus 
preserving social stability. 
Guanxi can contribute to commercial success and can provide a comparative advantage 
to those in the network (Luo, 1997). Close ties with family, classmates and colleagues ease 
business and allow for special treatment to those in the group. Therefore considerable time 
and effort is devoted to developing such networks and these informal contacts have great 
importance. This is reflected by a preference for short, generally-worded agreements, as 
well as a proclivity to ignore agreements once they are executed. Indeed, the custom of 
relying on Guanxi to finalise a commercial arrangement is frequently more acceptable than 
aspects of the legal system in business disputes (Xin & Pearce, 1996). A Guanxi proponent 
explaining the attitude of the business community in Taiwanese notes that: during the process 
of cultivating Guanxi within business relationships, customer loyalty evolves naturally, while 
bonds are created with suppliers and with creditors (Financial limes, 27/11/00). 
The Family 
The family is another element at the centre of Confucianism, which has extended into 
commerce. To understand the impact of Chinese society on an economy like Taiwan, it is 
necessary to understand the primacy of the family as a social institution in traditional Chinese 
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culture (Leung, 1995). Although the contemporary family structure has changed 
considerably in recent years (for example: smaller family sizes, the disappearance of the clan 
structure, and even the extent to which children are influenced by school rather than by the 
home), several traditional aspects remain. 
In common with most Confucian societies, the role of the family in Taiwan is primarily 
to continue the ancestral line, and this requires males to pass the family name to the next 
generation. It is thus the male that has the power to determine family issues (Huang, 1999). 
Respect for age is another core value, whether between parents and children or amongst 
siblings. These are both examples of hierarchical relationships between people, which help 
to maintain social stability and harmonisation. This is enhanced by the conception that 
family members are not primarily defined as an individual, but as the obligatory role of father, 
mother, spouse, elder brother or sister or younger brother or sister. Accordingly, the name of 
members of the Taiwanese family is composed of the family name first, the generation name 
second and the individual name last. 
The importance of these aspects of culture and custom in Taiwan is central to a number 
of aspects of the thesis. Links between the relationships with the family are extended to the 
networks and hierarchies in business and will impact on the analysis that follows (Yeh, 1991). 
For example, a manager of a small business would compare this role to that of the family, 
both in the decision-making role of the head of the firm and the responsibility shown towards 
employees. It is clear that features such as the observance of hierarchy, the quest for 
harmony, and the respect for the elders have implications, one of which is the difficulty young 
or less experienced managers have in business organisations. Furthermore, there is a 
tendency to demur to senior members of the firm, regardless of the degree of competence or 
knowledge (Heller, 1991). 
Chapter 1- Context of Study 
The Financial Markets in Taiwan? 
The Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) 
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No securities transactions took place in Taiwan during the period of Japanese control, but 
following the reforms after WWII, privatisation and land reform created the need for 
establishing financing channels for firms (whether under private or public ownership), and a 
rudimentary market for securities trading was established. Initially, this was highly 
unorganised and lacked any formal legal or other institutions, until the government introduced 
a more orderly stock market in 1959, enhanced by an official authority, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, in 1960. The Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TSE), which is 
responsible for conducting security transactions, was founded in 1961. Since that time, the 
securities market in Taiwan has grown gradually and is now an established and well organised 
institution. 
The TSE is the sole centralised securities market in Taiwan. The operational aspects 
have improved considerably since its establishment and the service provided to market 
participants has improved considerably. . The early method of trading was based on 
traditional out-cry methods, although this has now been completely replaced by the 
Automated Securities Trading System, which allows matching of transactions in a much more 
efficient way. There is evidence that the introduction of the new trading system has 
contributed greatly to the liquidity of the TSE. In addition, the Taiwan Securities Central 
Depository Corporation was launched in 1990 to provide the auxiliary service of central 
custodian for the securities trades within the TSE. 
Apart from the main list, a preliminary Over-the-Counter Securities Exchange began in 
1994, and provides a second financing channel for firms and also creates wider choices for 
investors. Furthermore, hedging instruments are traded on the Taiwan Futures Exchange 
This section of discussion relies on "Fact-Book of Taiwan Stock Market, 2000" and "Annual Report of Taiwan 
Stock Exchange Corporation, 2000", Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation. 
Chapter 1- Context of Study 20 
established in 1997 and in 1997 the Taiwan Rating Corporation opened, which was the first 
credit rating agency on the island. Other institutions to support the business sector are 
numerous banks, securities firms, insurance companies, investment funds or project financing 
corporations that are able to participate in the markets and provide independent assessments 
of firms trading on the exchange. 
While considerable progress has been made, the TSE is still at a developmental stage. 
Compared with global financial markets, the TSE is still a long way from the frontier in terms 
of transactions efficiency or market scale. Apart from its relatively short history, the market 
has been constrained by a number of factors. The most important of these is that many 
Taiwanese companies are still largely under family control, and this controlling family tends 
to be reluctant to sell shares to outsiders, since doing so could result in a loss of control over 
both management and finances. Moreover, Taiwanese companies customarily consider 
management as a family issue that can be solved within the members of controlling family, 
and are disinclined to either comply with disclosure requirements associated with a public 
listing or to pay dividends to shareholders. Furthermore, there is a widespread belief that the 
stock market in Taiwan is dominated by speculators, who have access to inside information, 
and are able to use this to take advantage of normal investors, thus causing price fluctuations 
and overall volatility. Given this high uncertainty about share prices, most investors view 
the stock market as a place to reap short-term speculative profits from price swings. This 
exacerbates market instability and harms investor confidence. Finally, the relatively brief 
history of the TSE means that there is a shortage of experienced brokers and managers. 
Thus, for the average investor, knowledge of the operational aspects of the financial markets 
is limited and there is a general wariness about taking an individual decision, leading to high 
levels of communal, or herd behaviour, none of which is conducive to price setting based on 
principles of market efficiency. 
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The Impact of Institutional Investors and Related Institutions 
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Before 1990s, shareholding by foreign institutions was forbidden. But in 1991 this 
restriction was removed and both domestic and foreign institutions have since operated on the 
TSE. However, prior to active trading, foreign institutional investors require permission 
from the Security & Futures Commission and the Central Bank in the form of a Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) certificate8. 
However, in order to prevent potential conflicts of interest, the Security & Exchange 
Law prohibited institutional investors from simultaneously operating any business relating to 
security transactions. In a relative small and nascent financial market like the TSE, 
institutional investors were limited to constructing efficient investment portfolios, simply to 
diversify risk. Therefore, most security institutions in Taiwan would prefer to be a broker 
rather than to invest directly in the market. Since 1988, this constraint has been removed, 
making it is possible for an institutional investor to perform multiple roles, such as those of 
underwriter, dealer, broker, investment-trust manager and investment consultant. In addition, 
domestic institutional investors have been allowed to issue their own securities. This 
encourages the security institutions to act as efficient and proactive investors in the market. 
The result of this liberalisation is that the market value of these publicly-listed security firms 
is not solely dependent on their brokerage business, but also on their profits from investment 
activity. 
Given the level of development of the financial markets in Taiwan, the participation of 
banks may be useful as an efficient source of market discipline. The 1988 revision in the 
Security & Exchange Law allows banks to function as institutional investors and also brokers. 
Before that, all banking institutions in Taiwan were banned from any form of investment in 
the capital markets in order to maintain their neutrality and protect the interests of general 
S The trading constraint of QFII certificate toward foreign institutions has been further canceled since 
4'"/October/2003. 
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depositors.. The series of reform that liberalised banking activity and provided them with the 
opportunity to investment in securities, has strengthened the confidence of individual 
investors with regard to accountability and transparency and improve the efficiency of the 
capital market. 
The Development of Securities Business 
Table 1.2 shows the growth in securities between 1989 and 2000. It is clear that after 
financial sector deregulation, securities firms diversified into a number of different areas of 
business. The number of brokers declined steadily, while the number of dealers and 
investment-trust firms increased, revealing a clear shift from a single capacity system to the 
much broader model of institutional investor. At the same time, the market is becoming 
more concentrated, with fewer large firms and more subsidiaries. This is a period of general 
reorganisation and the increased internationalisation of the TSE has resulted in a much greater 
level of competition between foreign and domestic institutions, although there are differences 
in the direction of their respective businesses. Most of the foreign institutions are interested 
in Taiwan as an investment opportunity in a newly-emerging market, and domestic firms have 
consolidated through mergers and acquisitions in order to be able to compete with the 
large-scale international investment organisations. 
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säble 1. z. securities rlrms in taiwa n, tyay - Luuu 
Year No. of Secu rities Firne Brokers Dealer Underwriter Investment bwestment 
Headquareern Branches Trusts Consultant 
1989 259 28 250 31 41 4 50 
1990 381 30 371 37 60 4 73 
1991 353 74 340 55 61 4 80 
1992 294 133 277 68 59 15 78 
1993 272 189 254 68 57 15 87 
1994 262 235 245 72 57 15 95 
1995 247 320 232 72 55 15 102 
1996 229 420 212 79 58 19 115 
1997 221 663 199 95 71 24 147 
1998 215 911 188 108 81 29 196 
1999 212 987 184 112 84 36 219 
2000 190 1092* 158 105 75 38** 238 
Source: Important Market Indicators of lit, vecember / luuu, ýecurny a ruture t-uinnnbsºun, ivniu «y VL 
Finance, Executive Yuan, Taiwan. 
* At the end of 2000, there were 13 foreign securities branches and 4 foreign representative offices. 
* *At the end of 2000, there were 38 investment trust companies, which had issued 301 mutual funds in total. 
The Weak Market Position of Institutional Investors in the TSE 
According to the statistics of the market regulator (Security and Future Commission SFC), 
institutional investors are not the major source of capital on the TSE. This is contrary to 
most capital markets in developed countries where the institutional investors are the dominant 
form of capital provision. Between 1996 and 2000, individual investors were consistently 
the major providers of capital (see Table 1.3), with the institutional investors second. Note 
that the institutional investors included in the table are a combination of government agencies, 
domestic and foreign financial institutions and domestic and foreign firms. 
Table 1.3. Capita l Source Analysis by Lis ted Companies in TSE f rom 1996 to 2000 
Year Individual Investors Institutional Investors" Investment Funds 
1996 57.96% 37.90% 4.14% 
1997 57.76% 38.25% 3.99% 
1998 59.65% 37.59% 2.76% 
1999 59.01% 37.53% 3.46% 
2000 56.13% 39.96% 3.91% 
Source: Taiwan Stoc k Exchanee Statistical Data 20 01. Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation. 
* The institutional investor includes government agencies, domestic financial institutions, foreign financial 
institutions, domestic corporations and foreign corporations. 
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Viewed by the value of market trading in Table 1.4, the weak presence of the institutional 
investor in the TSE is even more conspicuous. Despite a capital contribution of almost 40%, 
their total trading amounted to a maximum of 14% throughout the 1990s. The reason for the 
difference may also be related to the incentive for long-term investment that consolidates the 
controlling structure for a particular firm. 
Fable 1.4. Investors Composition by Trading Value on TSE 1991 - 2000 
Year Institutiona l Imresters Individual Investors 
Domestic Fore ign Domestic Foreign 
Amount Percentage Amount Percentage Amount Percentage Amount 
1991 620.6 3 11 0.1 19,829.00 96.9 1.08 
1992 452.7 3.6 31.6 0.1 11,953.80 96.1 1.14 
1993 993.2 5.4 89.7 03 17,415.10 94.1 1.68 
1994 2.261.00 52 264.5 0.7 36,415.20 933 332 
1995 1,378.30 6.7 284 1.4 18,940.00 919 2.61 
1996 2,265.40 8.6 556.7 2.1 23,445.20 893 2.67 
1997 5,694.90 7.6 1,289.00 1.7 68,428.20 90.7 10.85 
1998 5,14430 8.6 964.8 1.6 53,480.50 89.7 9.08 
1999 5,52050 9.4 1,420.10 2.4 52,043.20 88.2 8.11 
2000 6,306.50 103 2,222.20 3.6 52,855.30 86.1 5.7 
(Unit: Billion NT$) 
Source: Important Market Indicators of TSE, December / 2000, Security & Future Commission, Ministry of 
Finance, Executive Yuan, Taiwan. 
Growth of Institutional Investors 
As shown in table 1.4, while the trading volume of institutional investors in the TSE is 
relatively low compared with the figures for individual investors, there is a clear growth trend 
during the 1990s. Furthermore, this trend is not only reflected in trading values, but is also 
in the higher share of institutional trade in total. Although the financial crisis of 1997-1998 
had some impact, both domestic and foreign institutional investment recovered quickly and 
continued to grow. It appears that although making a late entry to the Taiwan markets, 
foreign institutional investors have been highly active in the Taiwan market. From 1991 to 
2000, the percentage of foreign institutional investment in the total trading amount of TSE has 
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increased from 0.1% to 3.6%. Domestic institutional investors also grew rapidly during this 
time, increasing from 3% of total trading in 1991 to 10.3% in 2000, in this case largely 
following deregulation and the move to multiple operations. 
The Investment Strategies of Domestic and Foreign Institutions 
Within the general category of institutional investor, domestic and foreign firms differ in their 
investment strategy. Foreign institutions are more concerned with the fundamentals of target 
equities, whilst domestic investors concentrate on technical analysis to guide investment 
decisions. Often there are conflicting results. Business Weekly (28, Aug, 2001), a local 
Taiwanese business newspaper, reported that domestic and foreign institutional investors 
reacted adversely towards the merger between Acer and Sertek, two listed companies on the 
TSE. Before the merger, these two companies were closely associated although operating in 
different product markets. Sertek was the electronics section of Acer but became 
independent in 1976. Since then, Acer had been the biggest shareholder of Sertek, holding 
over 30% of the shares in the first quarter of 2000. After the merger announcement, most 
domestic institutional investors reacted positively toward the issue and bought shares in the 
new, combined company Acer. In contrast, most foreign institutional investors reacted 
negatively toward the merger and sold their holdings of Acer. The view of market analysts 
of the negative attitude of foreign institutions to this merger was that they could not see the 
opportunity to achieve fundamental improvements for both companies since they were in 
different market sectors, they already had a close relationship for a long time and no 
additional synergies were expected. 
The Investment Strategies of Institutional and Individual Investors 
Despite the relatively ineffectual role of institutional investors in Taiwan, in terms of both 
volume and participation levels, they still have some influence on individual investments and 
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in determining market prices. Chang et al (2000) studied herd behaviour in the equity 
markets of five countries including Taiwan. Based on data from January 1976 to December 
1995, they found that the participants in the Taiwan stock market behaved remarkably 
similarly with respect to their investment decisions. This study covered a period prior to 
liberalisation and the opening-up to the international community, and investment patterns 
were common to both groups. In addition, macroeconomic conditions, rather than 
firm-specific information, tended to have a more significant impact on investor behaviour. 
This suggests that, while individual investors are the major source of capital, decisions are not 
purely made on firm-level information. Rather, investors rely on general awareness of the 
economy that is not purely rational, but could be explained by the prevalence, common in 
newly emerging markets, of asymmetric information. Even though individuals have 
resources and a willingness to invest, they do not feel confident about the level of information 
available for individual firms. 
All these features of the Taiwan stock market provide a favourable environment for 
institutional investors, which are better able to overcome the information asymmetries and 
make the most profitable investments. Furthermore, the superior abilities of institutional 
investors lead individuals to follow and therefore institutional investors are able to influence 
the trading decisions of individuals leading to a continuation of the herd behaviour found 
earlier. 
The Future of Institutional Investors in Taiwan 
At the moment, institutional investors are not major players in the Taiwan capital markets but 
signs indicate this will change in the future. With increasing levels of international 
expansion in Taiwanese companies, managers will be keen to attract the attention of the 
financial institutions as a source of funding, especially those able to raise foreign capital. 
Oxelheim et al. (2001) have argued that gaining and maintaining a global presence and the 
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availability to raise foreign capital is one of the most important factors in corporate 
international expansion. Companies are more likely to engage in foreign investment when it 
has retained one of the prominent international financial institutions as its advisor. For 
Taiwanese firms, the support and recommendation of international investing institutions is the 
best way to bridge the gap between themselves and global capital. 
However, in order to attract foreign investment, Taiwanese companies may need to 
switch from their traditional way of conducting business to a more transparent approach. It 
has been reported (Business Weekly, 20, March, 2002) that the chairman of a leading 
electronics company in Taiwan, a stereotypical older-generation entrepreneur, rigid, strict and 
reluctance to communicate, attended a conference in Hong Kong and made a speech in 
English for first time in his life. This individual was famous for his rigid attitude towards 
investors, and had even declared publicly that his company could survive without external 
finance. However, the purpose of the Hong Kong trip was reportedly explicitly to attract 
investment from foreign institutional investors for his latest expansion project. The report 
commented that it would be difficult in the current climate for any company to compete 
internationally without a global capital source, and personal contact between corporate 
chairman and investors was essential to earn the trust of foreign institutional investor. 
Internationalisation of Taiwanese Firms 
International Trade9 
Given its small geographical area, relatively high population and scarce resources, Taiwan is 
highly trade-dependent, especially with mainland China, Japan and the US. Fortunately, 
Taiwan is a very successful trading nation, with annual exports amounting to US$1228.7 
billon and imports of US$ 1072.4 billion in 2001. Table 1.5 shows in a global ranking of 
9 Discussion in this section relies on "Annual Report of Bureau of Foreign Trade", 2001 edition, Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Executive Yuan, Taiwan. 
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national trading values, Taiwan was 15th in 1999,14`h in 2000 and 16th in 2001, similar to that 
of Singapore and Spain. 
Table 1.5. The Ton Twenty Trading Nations. 1999-2001 
Ranking. 
-Nation 
Value Nation value Nation value 
I US 17,613 US 20,404 US 19,100 
2 Germany 10,164 Germany 10,457 Germany 10,575 
3 Japan 7,277 Japan 8.587 Japan 7,528 
4 France 5,974 UK 6,159 France 5,946 
5 UK 3,862 France 6,100 UK 5.883 
6 Italy 4,553 Canada 3,155 China 5,101 
7 Canada 4,532 Italy 4780 Canada 4,816 
8 Holland 3,906 China 4,534 Italy 4748 
9 China 3,609 HK 4,147 HK 4,110 
10 HK 3,534 Holland 4,064 Holland 3,910 
11 Belgium 3,436 Belgium 3,649 Belgium 3,691 
12 Mexico 2,784 Mexico 3,409 Mexico 3,268 
13 SouthKorea 2,634 SouthKorea 3,327 SouthKorea 2,915 
14 Spain 2,544 Taiwax 2,883 Spain 2,688 
13 Taiwan 2$23 Singapore 2,724 Singapore 2,378 
16 Singapore 2,257 Spain 2,662 Taiwan 2$01 
17 Sweden 1,534 Malaysia 1,802 Malaysia 1,619 
18 Switzerland 1,516 Sweden 1,596 Switzerland 1,532 
19 Malaysia 1,500 Switzerland 1,510 Russia 1,408 
20 Austria 1,337 Russsia 1,370 Sweden 1,378 
Global 109329 Global 122,516 Global 117,950 
(Unit: Thousand Million US$; Value = Import + Export) 
Source: Statistical Tables (International Trade) - Economic Statistic Annual, 2003 edition, Ministry of Economic 
Affairs Executive Yuan, Taiwan. 
After the separation with China following WWII, the US and Japan became the two most 
important trading partners of Taiwan during the1950s to 1990s. In particular, the American 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) programme in the post-War period, which granted 
duty reductions on imports from developing countries, was one of the main reasons for 
Taiwan economic policy to move from import-substitution to export-promotion in the 1960s. 
Since that time, Taiwan has maintained a close commercial relationship with America, and 
trade is heavily reliant on the American market. Trade with the US peaked in the late 1980s, 
and in 1988, Taiwan was the So' largest trading partner of the US, acquiring a trade surplus of 
US$10.4 and accounting for nearly 40% of Taiwanese exports. The US have reduced their 
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trading deficit by urging the Taiwanese government to cut import barriers and open their 
domestic market, but the increasing imports from the US have further strengthened the 
commercial relationship. 
Next to the US, Japan was the second largest trading partner prior to 2001. The strong 
trading relationship between Taiwan and Japan is largely due to historical and geographic 
reasons. Taiwanese companies have acquired sophisticated technology, industrial facilities 
and components, making Japan the major supplier for many firms. Compared with the trade 
relationship with the US, Taiwan has tended to maintain a bilateral trading deficit with Japan. 
Trade with Europe had traditionally been hindered by the distances involved and by the 
differences in culture, and subsequently there was little trading activity for a long time. But 
the worrying dependence on US trade in the 1980s has led to efforts to encourage a 
relationship with European countries. This has been largely successful. According to the 
Bureau of Foreign Trade statistics, the trade values rose 63.4% from 1986 to 1987 and 
achieved a further 35% percent of annual growth in 1988. It is now common for European 
businesses to tender for large infrastructure contracts in Taiwan, such as hydroelectric 
equipment and transport systems, which were previously limited to US and Japan vendors. 
Table 1.6 reports the values of exports, imports and the trade surpluses of Taiwan with the US, 
Japan and the EU countries between 1997 and 2002. In terms of exports, the US continues 
to be the most important market, followed by the EU and then Japan, whereas the ranking 
changes with respect to imports. 
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tame i. o. Taiwan t raue witn ub, japan an a hu, ui--uui 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Total Export 1,221 1,106 1,216 1.483 1,229 1,306 
Import 1,144 1,047 1,107 1,400 1,072 1,125 
Net Trade 77 59 109 83 156 181 
US Export 296 294 309 348 277 268 
Import 232 197 197 251 182 181 
Net Trade 63 97 112 97 94 87 
Japan Export 117 93 119 166 128 120 
Import 290 270 306 386 258 273 
Net Trade -173 -177 -187 -220 -131 -153 
EU Export 172 185 191 222 184 169 
Import 179 176 144 155 128 120 
Net Trade -7 8 46 67 55 49 
(Unit: 1 housand million USS) 
Sources: Statistical Tables (International Trade) - Economic Statistic Annual, 2003, Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
International Trade Statistics, Financial Statistics Monthly Report, May 2003, Ministry of Finance, Executive Yuan, Taiwan. 
Although there are political conflicts between Taiwan and China, there are clear signs of 
economic integration between them. This economic integration has resulted in mainland 
China being one of Taiwan's most important trading partners, even though much of this trade 
is indirect and conducted through Hong Kong and Singapore. This trading arrangement 
began in the late 1980s at a time when Taiwan faced pressure from the US to reduce the 
bilateral trade gap and look elsewhere for new markets. The government response was to 
allow indirect trade between Taiwan and China, which was achieved very successfully 
although there is now a higher level of dependency on these markets. Evidence of this is 
shown by a rise from 9% of exports to China in 1991 to 17% in 1996 and by 2002, China has 
overtaken the US as the primary markets for Taiwan exports. 
Table 1.7 shows the extent of indirect exports to China, most of which go through Hong 
Kong. This trade grew steadily, with the exception of the 1997-8 financial crisis and the 
recession in 2001. However, since the return of Hong Kong to Chinese control in 1997, the 
Taiwanese business community appear wary of the new levels of governance and the indirect 
benefit from trade through Hong Kong has slowed considerably. 
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Table 1.7. Direct and Indirect Taiwanese Trade with China. 1987-2002 
31 
Year Total Trade with China The Trade through Hong Kong 
Total Export tease Rate (%) Indirect Export Indirect Import Net Trade 
1987 1,227 51.2 1,227 289 938 
1988 2,224 81.4 2,242 479 1,764 
1989 3,245 45.9 2,897 587 2,310 
1990 4.171 28.6 3,278 765 2,513 
1991 6,928 66.1 4,667 1,126 3,541 
1992 9,697 40 6,288 1,119 5,169 
1993 12,728 31.3 7,585 1,104 6,482 
1994 14,653 15.1 8,517 1.292 7.225 
1995 17.898 22.2 9,883 1,574 8,309 
1996 19.148 7 9.718 1,582 8,135 
1997 20,518 7.2 9,715 1,744 7,971 
1998 18,380 -10.4 8,364 1,655 6,709 
1999 21.221 15.5 8.175 1,628 6,547 
2000 26,144 23.2 9,593 1,981 7,613 
2001 24,061 -8 8,812 1,693 7,118 
2002 29,446 22.4 10,312 1,708 8,604 
(Unit: Million US$) 
Source: Statistical Tables (International Trade) - Economic Statistic Annual, 2003 edition, Ministry of Economic 
Affairs Executive Yuan, Taiwan. 
Foreign Investment10 
The Taiwanese government has actively encouraged inward foreign investment since the late 
1940s, when a comprehensive scheme of benefits and incentives was established. The 
presence of foreign investors has played a critical role in the economic transform of Taiwan, 
providing capital, technology and experience to assist industrialisation. Between 1952 and 
1964, the value of foreign investment into Taiwan was approximately US$93 million and 
increased to US$466 million between 1965 and 1970. Between 1952 and 1981, US$3114 
million has been invested in Taiwan from overseas. However, since the mid 1980s, 
increasing labour costs and a strong currency have made inward investment less attractive 
while, at the same time, a highly skilled workforce and the introduction of quality technology 
has resulted in Taiwanese firms themselves looking overseas for cheaper resources. 
According to the World Investment Report (2002), over 90% of global outward foreign 
10 The discussion relies on "Annual Report of Approval Statistics: Inward, Outward Investment and Investment 
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direct investment (FDI) now comes from the developed countries of North America and 
Western Europe and the IMF (World Economic Outlook, 2002) indicates that the emerging 
and developing countries are following the same pattern, with over 60% of FDI from this 
group coming from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea. Data from the 
Investment Commission of Taiwan shows that, between 1991 and 1995, the annual mean 
outward FDI from Taiwan was US$24.5 thousand million, or nearly 1% of global outward 
FDI. From 1995 to 2000, annual mean outward FDI value from Taiwan was almost double 
reaching US$48.1 thousand million although the share fell to 0.88%. But clearly, Taiwan 
has been one of the 20 largest capital exporting countries in every year since 1991. In the 
past 20 years, Taiwan has moved from being a net recipient to one of the major FDI exporting 
countries. 
Table 1.8 shows the pattern of outward FDI from Taiwan to all countries, apart from 
China, between 1987 and 2002. With a few exceptions, this has grown at an average rate of 
46% per year. The main recipient is the US, with an increase from US$70 million in 1987 to 
US$1092 million in 2001. After the US, the South East Asian countries are a primary source 
of foreign investment opportunities, although this dropped during the period of the crisis. 
Obviously, the highly uncertain economic situation in the South East Asia was an effective 
deterrent. The large amounts of FDI that have flowed into tax-haven countries (such as 
those in Central America and the islands in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans) are not included 
in the Table. The Economic Daily, a local newspaper in Taiwan, claims the value of FDI 
invested in tax haven is even higher than the investment value into the US. FDI to Western 
Europe is low on all counts. 
to China", 2003 edition, Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Executive Yuan, Taiwan. 
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Table 1.8. Value of Outward FDI from Taiwan (excluding China), 1987-2002 
33 
Total Growth US Japan H. K. Singapore S. E. Asia Europe 
1987 102751 81% 70,058 3,481 1,283 1,301 14,787 199 
1988 218.736 113°/° 123,335 1,972 8,060 6,433 52.729 12,005 
1989 930.986 326% 508,732 335 10,372 5,209 276,873 2,333 
1990 1,552,206 67a/° 428,690 1,807 33,092 47,622 519,760 96,176 
1991 1,656,030 7°/° 297,795 3,431 199,630 12,540 690,097 60,289 
1992 887,259 -46% 193,026 5,321 54,447 8,790 300,336 45,933 
1993 1,660,935 871/6 529,063 63,297 161,918 69,473 364,170 255,913 
1994 1,616,764 -3% 143.884 22,731 127,284 100,732 296,999 22,209 
1995 1.356.878 -16°/° 248,213 8,811 99,555 31,649 294,449 59,868 
1996 2,165,404 600/0 271,329 6,798 59,927 164,978 422,290 11,875 
1997 2,893,826 34°/° 547,416 32,342 141,593 230,310 410,931 58,508 
1998 3,296,302 14% 598,666 29,596 68,643 158,176 319,318 33,828 
1999 3,269,013 -1°/° 445,081 121,867 100,318 324,524 197,656 60,982 
2000 5.077.062 550/0 861,638 312,222 47.512 219.531 169,915 36,751 
2001 4,391,654 -14% 1,092,747 169,033 94,901 378,301 145,038 45,594 
2002 3,370,046 -231/6 577,782 23,554 167,064 25,760 185,103 123.416 
Average 2.152,866 46°/. 433,591 50,412 85,975 111,583 291,278 57,867 
Pene"O 1000/0 - 20°! 0 21/6 4% 5% 14% 31/6 
(Unit: Thousand US$) 
Source: Statistical Tables (Investment) - Economic Statistic Annual, 2003, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
Executive Yuan, Taiwan. 
As with the trading relationship with China, Taiwan FDI to China is a fairly recent 
phenomenon, and this occurs mostly through Hong Kong and Singapore. The Investment 
Commission of Taiwan reports the average value of investment up to '2002 was US$2,773 
million and represents 49% of total FDI (see Table 1.9). However, this again creates a 
dependency that may be undesirable. This was made worse when funds withdrawn from 
South East Asia at the time of the crisis was redirected to China, such in 2001, FDI from 
Taiwanese firms to China amounted to US$6,723 million and made up the majority of all 
outward investment undertaken that year. 
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Table 1.9. Taiwanese Outward FDI by region, 1993-2001 
Year Total Overseas South East Asia China 
Value Growth Value Growth Value Growth 
1993 1,660,935 87/0 364,170 21% 3,168,411 1183% 
1994 1,616,764 -3% 296,999 -180/0 962,209 -70% 
1995 1,356,878 -16% 294,449 -1% 1,092,713 14% 
1996 2,165,404 60% 422,290 43% 4,334,313 297% 
1997 2,893,826 34% 410,931 -3% 2,034,621 -53% 
1998 3,296,302 14% 319,318 -22% 1,252,780 -38% 
1999 3,269,013 -1% 197,656 -38% 2,607,142 108% 
2000 5,077,062 55% 169,915 -14% 2,784,147 7% 
2001 4,391,654 -14% 145,038 -15% 6,723,058 141% 
Average 2,858,649 24% 291,196 -5% 2,773,266 177% 
34 
(Units: Thousand US$) 
Note: Values of "Total Overseas" excludes the investment in China. 
Source: Annual Report of Approval Statistics: Inward, Outward Investment and Investment to China, 2003 
edition, Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Executive Yuan, Taiwan. 
Finally, it is important to consider two further aspects of FDI: the distribution by 
industrial and by geographical region. Table 1.10 illustrates the distribution of FDI across 
industry in China between 1992 and 2001. As the table shows, these investments have 
changed from the traditional labour-intensive industries (such as food and plastics), to 
technology-intensive industries, and in particular to electronics. In 1992, the value of 
Taiwanese investment value in the food and plastics sectors was 19% and 18% of total 
investment respectively. However, in 2001, this fell to 2% and 6% of total investment value. 
In contrast, that directed to the electronics sector was 14% in 1992, and continually increased 
thereafter, with an accelerated growth rate following the Asian crisis, that reached 45% in 
2000. 
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Table 1.10. The Section al Distribu tion of Tai wanese FDI in China, 1992-2001 
Total Food Plastic Metal Electric Machinery Others 
1992 246.992 46,415 44,961 10,664 34,555 18,015 92,382 
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-- -- Percent 10% 12% 8% 14% 9% 47% 
1994 962.209 145,846 73,302 90,328 157,011 44,162 451,560 
Percent 15% 8% 9% 16% 5% 47% 
1995 1,092,713 117,447 62,736 116,805 214.796 29,454 551.475 
Percent 11% 6% 11% 20% 3% 50% 
1996 4.334.313 333,073 349.116 395,967 875,044 247,249 2,133,864 
Percent 8% 8% 9% 20% 6% 49% 









Percent 3% 3% 6% 37% 4% 46% 
1998 1,252,780 58,250 99,074 104,494 537,751 28,073 425,138 
Percent 5% 8% 8% 43% 2% 34% 
1999 2,607,142 43,253 184.776 183,854 1,464,775 84,797 645,687 
Percent 2% 7/0 7% 56% 3% 25% 
2000 2.784.147 58,420 156,067 193.797 1,254,834 125,997 995,032 
Percent 2% 6% 7% 45% 5% 36% 
2001 6.723,058 152,939 398,820 631.461 2,618.684 433,348 2,487,806 
Percent 2% 6% 90/0 39% 6% 37% 
(Units: Thousand US$) 
Source: Statistical Tables (Investment) - Economic Statistic Annual, 2003, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
Executive Yuan, Taiwan. 
The last Table presents the spatial distribution of Taiwanese investment in China. In 
Table 1.11 it is clear that between 1992 and 2001, investment in China has shifted from the 
provinces on the south coast to those in the central coastal regions. In 1992, the value of 
investment in the south coast area, including the provinces of Guandong, Fujian and Hainan, 
was approximately 57% of the total. By 2001, this share of the total had dropped by 39% in 
favour of the mid-coastal provinces, particularly Jiangsu close to Shanghai, and which 
accounted for nearly half of Taiwanese investment to China. 
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fable 1.11 . The Geog raphical Distribution of Taiwanes e FDI in Ch ina 1992-21W! 
Total South Coast Middle C. North Coast 
Guangdong Fujian Hainan Jiangsu Hebei North East 
1992 246,992 112,038 29,584 1,535 34,389 22,271 15,839 
Percentage 45% 12% 1% 14% 9% 6% 
1993 3,168.411 1,047,811 473.800 61,954 833,307 194,299 68,345 
Percentage 33% 15% 2% 26% 6% 2% 
1994 962,209 230,927 96,624 9,115 391,814 56,814 11,488 
Percentage 24% 10% 1% 41% 6% 1% 
1995 1,092,713 222,748 121,656 649 394,772 83,194 43,539 
Percentage 20% 11% 00/0 36% 8% 4% 
1996 4,334,313 1,720,900 472,229 37,984 1,247,297 233,565 62,768 
Percentage 40% 11% 1% 29% 5% 1% 
1997 2.034,621 824,419 150,793 12,997 694,751 92,421 10,499 
Percentage 41% 7% 1% 34% 5% 1% 
1998 1,252,780 500,114 58,899 388 475,008 57,281 10,289 
Percentage 40% 5% Wo 38% 5% 1% 
1999 2,607,142 1,019,703 99,486 1.595 1,251,623 92,630 14,380 
Percentage 39% 4% 0% 48% 4% 1% 
2000 2,784,147 787,972 120,122 2,403 1,422,590 125,228 18,950 
Percentage 28% 4% 00/0 51% 4% 1% 
2001 6,723,058 1,635,092 749,942 6,260 3,172,313 275,275 62,105 
Percentage 24% -- 11% -- - -- ---- -- 0% 47% 4% - 1% 
(Units: Thousand US$) 
Source: Statistical Tables (Investment) - Economic Statistic Annual, 2003, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
Executive Yuan, Taiwan. 
Foreign investment in China does allow Taiwanese companies to acquire cheap labour 
and resources, which would be particularly helpful for the traditional labour-intensive 
industries in Taiwan. However, the scale of investment in China has given cause for concern 
as the export markets previously enjoyed by Taiwan are now benefiting China. Exports from 
Taiwan to the US have decreased from a market share of 6% in 1987 to 4% in 1998, whereas 
Chinese exports to the US have increased their share from 1.5% to 8%. Over the same 
period, this export diversion effect is also seen in the level of Taiwanese exports to China, and 
China's reliance on Taiwanese technology is now eroded due to local production. Indeed, 
apart from the issue of export diversion, the higher level of dependence on the success of 
foreign investment in the Chinese economy increases the level of risk to Taiwan. One 
reason that the contagion resulting from the Asian crisis did not affect Taiwan too seriously 
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was the relative independence of its economy from that region. However, if a similar crisis 
were to occur in China, this would have a devastating effect on Taiwan and government 
policy is currently directed towards advising firms to diversify investments in order to 
decrease potential vulnerability. The continued rapid growth of FDI to China indicates that 
these warnings are going unheeded for the time being. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, the focus has been on the critical contextual factors that underpin this research 
on Taiwan, in particular those relating to corporate governance and the foreign investment 
decisions of publicly-traded firms. The first section reviewed the economic environment 
that firms operate in and the changes in financial sector regulation that are pertinent to 
business funding decisions. The importance of trade and changes in the pattern and 
distribution of trade are presented, as well as a brief historical background on how these 
relationships developed. 
The domestic economy in the last century was driven by a policy of export promotion 
and foreign expansion, both of which have been highly successful. However, customs and 
culture, especially the traditional values placed up on human relationships and family 
hierarchy, have influenced the approach to commercial activities and these issues were 
addressed in the second section. ' One change that has impacted upon the structure of the 
markets is the presence of institutional investors, both domestic and foreign. This was seen 
as a way to address problems of illiquidity and asymmetric information, and to improve the 
level of price efficiency on the TSE. Certainly, the introduction of foreign-owned 
institutions should be seen as a positive influence upon the security markets and should 
promote more active trading based on firm fundamentals rather than the herd instincts of the 
domestic investors. 
The final section reviewed the extent of internationalisation of the Taiwanese economy 
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in terms of international trade and foreign investment. Taiwan is very much part of the 
global economy, in the past, notably the US and Japan, and more recently with China. Tax 
havens also feature in this framework of FDI. The relationship with China has undergone 
various changes in both sectoral involvement and location, but the growing level of 
dependence on China is causing some concern. The economic environment, customs and 
practice in the business community, governance systems within firms and patterns of foreign 
direct investment will all be addressed in the empirical chapters of the thesis. 
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Chapter Two: The Nature of Corporate Governance in Taiwan 
Introduction 
The institutional framework for corporate governance in Taiwan draws from both Company 
Law and Securities and Exchange Law. Company Law specifies the contractual relationship 
between management and the providers of capital, where the obligation of managers is to 
ensure the interests of shareholder. Conversely, the role of Securities & Exchange Law is to 
provide some protection to investors trading on the Taiwan Stock Exchange. This includes 
regulations about the disclosure of company information, such as audited accounts, and 
reporting equity transaction, both of which ensure transparency and accountability. 
As discussed in Chapter I, the political and economic history of Taiwan has been 
dominated by a combination of Dutch, Japanese, and latterly, Chinese influences and many of 
these remain. Of these, the most enduring has been those following the continental legal 
system, the civil law tradition, such as German and Japan rather than the oceanic legal system, 
or the common law tradition, such as in the US and the UK. Moreover, in many respects, the 
corporate governance in Taiwan is unique, not fitting easily into either of the standard 
frameworks. 
This chapter briefly discusses aspects of the legal framework that are relevant to the later 
empirical sections. The requirements of Company law, the regulations around the required 
ownership of equity by board members, and the characteristics of board members and 
supervisors, all play an important role in the subsequent analyses. 
Company Law 
Under Company Law, the board of a Taiwanese firm has a two-tier structure, consisting of a 
board of directors and a further group of supervisors. The shareholders take the role of 
principal in traditional corporate governance terminology, and are able to exercise their voting 
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rights at shareholders' meetings, and to elect both directors and supervisors. Company law 
stipulates that shareholders' meetings should take place at least once a year, and the 
management has an obligation to inform shareholders about the meeting at least twenty days 
in advance in the case of owners of inscribed stock, and thirty days in advance for nominated 
stockholders. The board of directors or a significant number of shareholders that control at 
least 3% of total issued equity can convene an additional extraordinary meeting, if it is 
required due to an urgent event. 
The composition of the board of directors is strictly defined. No less than three directors 
comprise the board, and this board holds discretionary powers delegated by the shareholders 
to perform the functions of management and have the authority to decide most issues related 
to corporate operations. Regulation 202 stipulates that all operations should be decided by the 
board of directors, except those that are explicitly to be decided at shareholders' meetings. 
The board of directors are obligated to undertake all decisions in the best interests of the 
company, and with the aim of maintaining the value of the firm. 
Company Law stipulates six explicit obligations that directors are bound to adhere to: 
the preparation of documents of internal constitution, reporting critical issues at the 
shareholders' meeting, declaring bankruptcy if the situation arises, convening shareholders' 
meetings on time, making accounting statements conform to the requirements of supervisors 
for monitoring and not acting illegally. These six articles are enshrined in company law and 
as to protect the interests of both corporate debtors and creditors and to ensure the 
effectiveness of the supervisors. 
In contrast to the board of directors, Company Law does not require a minimum number 
of supervisors, except that at least one should be resident in Taiwan. Supervisors are 
restricted to individuals that are a director, a manager, or other employee in the company, so 
as to maintain objectivity but also knowledge of the firm and its operations.. Each supervisor 
monitors independently rather than acts by the common consensus of the whole group. This 
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is an important point in Taiwanese company law and the different roles of supervisors and 
directors are emphasised by the use of "board" for directors and not for supervisors. 
The principal role of the supervisor is to monitor the actions of directors and report any 
impropriety, abuse of discretionary power or action that is likely to cause a fall in the value of 
the firm. According to the latest edition of the Taiwan company law, regulation 218 states 
that supervisors are able to attend meetings of the board to pass an opinion about corporate 
decisions. Moreover, in the case that decisions of the board have violated the corporate 
constitution or where resolutions agreed at shareholders meeting are reversed or ignored or 
where decisions are actually illegal, the supervisors have an obligation to insist that directors 
amend their decision or halt operations. To ensure effective monitoring, supervisors have the 
right to audit managerial activities at any time and authorise lawyers and accountants to 
provide specialist expertise. They also have the power to convene a shareholders meeting 
independently if any other attempt to address directors shortcomings is resisted. Thus, it is 
clear that the mechanisms for supervisory monitoring are in place. However, some issues 
remain pertaining to the efficiency of supervisors and their independence from the board of 
directors are addressed in later chapters - 
Securities & Exchange Law 
For listed, publicly-traded, companies, ownership is more diffused and the monitoring 
mechanisms to ensure good corporate governance are weaker and not adequately defined by 
company law. Dispersed investors find access to information about corporate operations 
more difficult and rely heavily on published information, which is clearly an important factor 
in their investment decisions. Thus, a Securities and Exchange Law was established in 1968 
to respond to the need for regulation to provide investor confidence and enhance the quality 
of governance and hence the integrity of the market. 
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The Securities and Exchange law is enforced by the Securities and Futures Commission 
(SFC), a governmental agency supervised by the Ministry of Finance, and the market 
regulator for the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE). SFC has wide ranging powers in respect to 
the administration of the market and is responsible for the approval of newly-issued securities, 
overseeing market trading, licensing the securities' traders, the regulation of market 
intermediaries and settlement rules. 
To ensure the accountability of published information, the SFC imposes discipline on 
publicly-traded companies to disclose the status of corporate operations in a clear and timely 
manner. This is provided in annual, semi-annual and quarterly financial statements from all 
listed companies, and all the information is required to be audited and certified by accredited 
accountants (CPA - Certified Public Accountant). If companies fail to report within the 
specified time, trading is suspended until the reporting is acceptable. 
The SFC is also concerned with the probity of managers and monitors the extent to 
which their interests are aligned with those of the shareholders. Regulation 26 of the 
Securities and Exchange Law stipulates minimum proportion of shareholding for members of 
the board of directors and for the supervisors in all publicly-traded companies - see Table 4.1. 
Table 2.1: Statutory Shareholdings in Listed Companies 
Firm Capitalisation 
_ 
Minimum Reg ed Shareholding 
(New Taiwanese Dollar Board of Directors Supervisors 
< 300 mil NT$ 15% 130% 
300 mil NT$ - 1000 mil NT$ 10% 1.00% 
1000 mil NT$ - 2000 mil NT$ 7.50% 0.75% 
> 2000 mil NT$ 5.00% 0.50% 
Source: Securities and Exchange Law, Regulation 26 
In addition, public companies in Taiwan are required to report the trading activity of all 
directors and supervisors to the SFC on a monthly basis. Further, this report should explicitly 
state all changes of ownership for significant shareholders - those with holdings of more than 
Chapter 2- The Institutions for Corporate Governance in Taiwan 43 
10% of the issued capital. This is quite rigorous to include the changes in collateralised 
equities on the shareholdings of board members and significant shareholders. 
Except for these regular disclosure obligations, interim statements may be required and 
thus the SFC can promulgate rules and guidelines towards special disclosure requirement that 
may affect shareholders' interests. Information disclosed on this basis includes events that 
may have an impact on stock prices and shareholders' equity, matters regarding the offering 
and issuance of securities, the acquisition or disposal of assets, foreign investment 
in 
mainland China and changes to accounting principles. 
In addition, to protect the rights of minority shareholders and creditors for affiliated 
corporations, Company Law (369-12) additionally requires that information is disclosed on a 
consolidated basis. Particularly, at the end of each financial year, the controlling company 
and affiliates of a public company are required to prepare a consolidated business report, 
including group financial statements and details of the legal and ownership relationships 
within the group. Moreover, due to the increasing number of business affiliates in Taiwan, the 
SFC published the "Guidelines for Compilation of the Group Companies Management Report, 
the Consolidated Financial Statements, and the Relationship Report" in 1999 and required that 
the three reports include the following: 
" The Group Companies Management Report: The contents include the organisational chart, 
shareholding status of directors, supervisors and the general manager, the related party 
transactions among group members, financial status and operational results of each 
company, etc. 
" The Consolidated Financial Statement: the contents shall include financing 
accommodation among group members, endorsement or guarantee, transactions on 
derivative products, material matters, after day items, and the holding of bills and 
securities. 
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The Relationship Report: the contents shall include the purchasing and selling of goods 
and asset transactions, financing, and endorsement among group companies. 
International Comparisons 
Comparison with the UK US System 
The institutional structure of Taiwanese firms has a number of unique features, which set it 
apart from systems in other countries. Compared with the Anglo-American system, there are 
important differences with regard to the independence of the board of directors and the 
allocation of seats on the board. Compared with the Anglo-American style of legal system, 
which endorses "competence" and "independence" in the board of directors, the institutional 
framework in Taiwan stresses that the interests of company controllers should align with 
corporate value. The concept is rooted in the German system prior to 1937 and the Japanese 
system prior to 1951. In practice, the fundamental aspects of the institutional framework are 
to limit the possibility that an independent outsider has a role in corporate management, and 
to ensure that significant shareholders play roles as director and supervisor. This is clearly a 
departure from the US-UK model. Further, to guarantee the alignment of interest between 
corporate owners and control, Taiwanese company law stipulates in regulations 192 and 216 
that all members of the board of directors and all supervisors must be shareholders. Since 
November 2001, the regulations compelling all directors and supervisors to hold shares has 
been repealed, however, the Security and Exchange Law still requires a minimal shareholding 
for the board of directors and the supervisors. Thus, although an individual director or 
supervisor is not required to hold any equity, this makes them essentially powerless and truly 
independent directors or supervisors are rare. 
Another difference between Taiwanese and Anglo-American firms relates to the 
regulations allowing a "legal person" to act as a director or supervisor. A "legal person" in 
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Taiwan is defined as an institution, or a legal entity, that is not an individual, but which has 
the right to own assets, sign contracts and sue or be sued. In Taiwan the directors and 
supervisors are designated as either a natural person or a juridical person, both of which must 
comply with the shareholding requirement. Regulation 27 of company law states a legal 
person is entitled to hold a director or supervisor role of company and can assign any natural 
person as a representative on its behalf. In addition, the Regulation stipulates that a single 
legal person can simultaneously have numerous representatives as directors or supervisors, 
and there are no restrictions on the proportion of the board that can be represented in this way. 
The regulations with respect to legal persons can have a serious impact on board 
structure and can obstruct the voice of minority shareholders. Moreover, the regulations can 
encourage ownership interlocks among corporations, and thus allow coalitions to repel 
potential challengers, concerning control rights or market competition. In the US, antitrust 
laws prohibit the acquisition of shares in a company if this is likely to have adverse effects on 
competition as a result. Moreover, the relatively strict standard of conduct for directors 
regarding conflicts of interest tends to prevent the development of interlocking shareholdings 
among firms with long-term relationships. 
The influence of the continental legal tradition is clearly reflected in the institutional 
structure of Taiwanese firms. According to the Company Law, the Taiwanese company is 
required to have a two-tier board structure, putting the system apparently closer to that of 
Germany and Japan than to the US, UK. Further, in common with most countries with two- 
tier board structures, the supervisor in Taiwan has wide powers to monitor and discipline 
management, to the extent that they can select and deselect senior management, provided they 
have the support of the shareholders. : 
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Nevertheless, even within the group countries that share a similar legal tradition, such as 
Germany, France and Japan, the idiosyncrasy of the Taiwanese corporate governance system 
remains. The distinctness of the Taiwanese system in this group is reflected in the four 
aspects that follow. First, with respect to the function of supervisors, in Germany and France, 
the monitoring role takes place through the common consensus of all supervisors rather than 
by individual supervisors as in Taiwan. This is reflected in the independent nature of 
supervisors in Taiwan, where the supervisors are considered as individuals rather than as a 
supervisory board as in other two-tier board systems. In fact, the supervisors in Taiwan tend 
to have similar role as inspectors in the French system, in which, in addition to supervisors, 
all companies are required to have additionally one or two places on the supervisory board 
reserved for external inspectors to strengthen the degree of scrutiny. However, the supervisor 
in Taiwan differs from the French inspector in that the form is explicitly required to be a 
shareholder rather than an outsider. 
The second difference that exists between Taiwan and the other continental countries 
concerns board composition. In Germany and France, a specific proportion of supervisor 
positions are reserved for labour union representatives, while in Taiwan, the positions are 
required to be held by shareholders only. This means the supervisors in Taiwan tend to 
support the management rather than other stakeholders. The two-tiered nature of German and 
some French boards represents an attempt to formalise the different roles of outside and inside 
directors, since the supervisory board consists of members other than the current management, 
while the board of directors consists of serving managers. However, this arrangement is 
absent in the institutional framework of corporate governance in Taiwan, where members of a 
single family or a legal person can simultaneously be on the board of directors and a 
supervisors, as long as the shareholding requirement is met. 
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Further differences within governance models between Taiwan and those in Germany, 
France and Japan relating to the board of directors and supervisors are concerned with scale. 
In Japan, commercial law (1993 edition) specifically requires that at least three supervisors 
should be appointed in a large company, one of which should be an outsider, that is, an 
individual who has not worked for the company during the previous five years. This does not 
hold in small companies in Japan. In Germany, companies with less than 500 employees are 
not required to have a two-tier board structure to separate boards of supervisors from board of 
directors. However, for company with between 500 and 2000 employees, it is necessary to 
one third of supervisors dedicated to labour union representatives. Further, when a company 
employs more than 2000,50% of supervisory positions are reserved for labour representatives. 
However, while the institutional framework in Taiwan also requires higher standards of 
governance for larger firms, this is restricted to concerns about maintaining the alignment of 
interests between managerial shareholding and firm value (see Table 4.1), with no emphasis 
on the monitoring capacity and the representation of labour or other stakeholders. 
Finally, the factor that most clearly differentiates the structure and role of both the board 
of directors and the supervisors in Germany and Japan from that of Taiwan is the relationship 
between the corporate and banking sectors, resulting in major variations in the system and 
effectiveness of corporate governance. In Japan and Germany, banks are usually the most 
significant financial providers to companies. Given their sufficient shareholding, banks are 
usually major holders of equity and are able to exert considerable influence on the boards of 
directors and supervisors, having positions on both boards. Banks have a very close 
relationship with the firm, are knowledgeable on areas of finance, operations and other 
commercial issues, which provides an environment for highly effective monitoring. Although 
they may have a tendency toward conservatism, the independence of the bank in corporate 
affairs as a means of monitoring and supervision supports the expectation of a positive impact 
of a bank-dominated board on corporate governance. However, compared with this system 
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prevalent in Germany and Japan, banks or other financial institutions are rarely involved in 
monitoring Taiwanese firms. The institutional regulations in Taiwan that identify a legal 
person as an individual entity in corporate governance can be seen as an attempt to provide a 
channel for external supervision, while the effect of this legislation to discipline better 
corporate governance quality is controversial. Moreover, the material evidence supporting the 
legislation leading financial organisations to more actively participating in corporate 
governance remains unobservable thus far. 
Evidence of Corporate Governance in Taiwan 
As with many other countries, the institutional framework enabling corporate governance to 
be effective in Taiwan is not complete. In particular, the level of development of the 
Taiwanese economy remains at an intermediate stage of entrepreneurial capitalism, with 
many firms owned and managed by families. Although the share of equity ownership by the 
founding family is becoming less significant, especially in the case of publicly-traded 
companies, these firms are still perceived by the general public to be family-dominated. 
Accordingly, even though the involvement of the founding family has reduced, its 
overwhelming power in management remains. This reveals that the system is unsuccessful in 
align management interest with corporate value, which is the fundamental factor is ensuring 
good corporate governance in Taiwan. 
Table 4.2 compares the corporate insiders' shareholding of publicly-listed companies on 
the TSE in 1985 and 1999. The corporate governance system in Taiwan encourages senior 
managers to have a greater amount of shareholding. ' However, according to the table, the 
percentage of corporate insiders' shareholding has decreasing significantly during the period, 
and there is now a lower proportion of listed-companies with a concentrated ownership 
structure. This demonstrates the gap between the interests of ownership and control has 
increased and the alignment of interest between managerial ownership and firm value has 
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been eroded. This new phenomenon for Taiwan is likely to lead to a conflict of interest 
between small groups of controlling shareholders and the remaining majority of shareholders. 
Tahis. 77 incirler (lwnerchin of Public-Listed Firms on the TSE 
Insiders* Ownership Ratio Apr-85 Aug-99 
Firm Number Percentage Firms Number Percentage 
0-9.9% 3 2.68% 83 18.28% 
10-19.99% 32 28.57% 160 35.24% 
20-24.99% 21 18.75% 42 9.25% 
25-29.99% 18 16.07% 44 9.69% 
30-39.99% 9 8.04% 68 14.98% 
40-49.99% 10 8.93% 31 6.83% 
50-59.99% 12 10.71% 14 3.08% 
60-69.99% 4 3.57% 7 1.54% 
70-79.99% 1 0.89% 4 0.88% 
80-89.99% 0 0 1 0.22% 
90-100% 2 1.79% 0 0 
total 112 100.00% 454 100.00% 
Note: *Insiders are referred to Directors and Supervisors 
Source: 2002 Annual Report, Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation, Taiwan. 
Moreover, in a society dominated by family businesses like Taiwan, the hierarchical 
relationship between directors and those concerned with monitoring the firm can be confused 
and distorts the definition of what constitutes good corporate governance. The independence 
and integrity of directors and supervisors is crucial for the effective implementation of a 
culture of governance that matches that intended by the institutional framework established by 
the regulatory measures introduced. 
These issues are not purely of interests to academics and the legal profession. A leading 
article in the Taiwan Economic Daily News (12/Decembe/2002) notes the defects of 
corporate governance system, highlighting four major questions. Firstly, with the tradition of 
family control and the articles in the Company Law that prohibit and directors from outside 
the firm, all members of the board are direct stakeholders. Further, most significant 
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shareholders act as directors, while the appointment of supervisors depend on the votes of 
these significant shareholders. This results in a very weak position for the supervisors and 
they are unlikely to question those shareholder-directors on management issues. Secondly, 
again acting within Company Law, an organisation is treated as an individual in corporate 
governance terms, and is allowed to have several representatives holding positions as director 
and/or supervisor, while the mechanisms to prevent shareholder interlocking across firms are 
incomplete. Thirdly, there is no limit to the number of firms that an individual can be 
involved with, whether as a director or supervisor, as long as the necessary shareholding is 
met. And, finally, as the founding family usually holds the largest share of equity, it is not 
difficult for them to arrange for a family member to serve as a director or supervisor in the 
firm. Consequently, the board of directors, including the chairman, and the supervisors are 
commonly members of the same family, with examples of close family members being the 
chairman, board members and supervisors, not unknown. 
This concern in the media is replicated in another local financial journal, the Wealth 
Magazine (May, 2002), where it was reported that five leading technical companies in Taiwan, 
including the one once with the highest capitalisation on the Taiwan Stock Exchange, had a 
husband and wife team as supervisor and chairman of the board of directors. The report 
concluded that independent monitoring in these. companies was seriously in doubt and 
questioned the effectiveness of such monitoring arrangements. It is clear that in the minds of 
the public, family ownership and family control is open to abuse and does not result in any 
confidence that high levels of corporate governance can be expected in Taiwan under the 
current institutional framework. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, the institutional framework of the corporate governance system of Taiwan has 
been reviewed. Specifically, Company Law and Securities and Exchange Law, plus the 
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disclosure regulations required by the SFC, have formed the basis for corporate governance in 
Taiwan, although this system is distinct from those of most countries in the world. However, 
the limitations due to the incomplete institutions are itself to make the system ineffectual and 
jeopardise corporate governance in Taiwan. The imperfections of the system have been 
widely criticised by the public media and the latter part of chapter was focused on this. It 
is 
clear that the prospect of a system of good quality corporate governance is doubtful. 
Corporate controlling status, ownership distribution, board composition, and most importantly, 
the interference of the controlling family on management are all aspects of the present model 
of corporate governance in Taiwan. These all have to be addressed is the system is to 
improved. 
The following chapters will focus to test these critical corporate governance factors in 
Taiwan and link them to the issues of firm performance in the domestic economy, and also to 
the strategic decision with respect to international expansion, both in a familiar cultural 
environment and in other global markets. The examinations are expected to address some of 
the corporate governance concerns increasing surfacing in countries dominated by family 
controlled firms. 
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Chapter Three: The Literature on Corporate Governance 
Introduction 
As the illustration by Berle and Means (1932), one of the defining characteristics of the modern 
corporation is that companies have the ability to raise finance through external capital markets, 
and this has made the separation of corporate ownership and control a central issue for both 
researchers and the business community. Individuals holding shares in publicly-traded 
companies do so for investment purposes rather - than to become involved in corporate 
decision-making. However, the lack of active monitoring to discipline the controllers of the 
firm, may allow managers' self-interest to encroach on corporate decisions and thus neglect to 
maximize the efficient operation of the firm. M is moral hazard will detract from corporate 
value and shareholders' interests, hence the principal and agent problem. 
To limit appropriation on the part of managers, a number of mechanisms to ensure good 
governance, plus high profile failures in recent years, for example, Barings and Enron, have 
increased the level of interest in the topic at many levels. Regulators have clearly been 
concerned, shareholder groups are more proactive and academic ' research has focused on 
developing methods of theoretical model and empirical examination of systems of governance 
in a number of national contexts. This chapter review the major work in the area and provides a 
theoretical foundation for the empirical analysis that follows. 
The Agency Problem 
Incomplete Contracts 
The agency problem is concerned with the contractual view of the firm, which arises from the 
pioneering work of Coase (1937). ' In this seminal paper, "The Nature of the . Firm", Coase 
argues that firms exist in order to facilitate exchange and to improve the efficiency of resource 
allocation within the context of a free market. ', With the establishment of employment contracts 
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within the firm, such as the hierarchical relationship under the authority of a manager, 
transactions costs can be minimised. However, as firms grow large, managers find control of 
employees difficult as the distance between levels of labour increases. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) extended this theory by explicitly advocating that contractual relations are an essential 
element of the firm, further defining the firm as a form of legal function serving as a centre for 
the coordination of contractual obligation (nexus of contracts). 
Applying the contractual concept to the relationship between corporate ownership and 
control is useful when explaining the behaviour of the providers of capital. In this case, there is 
an invisible but important contract between the shareholders and the managers that is based on 
the expectation that there will be no inappropriate use of funds. However, the implicit contract 
is incomplete. In the literature, the contract is referred to as a contingent claim, and will only be 
met if all outcomes are observable and there is no possibility for adverse selection or moral 
hazard, both of which are needed for the contract to be complete. However, according to 
incomplete contract theory (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995a, 
1995b), most future contingencies relating to the contract are extremely hard to predict ex ante. 
Even though it may be possible for some agents to be aware of all contingencies that might 
affect the relationship in the future, their knowledge is unlikely to be transformable into a clear 
and enforceable contract because of their inability to verify all the relevant variables. After all, 
to validate a contractual relationship, any parties involved in the relationship should 
communicate the terms of the contract to all internal and external parties. Without a clear and 
definite statement in the contract, outsiders usually have little knowledge about the contractual 
agreement and do not recognise the existence of the relationship at all. 
The inability to enforce a complete contract is the limit of "bounded rationality" and 
"uncertainty" - two of the central concepts of Williamson's work on the governance 
mechanisms within firms (Williamson, 1971,1975 and 1985). Large number of agents would 
be involved in the specific set of complete contracts, not just to predict all possible 
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contingencies but also to state their outcomes unambiguously. This would be a very costly 
practice, if possible at all. Thus, since the reality is that a complete contract is technologically 
and economically infeasible, incomplete contract theory argues the conflicts between manager 
and financier will occur frequently when addressing corporate residual rights. 
Figure 3.1. The Optimal Contract - Incomplete but Lowest Agency and Contracting Cost 
Combination 
Cost Value 
Source: Grossman and Hart (1986) 
Based on the consideration that huge costs are unavoidable in achieving a complete 
contract between ownership and control, the simple Grossman-Hart-Moore model (Grossman 
& Hart, 1986) illustrates why an incomplete contract can be acceptable - see Figure 2.1. If x 
represents the completeness of the contract, the C-A(x) represents the responding agency cost 
function. The curve C-C(x) is the cost function representing the costs associated with the 
improvement of contract completeness, and this continuously increases with the value of x. 
Finally, the curve B(x) represents the total of the contracting cost and the agency cost. The 
optimal cost associated with defining the contract will be agreed by all agents to be at the point 
B(x*), although the contract still remains incomplete. This category of incomplete contracting 
X" Completeness of the Contract 
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models considers that it is costly to write elaborate contracts and therefore there is a need for ex 
post governance. 
But incomplete contracts allow agents the discretion to make decisions for the principal 
that are based on individual expertise and professional judgement, although these may seriously 
reduce any bargaining power held by shareholders over managers. This follows directly from 
the fact that an incomplete contract does not foresee all the contingencies relating to the 
obligations and outcomes that may arise, even to the extent of the manager taking all the 
residual rights of company. Given the power of the discretion accorded the manager, 
appropriation can be deliberate and shareholders are less able to acquire fundamental 
information about the firm they essentially own. 
Agency Theory and the Separation of Ownership and Control 
To explain the origin of the agency problem, two aspects of managerial motivation are 
presented by Jensen and Meckling (1976) that result in conflicting outcomes for shareholders. 
The first are pecuniary benefits, including salary, performance bonuses, shareholding, etc., all 
of which work in the interests of shareholders as well as managers. The second are 
non-pecuniary benefits that arise from the discretionary power of managers and include 
opportunity to extend personal contacting networks, and the trappings of power that are usually 
detrimental to the value of the firm. These are essentially incompatible with each other. 
Therefore, in order to maximise total personal interest, the manager aims to balance these two 
sets of incentives. 
Where the manager only owns a partial share of the firm, there will be an imperfect 
trade-off for the manager between pecuniary and non-pecuniary consumption. The pecuniary 
benefits of managers under the circumstances only align with firm value up to a proportion of 
their shareholding. In order to maximise personal interest in total, the manager will place more 
emphasise on non-pecuniary rewards. Consequently, the value of the firm will be sacrificed, 
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and the remaining shareholders will bear the loss of wealth. 
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An obvious question is why does such a part-owned corporate structure exist, that is, why 
are all firms not owner-managed? Jensen and Meckling suggest that since entrepreneurs cannot 
always provide sufficient support for growth and expansion, external financing is unavoidable. 
However, the agency problem does limit firm growth and the benefits of external financing will 
be counteracted by the increased costs discussed in the previous section. 
A dynamic model illustrating agency factors problems as firms expand is proposed by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). In Figure 2.2, the horizontal axis represents the market value of 
managerial expenditures on non-pecuniary benefits and the vertical axis represents the 
pecuniary wealth of managers, where pecuniary wealth equals the initial wealth, W, and the net 
value of investing, that is the value of the investment V minus the cost of I. 
In the owner-managed firm, the trade-off between the consumption of pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary benefits will be perfectly correlated, resulting in a negative slope to the 
managers' consumption line. Under this circumstance, the curve OZBC in Figure 2.2 
represents the locus of optimal managerial consumption allocation from two sources of benefits 
at each possible firm size along the expansion path. For example, for the expansion scale in the 
cost of I*, the optimal managerial consumption will be point C where the private consumption 
line of the manager with slope (-1) is tangent to the highest indifferent curve U1. There, the 
manager is consuming F* units of non-pecuniary benefits and achieving personal pecuniary 
wealth W+V*-I*. 
However, private finance by managers is limited, and if external resources are necessary 
for corporate growth after the cost I1, the locus of optimal managerial consumption allocation 
no longer follows OZC. Rather, the locus past the point Z (responding to the cost of 11) will 
follow the curve ZDH, which is determined by the various consumption possibility lines of 
managers in firm of different scale. Specifically, the slopes of the managerial consumption 
lines are determined by the proportion of managerial ownership - the proportion a (O<a<l) of 
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shareholding achieves the slope of -a, in consumption. When the lines tangent to the 
highest 
indifference curves along the budget constraints of the firm, the optimal consumption 
allocations between the two benefits are fixed. 
Figure 3.2. Agency Theory and Firm Growth 
Pecuniary Wealth) \\ýpansion Path with 100% Ownership by Manager 
of Manager 
W+ 
w+v, -I, / U2 
"ý Slope --a 
W+V 1-11 
Expansion Path with Fractional 
Ownership by Manager 
Budget Restriction 
(Slope-l ) 
0 F" F' 
Market Value of Managerial Expenditures on Non-Pecuniary Benefits 
Source: Jensen and Meckling (1976), pp. 320. 
With the ownership share of the manager gradually reducing, corporate expansion is 
constrained at the size of firm at point D, if the ex post monitoring activity is not available. At 
this point, the locus of managerial optimal allocation between the consumption of the two sets 
of benefits is at the highest indifference curve, U2 - further growth will rather lower managerial 
interests on this. Comparing the two expansion paths between the owner-managed firm and the 
part-owned firm, the vertical difference represents the agency costs of firm growth. 
However, after purchasing shares from the owner-manager, rational investors are likely to 
engage in governance activity ex post to constrain managerial consumption of non-pecuniary 
Chapter 3 -The Literature on Corporate Governance 
58 
benefits to an agreed level. In practice, there are many methods used by shareholders to 
monitor or discipline managers, such as audit, budgetary restrictions or incentive contracts. 
However, attempts to monitor the agency relationship are not free. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
argue that when the monitoring expenditure of shareholders is anticipated, a bonded contract 
matching the monitoring activity will be agreed by the manager. As the result, the manager not 
only achieves the highest utility but also acquires the additional monitoring costs presumed by 
shareholders. Accordingly, any cost arising from monitoring activity is included in agency 
costs. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the cost of agency problems to be the sum of (1) the 
monitoring expenditures by the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by the agent and (3) the 
residual loss (p. 308). The residual loss is referred to as the reduction of corporate value when 
the firm is run by a fractional-owner compared with the fully-owned management model. 
Corporate Governance - Strategies to reduce Agency Costs 
Given that managerial knowledge and expertise is essential to remaining competitive, Jensen & 
Meckling (1976) discuss the practicality of governance arrangements to minimise losses 
resulting from agency conflict. Following from the theory developed in the earlier section, it is 
clear that the higher the level of managerial ý ownership the less the problem of 
miss-appropriation. In the extreme case, when firm ownership is fully concentrated in the 
hands of the manager, the conflict disappears and the moral hazard eliminated. 
Johnson et al. (2000) summarise the effect of management ownership concentration to 
address the agency problem in a mathematical model, suggested by Jensen & Meckling (1976). 
In this model, a manager owns a share in the firm, a, with the remaining share, (1-a), dispersed 
to outside outsiders. The value of retained earnings for this company is I and the value of 
managerial expropriation of these earnings is S, where S>O. However, if the managerial 
expropriation has been noted by the outside shareholders, the manager is dismissed. Thus, 
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equation 2.1 predicts that the managerial expropriation on S carries a personal risk to the 
i 
manager of (2 
K) 
if caught. The sign on x denotes how sensitive and efficient the external 
shareholders are to monitoring and acting on poor behaviour by managers. Therefore, the value 
of x is negatively associated with the quality of the institutional environment in protecting 
shareholders rights. Poor institutional protection leads to a larger value of is and results in lower 
cost due to managerial expropriation of S. However, apart from the expropriated amount, the 
remainder of retained earnings from I are continually reinvested in subsequent projects and the 
gross rate of return for these is denoted as R in equation 2.1. Since the manager pecuniary 
benefit is still a function of reinvestment in projects and the return earned on the owned share, a, 
the manager will ensure the gross return rate R is positive. This results in the sum of the 
pecuniary benefits from investment and the amount of expropriation of retained earnings being 
the total gain to the manager: 
z 
MaxU=Max{aRx(I-S)+[S-(S )]) ; a, K, I, SZ0; R>O 2.1 2xK 
Differentiating 2.1, the optimal amount of managerial expropriation, S% gives 
AU 
=1-s -aR=0 2.2 AS "K 
and solving S' yields the optimal expropriation amount 
S'. =xx(1-aR) 2.3 
Further, differentiating the optimal expropriation in 2.3 with respect to a gives 
A 
2.4 Da 
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Equation 2.4 expresses the negative relationship between managerial expropriation and the 
extent of manager shareholding. If the values of x and R are fixed, a higher level of ownership 
concentration will force managers to lower their optimal managerial expropriation Se , in order 
to maximise total benefits. 
Jensen & Meckling's (1976) claim that ownership concentration by managers can 
effectively deal with the agency problem has inspired studies that search for feasible ways to 
limit managerial appropriation. The central theme is that through the construction of a 
governance mechanism, it is possible to turn management effort towards maximising firm 
value and various governance arrangements attempt to provide an efficient way to control 
agency relationships. 
The Empirical Literatures on Agency Problems 
Agency Problems in Practice 
The seminal work on corporate governance by Jensen and Meckling (1976) has shown 
theoretically that the separation of corporate ownership and control causes conflicts of interest 
between principal and agent. Following this, a" vast amount of empirical literature tests this 
relationship, in particular, relating to the question of the gap between the benefits managers 
extract for their private consumption and the impact this may have on the value of the firm. 
Denis (2001) illustrates the identification of agency problems in practice, presenting three main 
findings. 
.. t 
The first is that senior managers appear to have a strong desire to remain in power (see: 
Amihud, 1981; Charreaux, 1997; Coleman,, 1988; McEachern, 1975).. However, given the 
dynamic nature of the commercial environment, the' characteristics required of managers to 
retain an advantage over rival . 
firms differ. as situations, change. Therefore, frequent 
management changes would be expected and necessary,. for a modem business. But, clearly 
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incumbent managers are generally unwilling to lose their controlling rights and attempt to block 
any attempt to adjust to new situations by changing personnel. One way for manager to stay in 
power is to entrench their position by adjusting levels of output or blocking the disclosure of 
information to outsiders. Thus, a manager that is inappropriate in a given set of conditions that 
is able to manipulate the environment in order to stay in power presents an agency cost to the 
principals. The work of Vecchiolla et al (1998) illustrates the defence tactics that managers can 
choose to adopt to entrench the firms' controlling position and block any potential acquisition, 
regardless of the views of the shareholders. " . 
The' argument continues by noting that if a 
manager wants to put the defence strategy to a shareholder vote, they can do so, however, most 
managers choose avoidance tactics that do not require shareholders' approval. This indicates 
that self-interest on behalf of managers is a major motivation for entrenchment rather than 
being a strategic decision on the part of the firm. 
Secondly, managers tend to be risk averse and hesitate to act in response to environmental 
change (see: Hill and Snell, 1988; Hill and Snell, 1989; Hoskisson et al., 1993; Hoskisson and 
Johnson, 1992). Compared with shareholders who hold well-diversified portfolios, managers 
put all their effort into one firm. Therefore, the failure of a single company, although reducing 
the wealth of shareholders has more impact on the wealth of managers. Further, failure of the 
firm can destroy the professional reputation of the manager and reduce the changes of finding 
alternative employment. This may bias the manager in the choice of investment projects 
undertaken and the best potential opportunities may be disregarded in favour of a lower risk, 
lower return option. Conversely, a well-diversified shareholder would prefer the company to 
proactively invest in all projects with positive return, and managerial conservatism regarding 
investment policy conflicts with the wishes of shareholders. On the other hand, reluctance to 
respond external change can cause bias in project evaluation decisions, resulting in a tendency 
for firms to continue to pursue failing projects (Brockner, 1992). A large body of research 
supports the view that agency problems are an important set of conditions that lead to an 
Chapter 3- The Literature on Corporate Governance 62 
escalation in this commitment to failing projects (see: Rutledge & Karim, 1999; Harrison & 
Harrelle, 1994; Harrelle & Harrison, 1993). - With this potential for conflict between the 
interests of managers and shareholders, managers are likely to adhere stubbornly to their own 
experience of safe projects, often contrary to the views of shareholders. 
Thirdly, managers prefer to retain free cash flow within the firm (see: La Porta et al, 2000b; 
Jensen, 1986; Jensen, 1993; Rubin, 1990). Jensen (1986) defines free cash flow as the cash 
generated from operations in excess of the funds required to support all available projects with 
a positive return. If there is surplus cash, there are three uses to which it can be put: to pay it 
back to shareholders (dividends), to reinvest it in existing or new projects or keep it as retained 
earnings. The first choice of the shareholders would be a dividend payment to shareholders 
who can use their increased wealth in a way that maximises their personal utility, particularly 
since the claim on residual interests is theirs by right. The second best choice would be 
reinvestment in positive return projects to expand the company and maximise the value of the 
firm. However, retaining the earnings in the firm is frequently the course of action followed. 
The potential return to managers through higher salaries redirects free cash flows from the 
principal to the agent, and is clearly costly to the providers of capital (see: Lehn and Poulsen, 
1989; Agrawal and Jayaraman, 1994; Lang, 1991). In reality, it is difficult for outside 
shareholders to tell whether retained earnings are used for positive return projects or for the 
personal ambition of managers. 
Evidence ofAgency Problems - the Impact on Strategy Decisions 
In the last two decades, numerous empirical studies have revealed evidence of agency problems, 
and how this impacts on the strategy decisions, of the firm.: Using a sample of acquired 
companies, Ryngaert (1988) tests whether, the decision by managers to adopt takeover 
resistance strategies is in the interests of shareholders. Using a sample of 380 US firms, it was 
found that such strategies were significantly related with a fall in the share price. Moreover, 
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when the potential acquirer challenged this behaviour in court, a ruling in favour of the target 
company again lowered the share price, whereas a ruling against the target raised the share 
price. 
However, the study also found that such defensive strategies were not effective in all 
hostile takeovers, but only those arising from unsolicited bids in tender offers. As a bidding 
contest usually increases the stock price, shareholders should welcome it. But, when the 
defensive strategies are successful, the contest for ownership ceases and the share price no 
longer rises and the takeover premium disappears., Thus, the study concludes that defending a 
takeover is a strategy that enhances the manager's position of entrenchment in retaining 
controlling rights but is detrimental to shareholder value, and is clear evidence of an agency 
conflict. 
i As well as being a defence strategy for target-company opposition to a takeover, Trillas 
(2001) provides evidence that agency problems can also arise in the investment decisions of 
bidding firms. An example is that of Endesa, the largest electricity company in Spain. This 
company initially expected to take control of a major Chilean conglomerate in a bid valued at 
US$ 1500 million. However, after a long process of negotiation from 1997 to 1999, the final 
price was settled at more than US$ 5000 million. Moreover, ex post, the transaction did not 
create value for the shareholders, rather was a classic example of the free cash flow theory. 
When no positive net present value project is available, managers waste resources on 
subordinate expansion schemes instead of distributing the funds to investors. The paper argues 
that the firms with weak control systems are relatively unconstrained financially and will be 
more likely to pursue transactions that do not create value at all. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) also discuss the problem " of managerial entrenchment and 
obstructing management turnover. This study, presents a: model that illustrates how an 
incompetent manager can remain in power if their position can be effectively entrenched by 
undertaking a particularly successful project and making this public information. This single 
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success can shift the balance of power and may convince shareholders that they agree to a 
higher salary or benefits and remain in position. The incompetent manager will concentrate on 
entrenchment strategies rather than other projects to increase the value of the firm. 
Jensen (1986) uses an example from the oil industry to test the attitude of managers toward 
firm free cash flows. During the 1970s, the oil price increased tenfold and subsequently 
generated huge excess returns. At the same time, the trend in oil consumption globally began to 
fall and the market anticipated price declines in the future, putting an end to the excess profits in 
the sector. Although revenues remained high, the sector was concerned that crude oil reserves 
were limited and it was important to undertake further exploration and development. However, 
the huge free cash flows generated from existing operations were not returned to shareholders, 
not invested in R&D, but rather were used to launch extensive diversification programmes and 
much of the free cash flow was directed outside the oil industry. Unfortunately, without the 
expertise and experience in other sectors, these programmes were largely unsuccessful. This is 
another example of managerial decisions that directed cash flows away from shareholders or 
positive return projects but were appropriated by managers towards projects that had a lower 
probability of success. The study concluded that a company with excess cash flow but the lack 
of desirable investment opportunities presents a serious problem in the agency relationship. 
Jensen's (1986) work implies that when the environment is expected to be unfavourable in 
the future, managers tend to adopt diversification as a solution for growth although this may 
simply be a strategy to retain free cash and entrench their position. Compared with a strategy 
that builds on internal expertise and comparative advantage, diversification can complicate 
operations and cause more difficulty for the firm. 
Comment and Jarrell (1995) examine how a focused investment strategy impacts share 
prices and also contributes to the literature on the links between diversification strategies and 
the use of corporate resources. The paper finds a reversal in the US trend of increasing 
diversification since the 1950s to a more focused strategy from the late 1980s. A cross-section 
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study found a positive relationship between a focused strategy and stock returns, hence 
increased shareholder wealth. Their analysis reveals that diversified companies did not 
significant outperformance compared with more focused firms, and were more likely to be the 
subject of hostile takeover. This not only challenges the profitability of diversification but also 
provides evidence of an agency problem. 
Building on Comment and Jarrell, Denis et al. (1997) provides further direct evidence of 
the agency costs of diversification. With a sample of 933 US firms, the paper tests the link 
between managerial ownership and firm diversification, finding a strongly negative 
relationship, despite controlling for other factors related to diversification. However, in the 
presence of outside block shareholders with the ability to monitor management effectively, the 
extent of firm diversification is reduced dramatically. This finding directly links the positive 
effect of agency problems to strategic focus strategy. 
Dividend payments are the most direct way for managers to return excess cash flows to the 
legitimate owners. The work of La Porta et al. (2000b) tests whether the quality of the agency 
relationship can explain the range of dividend policies globally. Two alternative hypotheses are 
tested. The first argues that dividend payments are made because minority shareholders can 
effectively coerce managers to distribute free cash flows.. The second considers dividend 
payments are made because the manager intends to issue more equity in the future and pays 
dividends in advance to establish a reputation for fair treatment to minority shareholders. As 
both of these hypotheses imply the dividend payments are subject to the conflict and the 
symbiosis in the agency relationship. - An international sample of 4130 firms from 33 countries 
found that where the legal system provides better protection of shareholder rights, making the 
shareholders more powerful and able to bargain for residual rights with managers, firms pay 
higher dividends. On the other hand, in circumstances where firms are growing fast and 
dividend payout is low, it is only in those countries with high levels of investor protection that 
shareholders are prepared to wait for -dividend payouts until the' firms have become well 
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established. In these situations, it is clear that shareholders are more confident with the agency 
relationship. Thus, the findings support the first hypothesis that the bargaining power of 
shareholders is a critical element of dividend policy, plus a non-opportunistic agency 
relationship is important for the long-term growth of firms. 
Corporate Governance in East Asia 
With the exception of Japan, much corporate governance research relating to East Asia is based 
on case study methods that discuss the characteristics of, specific business communities. 
Although these studies yield a number of interesting and significant findings, such as 
confirming that businesses depend largely on the privileges granted by local government to 
protect domestic market from foreign competition, the picture of corporate governance remains 
unclear. Until the 1997-8 financial crisis, systems of corporate governance mechanism in East 
Asia had been neglected and there was limited research on the issue. However, since the crisis, 
this has attracted more attention. 
One example is that of Johnson et al (2000), which is based on the legal protection aspects 
of governance and argues that poor legal protection for shareholders is responsible for the 
financial crisis in East Asia. The corrupt, institutional environment led to the currency 
depreciation and stock market decline in East Asia countries and inadequate governance 
mechanisms rather than macroeconomic variables were much more damaging to the general 
economic welfare of these countries. - Johnson et al. argue that in an environment with poor 
investor rights protection, agency 'conflicts are exacerbated and instances of managerial 
appropriation proliferate. At the same , time, outside investors in East Asian countries 
fundamentally distrust the integrity of managers and any investment that does take place is 
based on the expectation of growth in an emerging market rather than the fundamentals of the 
company itself. Once their expected returns begin to look less certain; funds are withdrawn 
from the region altogether, due to a general lack of confidence. Therefore, during a recession 
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period, such as the financial crisis, investors move to a more certain environment and one with 
governance mechanisms they recognise and understand., 
Work by Mitton (2002) adds to the literature on understanding the role of corporate 
governance in the East Asia financial crisis. Contrary to that of Johnson et at. (2000), which 
focuses on the governance effect of national institutions and focuses on the national economic 
recession, Mitton conducts a firm level analysis to examine whether corporate governance 
factors are still meaningful to performance during the crisis time. Based on firm data from five 
crisis countries, the paper tests whether companies with good corporate governance outperform 
others, even during a crisis, and find that they do. Companies with better monitoring 
mechanisms, including audit by one of the big-six accounting firms and higher levels of 
ownership concentration held by outside blockholders, deteriorate significantly less than those 
that do neither of these. Further, this work reveals the performance of diversified firms is 
significantly worse than those that focus on core activities, despite the possible benefits of 
diversification during economic uncertainty. 
Given the importance of corporate governance in the region, a study by Claessens et al. 
(2000) further discusses characteristics of firm ownership in nine major East Asia countries. 
The paper finds that more than two-thirds of the listed-firms in East Asia are ultimately owned 
by the largest single shareholder. Moreover, among these companies, 60% of the management 
board places are held by family members from the majority shareholding family, making the 
companies in East Asian countries controlled by the family of the largest owner. Another 
finding is that the controlling families in this area largely use pyramid structures and cross 
shareholding among corporate subsidiaries to enhance their control., Depending on these 
particular ownership arrangements to leverage up the share of family, shareholding in the 
corporate ownership structure, large amounts of, shareholding is not. necessary for the 
controlling family in East Asia to achieve corporate control. Consequently, the different levels 
of interest between corporate ownership and control will directly motivate further managerial 
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expropriation by the controlling family. 
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Given this finding about the structure of ownership in East Asia, it is clear that agency 
conflicts existing in this region are of the principal-principal basis (Young et al, 2002) - 
between 
the controlling family and minority shares - rather than the agent-principal relationship 
suggested by Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) in Western countries. 
Furthermore, in the West, most publicly traded firms are highly diversified and family firms are 
small. However, in East Asia, the family of the largest shareholder commonly play a 
determinant role in the management of a public-listed company, such as in South Korea (Jung 
and Kwon, 2002), Hong Kong (Ho and Wong, 2001), Singapore (Mak and Li, 2001), Malaysia 
(Piesse and Khatri, 2002), Thailand (Dhnasirek and Tang, 2003; Suehiro, 2001) and Taiwan 
(Yeh et al, 2001). The difference impacts any study of corporate governance by presenting a 
challenge for the applicability of traditional models on this specific context of public-listed but 
family-controlled firm. 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Categories of Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
To confront the threat of appropriation, the shareholders may construct various governance 
mechanisms to protect their own interests, defined by Jensen (1993) in four general categories. 
The first are the legal and regulatory mechanisms. In theory, a shareholder willing to finance a 
company has a contract that gives them the right to residual claims. If this is violated, the 
shareholder can appeal to the court. Thus, ý legal protection - for shareholders is a basic 
governance mechanism and is fundamental to the structure of the contemporary firm. 
In contrast, the second category describes those mechanisms that apply within the firm. 
These include monitoring managerial performance and disciplining failing managers and are 
the responsibility of the board of directors... Therefore the composition of the board, 
compensation schemes for manager and the specific arrangements with respect to ownership 
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structure are all instruments that are pertinent to internal governance. These can be criticised 
proactive and disaffected shareholders who can bring about change if there is sufficient 
coherence. 
The third category relates to mechanisms that are brought about by external pressure, 
which challenges managers controlling rights. This is generally the result of an external bidder 
who considers the firm could be more profitable, perhaps because of poor governance by the 
incumbent management. Regardless of the result, the bid is a signal that there may be a 
problem within the firm and shareholders will be in a better bargaining position to negotiate an 
improved distribution of residual rights. 
The final category of corporate governance mechanisms arises from competition in the 
product market. In a competitive environment, a "manager with a high consumption of 
non-pecuniary benefits will induce slacks in productivity, the firm will no longer be competitive 
and the share prices will fall. This will make raising further capital difficult, or result in 
bankruptcy. 
Jensen (1993) suggests that product market competition is a blunt instrument in the fight 
for effective corporate governance. He argues that-the impacts of market competition come 
slowly, and a great deal of firm value can be further lost when waiting for the governance effect 
to materialise. With this concern, it is not common for empirical studies that test market 
competition as an efficient governance mechanism. On the other hand, Holmstrom and Kaplan 
(2001) argue that hostile take-over achieving slowed after the 1980s, and the importance of 
external discipline on corporate governance is reduced. In particular, with the characteristics of 
ownership concentration and pyramid shareholding structure, the possibility of external parties 
successfully challenging managers controlling rights is low in most East Asian countries (see: 
Mak and Li, 2001; Dhnadirek and Tang, 2003; Suehiro, 2001; Jung and Kwon, 2002; Piesse and 
Khatri, 2002). Therefore, the governance mechanisms depending on the external pressure of 
merger and acquisition (M&A) can be inappropriate to corporate governance in this region. 
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The categories of governance mechanisms pertinent to the empirical analyses of this thesis are 
discussed in the following section. 
Legal and Regulatory Mechanisms 
The introduction of a legal system in any country is an evolving process, generally arising from, 
and reflecting, a particular set of cultural and traditional histories. Most contemporary 
commercial law has its origins in one of two main systems: English common law and Roman 
civil law. Civil law origin can be further divided into three major groups, French, German, and 
Scandinavian and the vast majority of legal systems originate from one of these four. La Porta 
et al. (1998) test how these four legal groupings differ in investor rights protection, using data 
on publicly traded firms in 49 countries. Having divided the sample into four groups matching 
their legal origins, they compare the strength of investor protection. Their results show that the 
common law group has higher protection of investor interest than any of the civil law group. 
Further, within the legal family of civil law, the German and Scandinavian systems perform 
better than the French. However, differences also exist between types of investor, although 
investors and creditors were afforded some rights under all four systems. 
In addition to the existence of regulation at all, the quality of enforcement is central to how 
effective a governance mechanism is. This is also addressed by La Porta et al. (1998), who find 
an interesting difference in the rankings of legal systems from the results above. Isere, German 
and Scandinavian civil law have high levels of enforcement in common, with the French and 
English common law less effective:. In addition; they found that the quality of legal 
enforcement improves significantly with increases in income level. 
The final finding of La Porta et al (1997) shows that country specific differences can 
influence the effectiveness of the legal system in constraining managerial appropriation. A 
further study by La Porta et al. (2000a) considers how different legal systems protect investors' 
rights for both shareholders and creditors. Where there is an ineffective system of legal 
II 
Chapter 3- The Literature on Corporate Governance 71 
protection for investors, there will be an understandable reluctance to enter the local market. 
Where growth is dependent on the participation of general investors, and financial markets are 
crucial for the development of local firms and economies, governments are urged to improve 
legal system. The research advocates that looking for efficient mechanisms of legal protection 
is a valuable factor in establish robust systems of corporate governance. 
Ownership Structure as a Governance Mechanism 
Following the argument of Jensen and Meckling that managerial ownership concentration may 
be effective to control agency cost, researchers have studied the impact of governance 
mechanisms. However, the results provide support, for different effects depending on the 
characteristics of ownership structure. 
One example is based on a sample of 371 Fortune 500 companies in 1980. Morck et al. 
(1988) test the relationship between managerial ownership and corporate performance, 
measured by Tobin's Q. In this paper, the definition of managerial ownership is referred to the 
shareholding of all the board members holding shares greater than 0.2%. The results show that 
the governance effect of managerial ownership on, corporate performance presents a 
non-monotonic relationship rather than a simple linear one predicted by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). This analysis suggests that the positive governance effect is only sustained for 
managerial shareholding of between 0 to 5 percent or more than 25 percent. When managers 
own between 5 and 25 percent, the governance effects of managerial shareholding is negative. 
A contrary finding using a sample of more 1000 firms, McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
emerges from a re-examine of the governance effect -between managerial- ownership and 
Tobin's Q. Here, the managerial ownership is defined as shares owned by all corporate insiders 
including CEO, board directors and other senior managers. 'As with the different pattern of 
governance effects found by Morck et al. (1988), this study indicates that Tobin's Q is 
consistently positively influenced by insider ownership levels where these are low, but has a 
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positive effect where holdings are greater than 5%. The study goes on to test the governance 
effect of outside blockholder ownership and finds this has a positive but insignificant effect on 
Tobin's Q. 
A later study by Cho (1998) re-examines the governance effect of insider ownership and 
Tobin's Q, revealing a non-monotonic relationship in the governance effect similar to the 
relationship found by Morck et al. (1988) and opposite that by McConnell and Servaes (1990). 
However, Cho also examines the causality between corporate performance and ownership and 
finds an unambiguous direction of causality, with insider ownership a function of Tobin's Q and 
Tobin's Qa function of insider ownership. This conflicts with the uni-directional causality 
from Tobin's Q to insider shareholding found by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and others. 
Endogeneity in Governance and Ownership Structure 
The contradictory findings with respect to the governance effects of insider shareholding 
indicates that more care is needed in conducting empirical tests of the underlying relationships. 
An early study of corporate governance by Demsetz (1983) suggested that endogeneity was a 
major concern, arguing that firm ownership structure develops from a process involving the 
self-interested behaviour of shareholders and the influence of the market on share price. 
Demsetz claimed that regardless of the pattern of ownership, when external financing is 
required the most likely outcome is that managers actively manipulate insider shareholding in 
order to make the firm more attractive to prospective fund providers. Furthermore, where there 
is a hostile bid for the firm, each side will attempt to accumulate the maximum level of 
shareholding possible to them. However, this implies that patterns of ownership arc achieved 
by circumstance, rather than as a result, of governance mechanisms, - and simply reflect 
self-interest maximising behaviour. 
Further work by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) use a sample of 511 US firms from a number of 
sectors to investigate whether firm ownership patters are endogenous to the firm. Contrary to 
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much research on the impact of insider ownership on Tobin's Q, this study measured firm 
performance by accounting ratios and tests how these are influenced by the distribution of 
ownership. In addition, to capture any endogenous factors, two stage least square methods 
were used to estimate rather than ordinary least square techniques. Results confirm the earlier 
Demsetz study, and no significant governance factors were detected in the relationship between 
ownership structure and corporate performance. 
Again following Demsetz and Lehn (1985), analysis by Himmelberg et al. (1999) assumes 
ownership structure is endogenous. The study included a number of firm specific 
characteristics, such as size, capital intensity, R&D intensity, advertising intensity, cash flow, 
and the rate of investment, all of which could be expected to have a potential agency conflict. 
Estimation was by panel estimation, with fixed, effects to control for the endogenous 
relationship between managerial ownership and corporate performance and Tobin's Q was 
again the dependent variable. This study confirmed the findings of Demsetz and Lehn (1985), 
that is, after adding the fixed effects to control for the 'change of unobservable firm level 
characteristics, changes in managerial ownership pattern do not significantly affect firm 
performance over time. 
The methods used by Himmelberg et al has been challenged by Zhou (2001), who 
considers that by adopting the fixed effect estimators from the panel data analysis to control for 
endogeneity, the identification of any existing relationship between ownership and 
performance was invalid. Zhou claims that the fixed effect estimators are mainly used to 
exploit the differences within individuals, which removes all cross sectional effects between 
variables. If the pattern of managerial ownership differs substantially between individual firms 
and this difference does effect firm performance, the significant effect of ownership and firm 
performance will be eliminated. Because of this., Zhou predicts that it is not surprising that the 
fixed effects model failed to detect a 'significant governance impact on insider shareholding. 
Rather, the governance structure may evolve slowly from year to year within a firm and 
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therefore it is a common phenomenon that the changes in the corporate governance structure 
will not be observed with a limited period and any significant impact on individual firm 
performance will only be detected in the long term. 
Endogeneity problems may be not fatal for in a corporate governance study but it does 
require careful model design and estimation. Methods to identify and testing for the presence 
of endogeneity and subsequently instrumental variable estimation is necessary in order to 
obtain unbiased and consistent parameters. 
Board Characteristics as Governance Mechanism 
Tests of the effect of board characteristics on corporate performance have been done by a 
number of authors. In theory, the board director has wide power to influence firm decisions as 
well as monitoring activities by managers, as suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
However, the various board characteristics, such as size, share ownership and composition can 
have a significant influence on efficiency and monitoring, both of which contribute to levels of 
performance. 
Intuitively, monitoring is more effective ' where a larger proportion of members are 
independent or outsiders. Brickley et al. (1994) tested this hypothesis on a sample of 247 firms 
that had been the subject of a hostile bid between 1984 and 1986. The positive effects of 
resisting the bid on there firms were doubtful, particularly compared with the evidence that on 
managerial expropriation in this situation, found by Ryngaert (1988) and discussed above. 
Resistance strategies are usually the decision of senior management and shareholders are not 
consulted. Thus, if the responsibility of outside directors is to protect shareholder interest, 
where there is a higher percentage of these on a board, decisions are more likely to be made 
with that responsibility in mind. If the bid is hostile to management but is in the best interests of 
shareholders in terms of increased firm value, it is less likely to be opposed where the 
composition of the board is weighted towards outsiders rather than insiders. 
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Extending this hypothesis, the study found that as the percentage of outside directors on 
the board diminished the market reaction to the defence of the hostile bid becomes less 
supportive. Thus, from a positive market response where there is confidence in the outside 
directors, this becomes negative as their share decreases, with 26.5% being the cut-off point. 
Xie et al. (2003) examines the effectiveness of independent members of the board of 
directors in preventing earnings management. Earning management is the manipulation of 
accounting measures that can present a conflict between principal and agent. Where managers 
can influence reported results, external shareholders can, mislead by the disclosure of 
information and subsequently make decisions based on this poor data. Agency costs can be 
exacerbated where managerial compensation is based on reported financial performance. 
Again, the presence of independent board members with corporate or financial backgrounds are 
associated with better monitoring and will lower discretionary payments listed in the financial 
report. On the other hand, an active board, which meets frequently, is also associated with 
lower levels of discretionary payments, again suggesting that the board does perform a 
monitoring function. 
The size of board has also been shown to affect the quality-of monitoring. While a larger 
board may well be better as a monitoring mechanism, this advantage can be offset by the 
incremental cost of communication. Yermack (1996) investigated the impact of board size on 
firm performance. Using panel data from the 792 largest US firms from 1984 to 1991, the study 
used OLS in a number of models, regressing Tobin's Q and other performance measures on 
- board size and several controls including company size, industrial experience of board 
members and board equity ownership. Tobin's Q falls steadily as board size increases in the 
range from 4 to 10. For boards greater than 10, there is a positive effect on Tobin's Q. In terms 
of the alternative performance measures, results show these also deteriorated rapidly between 
board size 4 to 10 and then remain 'negative but fall much slower about board size 10. In 
addition, this research finds that the presence of non-executive chairman and a separation 
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between chairman and chief executive officer, significantly improves the valuation of these 
firms. In summary, the hypothesis that poor communication that is associated with a large 
board of directors negatively affects the quality of decision-making and leads to lower firm 
performance. 
Critics of Board Characteristics as a Governance Mechanism 
Not all authors find positive impacts associated with board size or composition. For example, 
Yermack (1996) considers external directors have little impact on the protection of shareholder 
rights. This is based on the empirical observation that while the average number of board 
members is increasing, and the share of the board held by outsiders is also increasing, there is 
no corresponding increase in firm value. This implies that the governance effect of outside 
directors is actually negative up to a particular size and then the sign changes. This finding by 
Yermack (1996) challenges the view commonly held by several researches, including Brickley 
et al. (1994) that outside directors can effectively resolve agency problems. Some of this 
criticism arises from the unresolved causality and endogeneity discussed earlier and much of 
the literature in the area concentrates on clarifying this ambiguity. One of the ways this is done 
is to examine the way that observable board characteristics have evolved into their current 
forms. Others directly link board characteristics to apparent governance outcomes. proxicd by 
firm performance. The attempt to model the process can enhance theory and explain the 
governance effect of the board of directors more comprehensively. 
A study by Warther (1998) constructs a model that considers corporate governance from 
the perspective of different board characteristics. This paper is different from previous 
corporate governance models, which simply consider the effects of corporate ownership and 
. control. 
Rather, it models the cumulative experience of board members, such as tenure as a 
manager and their association with the firm from its establishment and their performance as 
directors, such as whether monitoring, has involved votes to retain or dismiss the manager. 
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However, the model does claim that the votes of directors will be not purely based on the 
maximising firm value because, similar to managers, each director has a utility function, which 
is based on pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits that are derived from board membership. 
Higher corporate performance and evidence of careful monitoring will raise the professional 
reputation of directors and enhance their own earning capacity. It will also raise share valuation 
and thus the directors' and shareholders' interests are aligned. However, where attempts to 
discuss a manager fail, the directors are seen as poor monitors and any benefits accruing to 
board members disappear. A high profile conflict between manger and board members leaves a 
legacy of poor monitoring and thus low standards of governance. Manager that are able to 
resist calls for dismissal are considered dominant and the firm's governance mechanisms weak. 
According to this model, the utility of board members is not perfectly aligned with the interests 
of shareholders. In order to enhance board effectiveness, Warther suggests an incentive scheme 
that rewards directors that insist on replacing an ineffective manager with a competent one. 
1 According to Warther (1998) managerial - power is a critical factor in determining the 
governance effect of board characteristics.. Arthur (2001) provides evidence that managerial 
power can interfere in the process of deciding board composition. This study of 135 firms listed 
on the Australian Stock Exchange in 1989 tests the hypothesis that board composition is an 
outcome of bargaining process between the manager and the rest of the board. Results show 
that the CEOs of these companies was involved in determining board composition, with the 
number of outside directors inversely related to a series of proxies representing CEO bargaining 
power, tenure and shareholding. A further test of the impact of managerial power on board 
leader indicates that a CEO with a longer tenure or higher shareholding is more likely to be 
chairman of the board. Arthur confirms that the governance effect of board characteristics is 
neither monotonic nor uni-lateral with respect to compliance ' with shareholder preferences. 
Rather, there is an endogenous interaction among managers, shareholders and directors that 
combine to determine the composition of the board, resulting in an ambiguous impact on 
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corporate governance. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, the theoretical and empirical literature on corporate governance is reviewed in 
order to provide a framework for the analysis that follows. The chapter begins with the 
definition of the agency problem and then goes on to discuss how conflicts between principal 
and agent arise and the impact this may have on firm value. The seminal work of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) set out the early framework and the model is reviewed, in particular, to 
explain the impact on shareholder wealth from the violation of the agency relationship. 
The empirical papers that are central to the literature and most relevant to this thesis are 
included, especially those identifying examples of managerial appropriation and the impact on 
strategic decisions. Further, since the basis of the thesis is an analysis of corporate governance 
in Taiwan, empirical studies of the East Asia region are presented. These are largely based on 
the 1997-8 financial crisis which exposed shortcomings in governance, which have been linked 
directly to family ownership and control and exaggerated by cross holdings and the low level of 
outsider influence. 
Finally, the reviews of empirical agency relationship led to a discussion of the literatures 
on governance mechanisms, institutional arrangements and the rights of internal or external 
shareholders and how agency conflicts can be minimised. 'The legal system, ownership 
structure and board characteristics are presented as possible ways to contain bias and distortion, 
as well as some of the methodological problems that arise in modelling governance and control. 
In summary, this chapter set up a framework for the empirical chapters on the impact of 
ownership structure and board control to draw upon. This provides a solid basis for the 
governance aspects of this thesis. The next chapter considers foreign direct investment and the 
links between these investment decisions and the system of governance with these firms. 
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Chapter Four: The Literature on Foreign Investment Strategy 
Introduction 
To test the effects of governance mechanisms, most of the existing literature uses firm 
performance as the measure of corporate governance outcomes. However, the relationship 
between governance mechanisms and performance, is not necessarily direct but rather works 
through the improvement or deterioration in management quality. Indeed, using performance 
as a proxy may not reflect all governance related outcomes. Non-liner relationships between 
managerial ownership and corporate performance have been identified in several studies, for 
example, Short and Keasey (1999), McConnell and Servaes (1995), Kole (1995) and Morck et 
al. (1988), which may support an indirect relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance. Moreover, for work linking senior management characteristics to firm 
performance, the empirical results are ambiguous (Priem, 1990; Michel & Hambrick, 1992; 
West and Schwenk, 1996; Keck, 1997)., Carpenter (2002) argued that the inconsistent findings 
in terms of demographics and firm performance may be the result of previous studies that have 
overlooked important moderating or intervening variables. If this is so, the strategic context of 
firms is critical in determining a -relationship between differences in senior management 
characteristics and firm performance. 
Some studies have been successful in testing the effect of governance mechanisms on 
strategy adoption directly. For example, in the event study of firm diversification, it is argued 
that strategy adoption is though to be motivated by diversification that is the personal interest of 
managers involved with corporate operations (Amihud and Lev, 1981) resulting in a strategy 
that actually reduces corporate value (see Bhagat et al., 1990; Lang and Stulz, 1994; Comment 
and Jarrell, 1995). Empirically, a robust governance mechanism of high shareholding by top 
echelon managers, board directors and outside blockholders is proven to be associated with 
lower levels of corporate diversification (Berger and Ofek, 1995a; Denis et al, 1997) and even 
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encourages the adoption of strategies that refocus following diversification (Berger and Ofek, 
1995b). The findings of these studies not only validate the direct effect of governance systems 
on the value-reducing strategy, but also place the strategy decisions as the link between 
corporate governance effects and firm performance. 
Explicitly, Howell and Stover (2002) question the appropriateness of methodologies that 
link corporate governance with performance. They argued that the seemingly significant effect 
on the relationship that had widely been found in prior studies might be caused by 
miss-specified models to deal with exogenous factors or failure to control for interactive effects 
among corporate governance variables. -The problem can be caused by the 
indirect causality 
from corporate governance to firm performance, and thus the previous findings about the 
governance mechanism efficiencies on this relationship are should be re-examined within the 
strategic context of the firm. 
With this concern, this, thesis additionally tests the effect of corporate governance 
mechanisms on one of most important strategy, decisions for the development of Taiwanese 
firms in recent decade, direct foreign investment (FDI): To establish a theoretical foundation 
for the following analysis, this chapter reviews the literature on corporate internationalisation. 
Furthermore, corporate strategy decision models and governance in the context of multinational 
enterprises, which are crucial for, the link between internationalisation and corporate 
governance, are also addressed in this chapter. Finally, the relevant literatures for the two 
empirical issues on this topic are reviewed. 
Corporate Internationalisation 
Product Life Cycles in Global Corporations 
Unlike the national welfare perspective of classical economics (the Absolute Advantage of 
Adam Smith, 1723-1790, the Comparative Advantage of David Ricardo, 1772-1823) and the 
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Hechscher-Ohlin theorem' that are used in the explanation of cross-border trades, the product 
cycle theory reflects firm level decisions. Product cycle theory was introduced by Vernon 
(1966) and adopts a more dynamic perspective to explain the process that firms set up 
production facilities abroad for products that had already been standardised and matured in the 
home markets. According to the theory, the internationalisation of firm follows three stages of 
the product life cycle. First, a new product is initially developed in the home country and serves 
foreign markets by cross-border trade. Second, the production technology is captured by 
competitors in foreign markets. To deal with the prospective challenges, the initial producer 
chooses to localise the production to consolidate its foreign market. This stage is import 
substitution. Finally, the stage of export substitution occurs when the production of the good 
has fully standardised, and price competition occurs. To ensure market position, manufacture is 
transferred to low-cost countries overseas and customers are served through the export market. 
.. 
Compared with classical and neoclassical economics, the product life cycle theory 
provides an explanation of inter-industry trade and also addresses the issue of why individual 
companies engage in multinational investment and production. The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem 
highlights the importance of national resource endowment differences and suggests that these 
determine patterns of international trade. . Furthermore, product cycle theory 
introduces 
knowledge as an independent variable in the decision for trade and multinational production; it 
argues that the dispersion of innovative knowledge from advanced to developing countries is 
the most critical factor determining a range of cross-border commercial activities. Vernon 
(1966) explains that although the possibility to gain access to scientific principles might be 
equal in all the advanced countries, the distance between the technology and its embodiment 
into a marketable product varies between countries. Since knowledge is imperfectly used in 
many countries worldwide, product cycle theory - not only explains the reasons why 
multinational production occurs and is seen to be profitable, but also investigates the 
For further information, please refer to webside: http//internationalecon. com/v1.0/ch60/60c010. html 
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proliferation of multinational enterprises. 
The International Operation of the National Firm 
Another major contribution to the theory of international business was that of Hymer in a PhD 
thesis from MIT in 1960. Prior to the 1960s, the concept of multinational production was still 
immature and most economists simply treated the phenomenon of multinational investment by 
firms as the result of arbitrageur between countries, that is, capital is moving from a country 
with a low return to one providing higher returns. Hymer's thesis asserted that multinational 
investment of company involves the transfer of a whole package of corporate resources, not 
simply financial capital. Dunning and Rugman (1985) praised Hymer's contribution, stating 
that: this was an escape from the intellectual straightjacket of neoclassical type trade and 
financial theory, and moves us towards an analysis of the multinational enterprise based upon 
industrial organisation theory (p 228). 
Hymer began with one of the fundamental concepts of foreign expansion by multinational 
enterprises, that a firm requires some form of advantage in order to operate and compete in an 
unfamiliar foreign environment. This view, of the importance of acquiring competitive 
advantage over local rivals effectively underlies the . assumption of many later works on 
multinational enterprise, such as that of Dunning (1977). ', To operate in a foreign market, the 
company will encounter competition from local firms, which are much more experienced in the 
operational environment than the outsiders. - Without any means of overcoming this, the foreign 
firm has no incentive to locate in a foreign market or the ability to survive in it. The acquisition 
of competitive advantage can be -achieved in a number of ways, for example, superior 
technology and knowledge, superior management and organisational skill, access to capital, 
economics of scale, access to raw materials, when one is discovered, an overseas firm can 
sufficiently enhance its ability to compete with the local competition., 
With a greater comparative advantage, businesses will naturally extract whatever benefits 
9 
Chapter 4- The International Business Literature 83 
they can from an overseas market. However, Hymer argues that this alone does not fully 
explain the motive for multinational production. To explain the choices between multinational 
production and exporting, a number of "locational factors" should be considered. The original 
concept of location as a factor has grown in importance and is now used to discuss the 
behavioural models of foreign direct investment. For Hymer, the comparative advantages in 
multinational production push the firm to further foreign markets in the rush to expand. In 
contrast, locational factors within foreign countries attract multinational production, rather than 
encourage domestic production and then export to overseas markets. As with competitive 
advantage, a number of factors influence the locational choice of firms, such as, tariff and 
non-tariff barriers, policy of local government, idiosyncrasies of foreign market, and the 
significance of specific factors differ across industrial sectors. 
As Dunning and Rugman (1985) indicated, the Hymer thesis was a serious addition to the 
theory of international business, although it has attracted some criticism. Dunning and Rugman 
(1985) expressed some doubts, claiming that Hymer did not fully appreciate Coase (1937), and 
thus failed to distinguish the sources of market imperfections that arise from structural and 
transactions costs (p 229). Dunning argues that Hymer's analysis was based on structural 
imperfections, which form the competitive advantage of multinational firm in term of 
cross-border trade. However, many of the conceptual imperfections arisen from 
Williamson-type transaction costs (Williamson, 1975) are completely ignored. Transactions 
costs arise from market imperfection between, two countries, which are exogenous to 
organisational competitiveness. These market imperfections motivate enterprises to internalise 
multinational operations within the structure of the firm and thus improve the efficiency of 
market transactions. Following this route of multinational market internalisation, no economic 
rents would be anticipated by the firm. . 
In contrast, the concept of competitive advantage 
according to Hymer is restricted to structural market imperfections where firms can gain from 
the process by exercising structural-cost power on multinational activities. Dunning and 
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Rugman (1985) criticises Hymer further, saying there is too little attention paid to locational 
factors in the decisions of multinational enterprise (p 230). However, overall, Dunning 
considers Hymer to be pertinent in the discussion of location in multinational production. 
Transactions costs that arise from market imperfections are discussed in the next section. 
Transaction Cost Perspective for Multinational Firm: Internalisation Theory 
In the Heckscher-Ohlin model, cross-border exchange is characterised by free trade, that is, 
perfect goods and factor market are assumed in which transport costs exist, consumers' tastes 
are identical internationally and there are constant returns to scale in production. Under these 
assumptions, global demand in the product market can be fully satisfied by cross-border trade 
and there is no reason or incentive for companies to engage in multinational production. Hymer 
initially challenged these assumptions, arguing that imperfections do exist in the global market 
and claimed that because of firm specific advantages there is a good reason to engage in 
overseas production. However, Dunning and Rugman (1985) highlight the importance of the 
missed transactions costs and suggests that a theory of internalisation that explicitly adopts the 
transaction cost perspective may be more valuable. 
Although representing an incentive for foreign production, tariffs on imports present huge 
transaction costs for firms. Another distortion is the costs of securing intellectual property 
rights to avoid or delay corporate advantage being dissipated by products being copied by 
foreign agents. Transactional cost theory provides a different perspective on the reasons for the 
growth of multinational enterprises. An early paper by Coase (1937) sought to explain the 
boundaries of firm activity, although'the focus of the study was on the multi"plant domestic 
firm rather than the international operations of firms. ` In this seminal paper, Coase argues that 
firm and market represent alternative methods to organise production. The firm produces 
through the organisational structure and the market functions through a series of transactions of 
intermediate goods that result in a final product. However, it is recognised that market 
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operations are frequently distorted by externalities *that make the market costly and inefficient. 
Coase noted four types of transactions cost in the market: the brokerage cost of finding a 
correct price, the cost of defining the obligations of parties in a contract, the risk of scheduling 
and related input costs, and the taxes paid on exchange transactions in the market. The 
existence of such costs means that when the transformation of intermediate goods to final 
product can be achieved with lower cost within a corporate structure than within the market, 
transactions relating to production will be internalised and undertaken by the firm itself. Firms 
will internalise the market transactions until the marginal cost of doing so exceeds marginal 
revenue. 
Extending from the argument of Coase, Williamson (1975,1981,1985) further suggested 
that the transaction costs for a market can be examined systematically in relation to three 
factors - bounded rationality, opportunism and asset specificity. -Me bounded rationality refers 
to the individual limitation in learning all the information necessary to control for all possible 
contingencies in the future making the individual transactional decisions invariably 
sub-optimal. The costs of opportunism refer to the self-interest= behaviour during the 
transaction process causing extra expenditure on monitoring and neutralising cheating, 
misrepresentation and negotiation. Asset specificity reflects the cost of necessary investments 
in terms of material and intangible assets to validate the transaction fully and also includes the 
cost of value loss in circumstance where agents adopt alternative sub-optimal methods to 
complete the transaction. Willamson argues that when the total transactional cost of the market 
from these three sources is too high, firm will have an incentive to replace the contract by an 
organisational hierarchy. For example, when particular equipment is necessary to conduct a 
specific transaction, the market contract requires additional expenditure to settle which agent in 
the transaction should be responsible for the investment beforehand and also to prevent 
opportunism by attempting to renegotiate the trading conditions afterwards. When the extra 
cost relating to the transaction is overwhelming high, there will be an incentive to internalise 
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the market transaction by acting within the firm. 
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McManus (1972), Buckley and Casson (1976) and Hennart (1982) extend the concept of 
internalisation to explain the existence of the-, multinational enterprise. For international 
markets the expectation is that the efficiency of the transaction is contingent on much more than 
simply cross border trade, since these transactions can be distorted more seriously by additional 
transitional costs. This raises the possibility for multinational enterprise to internalise 
cross-border transactions within the same organization and thus achieve more economic and 
efficient production. However, to internalise the transactions of multinational markets is 
extremely costly and a high return is required to compensate for the added complexity of these 
international operations. Compared with Hymer, this internalisation theory conceptualises 
multinational enterprises as institutions coordinating intermediate goods production in a 
number of countries to achieve final goods production in one specific country rather than force 
the company to produce the same product in different countries simultaneously. Moreover, the 
primary concern of internalisation theory is not how multinational enterprises exercise their 
competitive advantages over local competitors, but how the cross-border transactions are 
internalised within the same firm, rather than being conducted by means of international trade 
between independent firms. 
Following this theory of multinational coordination, Casson (1987) uses internalisation 
theory to explain the patterns of both vertical and horizontal integration across national 
boundaries. Casson argues that the internalising process of multinational enterprise of the 
production of tangible intermediate goods explains the incentive for cross-national vertical 
integration, both upstream and downstream. Particularly, the incentive for vertical integration 
is contingent on the transaction costs that arise from the small number conditions. This is where 
the number of parties involved in the transaction is small, and arises from the need for physical 
asset specificity or specific expertise, which can cause difficulties in overcomes opportunistic 
behaviour during the transaction process. However, the internalisation of intangibles, including 
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knowledge and reputation globally, explains the incentive for cross-border horizontal 
integration. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is one of the most important ways for enterprise to 
coordinate multinational transactions within a single internal organization. FDI occurs when a 
firm undertakes an investment in overseas assets, in which the investor retains a substantial 
degree of ownership and control and which fundamentally internalises that investment as a 
foreign affiliate within the corporate structure. "According to the World Investment Report 
(2001), FDI has grown faster than world trade since the mid-1980s and is proof of the 
significant role of FDI in contemporary international commerce. In the modem multinational 
theories, internalisation is an enhancement, reducing market imperfections an providing an 
explanation for FDI activity. According to Rugman (1980), most existing FDI theories can be 
seen as sub-cases of internalisation theory (p 370). .: 
The Resource Based Perspective of the Multinational Firm 
Following internalisation theory the resource based view is the other most cited theory to 
explain foreign investment and multinational firm (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). The 
resource based view suggests that a combination of unique resources and capabilities within a 
company achieves its competitive advantage and thus shapes the strategy content of this firm to 
compete in markets (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). By contrast, a 
competence-based strategy of firm achieved by the resources combination helps the firm to 
achieve and maintain competitive advantage (Hamel and Heene, 1994; Itami and Rochl, 1987; 
prahalad, 1998). The reasoning from a resource based perspective supports the arguments of 
Hymer (1960) that foreign expansion strategies of firms are motivated by their own competitive 
advantage. 
The resource based perspective of the, firm states. that the firm's strategy and success 
accrue from its resource profile, developed and accumulated within the firm over time, not 
Chapter 4- The International Business Literature 88 
those acquired externally (Perurose, 1959). These resources are heterogeneous and immobile 
within the firm and provide unique services or attributes that are a source of economic rents 
(Collis, 1991; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Peteraf, 1993). The resources may be bundled to form 
capabilities that lead to the strategic potential to exploit opportunities or neutralise threats from 
competitors (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984). Such unique resources and 
capabilities usually are the source of abnormal profits and thus linked to the competitive 
advantage of the firm. Barney (1991) states that: "the sources of sustained competitive 
advantage are firm resources that, -are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and 
non-substitutable" (pp. 116). The resources and competencies achieving competitive 
advantage enable the firm to obtain a near monopoly position in the chosen markets (Rumelt, 
1987; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) 
The resource based perspective recognises not only the potential for firm-specific 
resources to provide a competitive advantage, but also acknowledges that firms must maintain 
and continuously renew, augment, and adapt their competencies over time, if they are to retain a 
competitive advantage. Strategic choice is essential for 'a - firm to enhance and foster the 
. valuable resources and competences (Cohen and Levintha., 1990; Dierickx and Cool, 1989). 
Accordingly, the strategic decisions made by senior managers play an important role in 
leveraging corporate resources and seeking to accumulate or develop the necessary resources to 
retain competitiveness in the future (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Tyler and Steensma, 1995). 
Collis (1991) argues that the capacity of management for continuous renewal is contingent on 
the firms' ability to innovate, learn, and transfer information within and between the firm and its 
environment. 1., 
The resource-based perspective is primarily applied in the strategy field to explain 
firm-level performance resulting from idiosyncratic resources and capabilities. However, many 
studies have explicitly suggested. that it is compatible with the rationale for cross-border 
investment (Fladmoe-Lindquist and, Tallman, 1994; Tallman, 1992; Hitt et al, 1997). 
Chapter 4- The International Business Literature 89 
Specifically, by extending resource-based thinking to the international arena, it may be able to 
offer further insights into the rationale behind the deployment of firm-specific assets in foreign 
markets. 
Moreover, resource-based view complements the argument of Hymer (1960) about the 
location attractiveness of the host-country (Trevino and Grosse, 2002). To attract foreign 
investment, host-country location must offer benefits to help investors overcome the inherent 
disadvantages of operating in an unfamiliar setting. By contrast, the unique resources and 
capabilities of investing firms must be matched to the host-country environment because of 
location-specific advantages, and then move to the foreign investment decision. In line with 
this argument, empirical studies have found a strong connection between global sourcing 
choices and foreign investment decisions and proved that the location advantage provided by 
global sourcing that achieves low-cost conditions of production, complements firm-specific 
resources in pursuing overseas markets (Park, 2000; Fladmoe-Lindquist and Tallman, 1994). 
This confirms that the foreign investment of firms is not only based on the motive of market 
seeking, but also on the strategic and economic aim to increase competitive advantage in 
domestic or international markets. 
The Eclectic Paradigm 
Incorporating the major factors that account for the motivation that leads to multinational 
production, the eclectic paradigm provides the necessary foundation. The eclectic paradigm 
was initially proposed Dunning in 1977 and gradually evolved into contemporary theory. The 
eclectic paradigm identifies those factors relevant to the decision to become a multinational 
firm and from these constructs a conceptual framework that explains multinational production. 
According to the paradigm, the performance of multinational enterprises is determined by three 
sets of factors: ownership advantage, location advantage and internalisation advantage. 
Incorporating the theory proposed by Hymer discussed above, the eclectic paradigm 
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incorporates ownership advantage as the first set of factors, although here it is directly linked to 
the ability of the firm to deal with the competition in foreign markets and as such, is called 
firm-specific advantage in this context. In the initial paper, Dunning describes ownership 
advantage from three aspects of corporate capability. The first stems from the exclusive 
privileges that allow the company to possess or access specific income generating assets, such 
as the patent or unique technology that enable = the firm to innovate new products or to 
differentiate existing products from the mainstream. Secondly, Dunning argues that the 
firm-specific advantage can be determined by the methods and extent in which the current 
firm's operations can support its foreign expansion. For example, depending on the existing 
advantage gained from economies of scale in current operation, the newly acquired foreign 
plant will have superior productive resources and materials compared with the local 
competition. The final ownership advantage derives from the firm's ability to create or add 
value for the benefit of its multinational operations as part of a portfolio of business in various 
locations. This advantage can be a function of the level of knowledge and information acquired 
to conduct corporate management or marketing activities. Moreover, the ability of the firm to 
devolve these intangibles to foreign subsidiaries, and the extent to which these intangibles can 
be used to compete in particular foreign markets, will further determine ownership advantage. 
Generally, the ownership advantage in the eclectic paradigm can be referred to as the specific 
characteristics of the firm that enhance it to retain a competitive advantage and survive in 
foreign market. 
The second group in the eclectic paradigm that shapes the outcome of multinational 
enterprises are the advantages derived from location-specific characteristics. These represent 
the absolute and relative benefits of different locations for multinational production. In fact, the 
characteristics of specific locations, such as subsides from, local government, good local 
infrastructure, a robust institutional environment or lack of ethnic conflict, will clearly appeal to 
foreign companies to locate in the area. Dunning and Dilyard (1999) states that the location 
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specific advantage of a particular location rests on the ability of national or sub-national 
markets, and of governments, to provide a unique set of long-term assets essential for investing 
firms (p 12). To construct robust models of locational advantage that truly explain why firms 
choose specific production destinations and to what extent locational characteristic impact on 
this choice. While the eclectic paradigm separates location advantage from ownership 
advantage, Dunning agrees that the location advantage and ownership advantage are by 
necessity interdependent. Dunning explicitly acknowledges that at the same time as the 
company exercise their location advantage, ownership advantage should also be considered. 
On the other hand, the exercise of location advantage is also influenced by imperfections in 
local market that arise from positive transactions cost barriers to free trade. 
In the eclectic paradigm, the final factor determining multinational production is the 
internalisation advantage. Based on the concept of internalisation theory, multinational 
enterprises can benefit by coordination within the organisational structure and thus eliminate 
major transactions across national borders. . To consolidate the benefits of internalisation 
advantage, the multinational can establish an internal hierarchy within the subsidiary structure 
of the total worldwide organisation. - Different responsibilities can be assigned as part of a 
strategy aiming to achieve location-specific advantage in each area. However, in reality, the 
extent to which a company can realize any internalisation advantage varies considerably. For 
example, the ability of a multinational company to harmonise the production in different 
geographical areas can significantly determine the success of international operations. 
Companies at the start of their international operations will take some time to acquire the 
necessary experience and internal hierarchies such as inter-firm alliances or network take some 
time to establish. As they become more efficient, the company will be able to maximise the 
benefits from the internalisation of production:: Higher level of integration results in synergistic 
advantage impacting both vertical and horizontal processes, with direct benefits to the 
company. 
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The previous section has outlined the structure of the eclectic paradigm and the three sets of 
advantages accessible in multinational production. However, before this framework can be 
applied in an empirical analysis, some contextual factors must be considered. The value of this 
model for any particular firm depends largely upon four contextual variables. 
The first set of variables address the question of why the company is involved in 
multinational operations in the first place. The basis motivations for companies to undertake 
multinational production vary considerably, and will have a bearing on the distribution of 
advantages between ownership, location and internalisation. Dunning (1993) distinguished 
four different incentives that can motivate company, namely, resource seeking, market seeking, 
efficiency seeking and strategic asset seeking, all of which are based on the common aim of 
maximising the value of the firm. 
The second set reflects the influence of the firm's country of origin. Given differences in 
resource endowments across the world, this is a major determinant of the extent to which firms 
can benefit through ownership, location and. internalisation ý advantage. These inherent 
differences mean that countries have actively or passively developed in ways that have enabled 
them to prosper in as part of a global environment, with some encouraging outward investment 
or as the recipient of inward investment. 
The third set of factor is associated with industry level effects that particularly apply to 
firm internationalisation. It is clear that certain industries or types of businesses have a greater 
tendency to have multinational operations. For these activities, foreign expansion appears 
especially appropriate, while advantages in terms of ownership, location and internalisation are 
not so obvious in others. However, ' different industry sectors can also require different 
conditions, such as subsidies, -intellective property protection, abundant and cheap labour, 
highly skilled labour, infrastructure and the benefits arising from the economics of 
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agglomeration. Consequently, these contextual factors are highly industry specific. 
The final set of contextual variable deals with innate firm differences. These include 
factors such as size, history, market, product range, the degree of external and internal 
integration in production processes, the management team and corporate culture and identify. 
These can result in huge variations in the levels of success achieved by multinational 
production. 
The eclectic paradigm has provided a useful framework for research. Particularly with 
empirical studies, the inherent differences are highly relevant as a wide range of production 
processes are moved into the international arena. Many of the factors discussed are interrelated 
and the direction of causality is frequently ambiguous. This literature has provided a guide to 
modelling multinational production decisions at the firm level but takes account of exogenous 
factors and industry specific characteristics. ' Criticism of the initial arguments of the eclectic 
paradigm has focussed on its generality, rather than explicitly take a single testable hypothesis 
to task. Although the explanatory power, of the eclectic paradigm on specific area of 
multinational production may be limited by its generality, this can be strengthened by firm level 
factors. In summary, the merits of the eclectic paradigm as a research tool are enhanced by the 
inherent flexibly to resolve micro level controls. 
The Uppsala Model of Internationalisation 
Both Dunning (1980,1988) and Hymer (1960) adopt a relatively static perspective to explain 
foreign investment as a series of choices dictated by specific efficiency considerations and 
relative transaction costs and benefits. By contrast, in the spirit of Vernon (1966), another 
tradition of international - business views internationalisation as a sequential process of 
-, increasing involvement within and across-foreign markets., Within this tradition, the Uppsala 
model is one of the most cited and contested theories in the literatures (Chandy and Williams, 
1994). °:, 
Chapter 4- The International Business Literature 94 
The Uppsala model is developed by a series of papers by Johanson and his colleges at 
Uppsala University, Sweden. These argue that the expansion of firms into foreign markets is 
undertaken on the basis of incremental steps (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Johanson 
and Vahlne, 1977; 1990). According to the model, one of the primary obstacles to international 
operations is the lack of knowledge about foreign markets. However, this market knowledge is 
accessible to foreign investors. The model argues that acquiring knowledge is necessary for a 
multinational enterprise to be active in the new market, although this requires the intangible 
commitments of the firm to increase its connection with the market (Hadjikhani, 1997). Further, 
to tackle market uncertainty in the unfamiliar environment, the model argues that a learning 
process is required for the investing firm, and based on a learning by doing proposition, 
decisions and their implementation concerning the foreign investments are made incrementally. 
Johanson and Vahlne (1977) argues that as long as the perceived risk remains higher than the 
maximum tolerable risk, the company will rather postpone investing in new markets. Finally, 
the. model advocates the concept that the experience itself can never be transferred (Penrose, 
1959). Therefore, the knowledge accumulated by the experiences of problem solving that are 
intrinsic to a foreign market will be learned and maintained primarily by those who are working 
in the market. 
Basing on the four core concepts of market knowledge, market commitment, commitment 
decisions and current activities, the Uppsala model addressed how organisations learn and how 
the learning behavior causes incremental steps in the internationalisation process (Clark and 
Pugh, 2001). Explicitly, the-model predicts two basic rules for the pattern of firm 
internationalisation. First, the foreign investment is begun and continued in just one or a few 
neighbouring countries, rather than in several countries simultaneously. Second, the operation 
in a specific country is carried out on a step-by-step pattern to establish a chain of contacts - for 
example, the move from pure exporting to appointing an agent to setup a sale subsidiary 
overseas and, finally, establishing a production facility. At the same time, the operation is 
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accompanied by a process of learning from people working in the marketplace. 
The process of incremental knowledge accumulation in the Uppsala internationalisation 
model provides an alternative view to the tacit tradition in the international business literature 
that discusses how the firm reacts to the location attractiveness of a host-country, and gradually 
shapes the spatial distribution of corporate foreign investments. Specifically, in order to limit 
market uncertainty and to facilitate knowledge accumulation, the physical distance is 
considered critical in the model as the factor that determines which market the international 
enterprise will enter. Moreover, according to the model, knowledge accumulation depends on 
current activities. With the knowledge gained from these activities, the company acquires 
valuable insights to continue operating in this location. At the same time, the increasing 
investment in the location will deepen its commitment to other actors in the market and reduce 
the alternative uses of the committed resources. All of these cause the firm to stick to specific 
markets with familiar environments rather than explore new business alternatives (Forsgren, 
2002). 
In terms of organisational learning, the Uppsala model primarily recognises single a 
approach of learning through experience. However, other studies have revealed multiple 
dimensions on this. An organisation can gain access to knowledge from other firms, without 
having to go through exactly the same experiences (Eriksson et al, 1997; 1998; Hansen, 1999; 
Kraatz, 1998). Specifically, mimetic behaviour (Huber, 1991), by acquiring organisations or 
hiring people with the necessary knowledge (Barkerns and Vermeulen, 1998; Huber, 1991) and 
conducting a focused search for new information (Huber, 1991), all have potential for 
organisational learning. Thus, the unitary view of the Uppsala ' model on the experiential 
learning may not hold for some firms that have diffuse international operations and undertaken 
more disperse strategies for foreign investment. Forsgren (2002) states that "the fact that firms 
sometimes `follow the herd" when they invest abroad, or learn through the imitation of other 
organisation - network partners or organisations with high legitimacy - should also be 
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The Strategic Decision Model 
Over the past few decades, researchers have attempted to model strategic decision-making 
processes, for example, Mintzberg et al (1976), Hickson et al (1986) and Hart (1992), although 
empirical testing of these models remains incomplete (Schwenk, 1995). Perhaps not 
surprisingly, a single model to explain the decision process in practice is inappropriate, and 
much of this research has focussed how parties involved in strategy formation interact amongst 
themselves. One popular area of research considers the cognitive process of managers, such as 
Huff (1990), or of organisation, such as Prahalad & Bettis (1986) and Lyles & Schwenk (1992) 
and their response to challenges arising from changing environments. 
These studies do not only support managerial influence on strategy formation, but more 
importantly, they argue that, as with individuals, organisations adjust to competition from 
external environments, and their strategic responses reflect this. Prahalad and Bettis (1986) 
suggest that the strategic decision process is guided by the dominant managers' judgement and 
this reflects the shared view of the firm. Extending this from the discussion of the managers' 
judgement, Lyles and Schwenk (1992) suggest there are processes in which ideas from various 
individuals within the firm are combined to develop policy at the organisational level. 
Moreover, when environmental change invalidates existing management responses to 
challenges, members of the management team articulate their views on how to retain or recover 
high levels of competitiveness. These are then coalesced by the dominant coalition of 
managers into a revision of organisational strategies that fit the new situation. The ability of 
firms to do this is large dependent on the individual contributions but also on the effectiveness 
of the dominant coalition. Thus, the study of how dominant coalitions function is essential in 
the understanding of strategic decision-making. 
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bankrupt firms are associated with smaller board size, but their test further pointed out firms 
with a smaller board at the time of bankruptcy are more likely to survive in the post-bankruptcy 
period. Other studies consider situations were the chief executive office is also the chairman, 
and the propensity for this to occur in failing firms. Daily and Dalton (1994a, 1994b) 
confirmed that compared with surviving companies, bankrupt firms had a greater incidence of 
this dual structure. 
In contrast to these cross-section studies on specific corporate situations, others research 
has adopted a more dynamic prospective to examine the causes and consequences of turnover 
of senior management and strategic change. For example, a number of case studies of 
recovered or rescued firms have documented how new executives can bring different skills and 
new perspectives to problems of declining firms, for example, Nystrom and Starbuck (1984) 
and Slatter (1984). Michel and Hambrick (1992) report that the characteristics of senior 
managers can achieve significant impacts on developing diversification strategies. Wiersema 
and Bantel (1992) showed that using more flexible strategies within an organisation is 
positively related to characteristics such as being relatively younger, being more experienced 
and having a level of educational. On the other hand, environmental factors within firms 
influence the choice of the upper echelon team (Keck and Tushman, 1993). Thus, changes in 
organisational environments may, cause a shift in the characteristics of the team that are 
necessary to respond to different competitive situations. Finally, Wiersema and Bantel (1993) 
showed that turnover of senior team members was lowest when the company faced a 
munificent, stable, and simple environment. 
Conflicts in Upper Echelon Teams 
Unlike the work on the heterogeneity of senior manager characteristics, other studies 
emphasize the operational patterns of upper echelon teams. To capture the effect of interactions 
among team members in their decision-making, this work focuses on the conflicts arising from 
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the decision process. The traditional view has been that conflict among senior team members 
obstructs decision-making, for example, Hickson et al (1986). More recently, however, 
researchers have found that conflict can improve the quality of decisions and enhance 
understanding of the environment (see Schweiger et al, 1986a; 1986b; Schwenk, 1990a; 1990b). 
Amason and Schweiger (1994) point out that conflict can appear in different forms. If the 
conflict is cognitive, based on task-oriented principles, or arising from differences in judgment 
or perspective, this could facilitate the exchange of information among the team and be 
beneficial overall. But the conflict can be affective, when it is based on personal 
incompatibilities or disputes, it can produce suspicion, distrust, and hostility among team 
members, which is detrimental for strategy decision. Ensley et al. (2002) provide evidence that 
cohesion within the senior team is negatively related to affective conflict and positively related 
to cognitive conflict, suggesting the dual-effects of conflict on decision quality. 
Several researchers have warned that when teams try to obviate affective conflict, it may 
simultaneously constrain occurrences of cognitive conflict and thus reduce decision quality 
(see: Schweiger et al, 1986a; 1986b; Schwenk, 1990a; 1990b; Pinkley, 1990; Pelled, 1996; 
Pelled et al, 1999). For example, some studies suggest higher heterogeneity in senior managers 
is a way to stimulate information exchange and enhance decision quality (see: Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984; Nemeth, 1986; Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Eisenhardt and Schoonhovcn, 1990; 
Hambrick et al, 1996). However, heterogeneous teams require greater coordination and 
monitoring, as noted by Cho et al (1994) and Priem (1990). If this does not occur, harmful 
conflict may obstruct communication and undermine the team's ability to act collectively 
(Priem, 1990; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990). Pelled et al. (1999) explains that the 
dilemma for conflict is based on the fact that no one truly takes criticism happily or likes to be 
contradicted and when disputes take place, senior team members may feel that others do not 
respect their judgement. 
Fortunately, recent theoretical and empirical research has showed that cognitive and 
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affective conflicts do not necessarily occur simultaneously (Jehn, 1994; Jehn, 1995; Amason et 
al., 1995; Amason, 1996). These studies argue that senior managers prefer to retain conflict 
where it is task-focused. When the conflict is oriented to individuals, this is detrimental and the 
commitment of that manager will decline and be less able to make high quality decisions. Thus, 
where there is a stimulus to use cognitive conflict in strategy decisions, team members may 
choose to remove any affective factors from the interaction process. Amason and Sapienza 
(1997) provided evidence that with strategies to stimulate team efficiency, the top management 
are more likely to engage in cognitive conflict but limit affective conflict. Thus, not only will 
high quality strategic thought be ensured but the commitment, coordination and trust among 
team members would be established in the team, all of which are essential for good planning 
and implementation (Tjosvold et al., 1992; Jehn, 1994; Mohr and Spekman, 1994). 
Although senior management may be averse to personal conflicts intrinsically, in certain 
circumstance, it may be important to retain dominance in the decision process and comply with 
the interests of specific parties. Consequently, interaction among managers can cross the line of 
pure conflict to a conflict of interest where the politics of the firm becomes involved in the 
process of decision making. Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) differentiated politics from 
conflict as politics being those covert actions by which executives enhance their power to 
influence a decision. Moreover, from a study of eight microcomputer firms, they found that 
politics tended to emerge when power was centralised, whereas the occurrence of politics was 
negatively related to organisational performance. As the politics are based in contests of 
self-interest, contests amongst senior managers, when it appears to be harmful to the quality of 
decision-making, implies a principal-agent problem has arisen. In a theoretical paper, 
Eisenhardt (1989) suggested that an agency prospective might provide a feasible framework for 
the study of conflict and politics in strategic decision-making. 
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Fundamentally, corporate governance deals with the agency problem to assure the corporate 
finance provider get a return on their investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Compared with 
upper echelon theory, corporate governance is more about emphasising the legal obligation of 
the management team in corporate management. Facing the fact that corporate management is 
unavoidably separated from ownership and the company management team hold substantial 
power in corporate issues, it is necessary to set a robust framework to monitor the moral hazard 
that may be an outcome of managerial discretion. On the other hand, with established 
frameworks, the self-interest factors can be reduced, since from the agency prospective, the 
quality of strategic decisions and the value of the firm would be enhanced if the company is able 
to construct efficient governance mechanisms. 
Numerous empirical studies have been reviewed in Chapter 2 that prove that self-interest 
is part of strategy decisions and a robust governance system is necessary to constrain the 
problem post ante. Through monitoring the potential problems of management, governance 
mechanisms can discipline the activities of the upper echelon team and stimulate the 
development of superior strategies. For example, the findings of Bhagat et al. (1990), Lang and 
Stulz (1994), and Comment and Jarrell (1995) link poor quality of corporate governance with 
the adoption of value-reducing strategy relating to diversification, which extends the operations 
of the firm to unfamiliar areas. Moreover, companies with poorer governance efficiency are 
found to be more likely to undertake negative return take-overs (Lewellen et al, 1985), resulting 
in little or no benefits to shareholders (DeAngelo and Rice, 1983; Ryngaert, 1988; Malatesta 
and Walkling, 1988). 
Models of Internal Governance in Multinational Enterprises 
International theory has addressed the motives of multinational enterprises to internalise 
cross-border transactions within the firm. Strategic decision theory has also enhanced levels of 
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understanding that explain how different patterns of corporate internationalisation are achieved. 
However, the precise form of the internal governance architecture in a multinational enterprise 
has still to be explained and will be addressed next. 
Governance Costs of Internal Transactions, 
According to the transaction cost perspective, the primary reason for multinational enterprises 
is to internalise external transactions into the production hierarchy in order to minimise or avoid 
the costs arising from market transactions. However, to do this incurs considerable pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary costs to managers. In particular, multinational production involves several 
intermediate products made by subsidiaries worldwide. This results in high costs of internal 
governance that follow from the co-ordination of effort across the firm. Teece (1983) argues 
that governance costs are a crucial factor in determining whether the company will internalise 
specific production activity within the firm and explains the scope of the effect on corporate 
operations. In the study, governance costs are a function of the complexity of knowledge and 
asset specificity relating to internalising market transactions. In addition, the risk of 
expropriation during the range of operations is also a crucial factor. The greater the risk, the 
more international governance costs will be achieved. If there is high governance costs in 
internalising direct transactions, foreign expansion by FDI will be avoided and other methods, 
such as licensing or purchasing may be preferable. 
Buckley and Carter (1996,1998) use the problem of organisational design to identify the 
governance costs of internal transactions. These include the problems of communicating 
information, the co-ordination of complementarily among internal productions and the ability 
to limit opportunistic behaviour in corporate development. They argue that in optimal 
organisational design all participants have access to the best decision-relevant knowledge, all 
complementary actions are chosen jointly and all corporate members share a common objective 
function. Then, internal transaction costs will be eliminated. In contrast, deviating from this 
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optimum incurs losses and operational costs associated with internal transactions. Specifically 
with respect to information sharing, the internal transactions of the company suffer from poor 
decision-making plus the addition costs of finding and filtering the correct information. 
Departure from the optimal level of co-ordination will result in the lack of activity matching 
and the loss of synergy that fully complementary production allows. Finally, departure from the 
optimal conditions for motivation will cause corporate losses from members pursing individual 
objectives and behaviour. 
Governance Costs in Multinational Firms 
It would be reasonable to predict that internal transaction costs will be greater where firms are 
operating in a number of countries rather than only one. In particular, the spatial separation of 
internal transactions related to multinational operations will naturally increase costs, with 
respect to information sharing, co-ordination and complementarity in production and shared 
objective functions. Although the latest technology effectively shortens the spatial distance 
between overseas subsidiaries and facilitates internal cross-border transactions as single 
country operations, the investment to acquire the technology will cause an additional 
transaction cost. Thus, the multinational enterprise will require higher expenditure on internal 
governance to overcome the additional externalities of internal transactions that arise from 
multinational operations. 
Apart from the difficulty of spatial separation, factors such as language differences can 
cause an additional barrier to internalising multinational transactions into the firm, 
fundamentally increasing the transaction costs of communication and co-ordination. Despite 
the prevalence of English as the global business language, casing communication costs of the 
multinational enterprise and possibly converging with local costs, more expenditure may be 
necessary for recruitment, education and training. But, perhaps the hardest problem is to 
confront motivation in individuals that do not share the same objectives. Cultural differences 
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may make motivation or discipline difficult to manage in organisations comprised of 
employees with a range of alliances and loyalties and for whom a single alignment with 
corporate culture is not possible. Thus, the problems relating to the greater geographical and 
cultural distances encountered within multinational operations are potentially the highest 
source of governance costs. 
The question of cultural differences has been examined by Hofstede (1980). This research 
has shown that even in multinational enterprises, which operate within a framework of a clear 
and strong company culture, the managerial differences among national subsidiaries can still be 
overwhelming. The implications of this are the additional governance costs necessary to deal 
with the principal-agent problems that may exist between corporate headquarters and overseas 
subsidiaries and the efforts required to reconcile conflicting interests. In particular, through the 
process of multinational expansion, firms encounter various societal and institutional structures 
within the national environments of other countries, many of which are greatly different from 
those at home. In order to offset the costs of this lack of familiarity of local markets and 
institutions, the multinational enterprise may choose to manage the subsidiary locally. 
However, the effect of subsidiary management has the potential to separate even further local 
management from the headquarters, exacerbating the intra-firm transactions costs. 
Governance in Multinational Firms 
This divergence between wholly domestic operations and those of multinational enterprises, 
and the additional costs involved, is not new. Three centuries ago, Adam Smith explicitly 
advocated the concept that greater quality of corporate governance should be expected in 
companies involved in international trade. He wrote: 
... It is upon this account that joint stock companies for foreign trade have seldom been able to maintain 
the competition against private adventures. They have, accordingly, very seldom succeeded without an 
exclusive privilege, and frequently have not succeeded with one. With an exclusive privilege they have 
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commonly mismanaged the trade. With an exclusive privilege they have both mismanaged and confined 
it. (Smith 1776/1976: ii. 264-5) 
However, these relationships can be managed well, given experience and the willingness 
to adjust to new situations. Kogut (1983) compared the governance costs between experienced 
and inexperienced foreign investors and found that the corporate governance gap can be 
reduced as managers move along the learning curve and adapt to multinational operations. 
However, even this finding proves that the governance costs of multinational enterprise will be 
a declining function of time and geographical spread, with early costs unavoidable. 
Buckley and Casson (1992) suggest several responses to the problem, including 
divisionalisation, matrix structures, and strategic business units and joint ventures. The first 
allows the multinational enterprise to make use of local information and assigns managers to 
different operating divisions that form part of the international network. In this way, the firm 
can create a series of national divisions that duplicate marketing and production from country to 
country, with sub-national divisions that operate within the same territory. By communication 
amongst divisions of both types, internal corporate information, resources and knowledge can 
be shared. The second possible solution is the matrix structure, which provides a series of 
connecting channels for passing information and increasing co-ordination. Strategic business 
units refer to a full matrix structure, not limited to existing information channels but involving 
intra-firm linkages among particular divisions that eventually form a team responsible for 
achieving specified corporate targets. Depending on the organisational structure, the internal 
transactions of the multinational enterprise should be more efficient in providing information 
and co-ordination once this is established. Finally, the network of joint ventures and alliances 
mainly refers to the external linkages of multinational enterprise with other companies, both 
multinational and local. Through the joint venture or alliances network, collaboration amongst 
companies will be possible, and companies can enlarge the scope of their internal transactions 
and compensate for the initial governance-related expenditure. 
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Although internal governance mechanisms do exist in the structure of multinational firms, 
these mechanisms can be cumbersome and represent a passive response to corporate 
governance. In terms of divisionalisation and matrix structures, they can be bureaucratic and 
hierarchical in character, which would complicate the transaction process within firms. 
Moreover, the strategic business units and joint ventures network are contingent upon the 
co-operation of partners that may be engaged in competing opportunist behaviour that caused 
the problem in the first place. 
Corporate Governance Effect on Internationalisation Strategy 
In theory, internal governance cost is an essential issue for a multinational enterprise, however, 
empirical studies to test in what extent this factor can impact on internationalisation decision, 
even though the corporate governance is revealed to be influential in certain strategy outcomes 
are rare. An early paper to do so is Filatotchev et al. (1999; 2001). Using data on privatised 
firms in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, this research examined the roles of managerial ownership 
and managerial board representation on the process of strategic decisions about promoting 
export intensity. The study began by testing the effects of several possible strategies that would 
impact on exporting activity and then discussed whether the governance factors of the firm 
influenced the adoption of these strategies. Their results revealed strong evidence of corporate 
governance effects on strategic choices. In particular, both managerial ownership and 
managerial board representation had a negative impact on the adoption of export-facilitating 
strategies, although were positively associated with export-blocking strategies. As exporting 
activity would increase uncertainty, risk-averse managers opt for the less risky strategy rather 
than become involved in high levels of international commitments. Thus, strategic intentions to 
export were significantly influenced by corporate governance factors. 
On the other hand, Carpenter (2002) discusses international strategies in a review of 
various issues related to the corporate governance effect on performance. In the spirit of 
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Prahalad (1990), the paper claims that internationalisation is a process that exacerbates the 
complexity of the total range of management tasks and the extent of this is a good proxy for 
environmental complexity. The extent of heterogeneity amongst senior managers, measured by 
education, functional background and tenure was found to be positively related to performance 
at low levels of internationalization, but had a negative effect at high levels of environmental 
complexity. Contrasting this finding to the conflict perspectives of upper echelon theory, it was 
found that managerial complexity would damage team efficiency by increasing affective 
conflict and decreasing cognitive conflict. While this work does not directly discuss the effect 
of corporate governance on strategic decisions, the findings do support corporate strategy as a 
critical contextual variable that moderates the relationship between governance mechanisms 
and management outcomes. Moreover, by adding the international factor into the process of 
corporate governance, the links between these variables is confirmed. Despise the ambiguous 
causality between corporate governance and internationalisation, this paper is interesting and 
will lead to further research to verify these linkages. 
To further test the corporate governance effect on firm internationalisation, two further 
questions, neglected so far, are proposed by this thesis to test corporate governance effects on 
investing decision and location decision of FDI. The relevant literatures on the topics are 
reviewed next. 
Corporate Governance and the FD1 Decision 
Given the increasing levels of integration in the world economy, internationalisation has 
become the mantra for corporate growth. In the past, international economists were more 
interested in the structure of trade relations than in patterns of foreign investment. However, 
flows of foreign direct investments during the last few decades have accelerated spectacularly, 
far outstripping the growth in world trade. The World Bank data (World Development 
Indicators, 1999) reports that worldwide FDI flows have grown from US$ 46 billion in 1980 to 
Chapter 4 -The International Business Literature 108 
US$ 644 billion in 1998. At the same time, statistics from the WTO (Annual Report, 1998) 
indicate that worldwide flows of FDI increased by over 1000% between 1984 and 1998, while 
world trade grew by only 91%. The remarkable increase of FDI flows confirms that this has 
become an extremely popular vehicle by which firms achieve their strategic objectives. 
Buckley (1996) argues that FDI represents a major strategic weapon for enterprises in their 
struggles for the world's appropriable surplus. 
Compared with trade, FDI implies that the investor is able to exert a considerable degree 
of influence on the management of their overseas enterprises, which naturally gives rise to a 
greater level of risk and complexity for the firm. This makes FDI a quite different form of 
investment from a simple portfolio arrangement of organizational assets and knowledge (see 
Aliber, 1971, Kogut, 1983). Many studies consider FDI to be a strategy that extends corporate 
advantage in domestic markets to international ones (Caves, 1971; Dunning, 1980; Teece, 
1981). Moreover, the bandwagon effect has been used to describe FDI motivated by 
companies' rush to invest abroad as a strategic response to oligopsonistic rivalry in home 
markets, Knickerbocker (1973). In contrast to outward FDI motives, some studies have argued 
that firms choosing multinational production rather than trade, do so because of 
transactional-cost-saving incentives and intend to internalise the necessary cross-border 
transactions within a single organization (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Ilennart, 1982; Buckley, 
1987). At the same time, the Upsaala model proposed by Johanson and Vahlne (1977) focuses 
on the diverse FDI opportunities available to a firm and suggests incrementalism in the process 
of foreign investment. An appropriate context for the discussion of this phenomenon is 
Dunnings eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1980,1995) discussed earlier. The paradigm is 
composed of three measures of specific FDI advantage to provide a comprehensive framework 
embracing most perspectives and models to explain and predict FDI related decisions. 
In the international business literature, many studies have identified cross-country 
differences in the general political environment that are important factors in the process of 
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corporate internationalisation (Altomonte, 2000; Bavan and Estrin, 2000; Morisset, 2000; 
Stevens, 2000; Tuman and Emmert, 1999). At the same time, La Porta et al. (1998,1999,2000a, 
2000b) suggest that the national institutional framework will determine the quality of corporate 
governance in the country. In a survey of 49 countries (La Porta et al., 1997), those with an 
efficient legal system to prevent agency problems had a positive and significant association 
with healthy economic development and larger international capital markets, whether 
predominately credit or debt based. A highly developed capital market enables resident 
companies to acquire financial resources and also provides access for firms in specific 
industries to reach strategic assets and markets, consolidating the advantages of FDI at that 
location. Oxelheim et al. (2001) noted that for firms resident in countries with small, illiquid 
capital markets, financial resources are essential for their survivor, particularly when facing 
international competition. Thus, the existence of a well-function capital market is an important 
factor, correcting the inherent defect of their home country. In summary, it is expected that the 
country with better institutional infrastructure in corporate governance will reduce the political 
risk of a location and strengthen its functional value in global operation, in turn encouraging 
further FDI inflow. 
Further research on the role of governance infrastructure in influencing global FDI flows 
is Globerman and Shapiro (2002), using data on 144 developed and developing countries from 
1995 to 1997. This study assessed not only the extent to which governance infrastructure 
attributes attracted FDI inflows but also on whether this increased the internationalisation of 
domestic firms. They used the same three variables as La Porta et al. (1997,1999,2000a, 
2000b) to measure the quality of governance infrastructure: the effectiveness of the legal 
system in protecting individual property rights, the credibility and honesty of public institutions 
and the degree that governmental policies favour free and open market. Results clearly 
indicated that governance infrastructure is an important determinant of both FDI inflows and 
outflows. Moreover, for most countries, both inflows and outflows respond positively to good 
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governance. Kishi (2003) too, provided empirical evidence in the context of the Asian financial 
crisis to support the view that efforts to upgrade financial infrastructure approximate to optimal 
corporate governance is critical for the enhancement of FDI inflows. According to the 
arguments of existing studies (for example, Claessens et al., 2000; Johnson et al., 2000; Mitton, 
2002), the poor institutional environment of the South-east Asian countries accounted for the 
difficulty they had in responding to the crisis. A survey by Kishi on Japanese FDI projects in 
East Asian countries was used to compare the profitability of these firms before and after the 
financial crisis. Results show that the FDI cases located in Asian countries that actively 
engaged in financial reform after the crisis, such as South Korea and China, outperformed the 
rest. 
Thus far, many studies have recognised the institutional framework of corporate 
governance as one of the locational advantages to motivate or attract FDI, however, in this 
review of the international business and corporate governance literature, it is rare for existing 
research to treat corporate governance as a firm-specific advantage that determines the decision 
to undertake FDI. While Globerman and Shapiro (2002) have confirmed the importance of 
governance institutions to FDI outflow, the form of the governance factors in firm level FDI 
decisions remains ambiguous. The links between corporate governance mechanisms and 
strategic decisions has been extensively discussed and it does appear that a significant 
relationship can be found between them (Berger and Ofek, 1995a; 1995b; Denis et al, 1997). 
Given this consensus, it is reasonable to expect that FDI decisions are influenced by corporate 
governance factors. 
Spatial Distribution of FDI 
In the internationalisation theories, locational factors have been widely treated as crucial 
elements (for example, Hymer, 1960; Dunning, 1977). In addition, an extensive empirical 
literature has developed that tests the effect of specific locational factors that may attract or 
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repel foreign investors. Among these, one of the most common arguments is that locational 
characteristics based on macroeconomic conditions are responsible for FDI spatial distribution 
outcome. Coughlin, Terze and Arromdee (1991) observed FDI in the US during the period 
1981-1983 and found the three macroeconomic characteristics most influential in determining 
the location decisions were per capita income, wages, and the density of manufacturing activity. 
Similarly, Woodward (1992) studied the spatial distribution of Japanese manufacturing 
affiliates in the US during the 1980s and found that the locational decisions of Japanese 
investors tended to be influenced by market size and low unionisation rates. Also focusing on 
Japanese manufacturing firms in the US, Yeung and Strange (2003) found that educational 
standards of the workforce, the size of local markets, transportation infrastructure and average 
labor cost are highly significant in location decisions. 
In addition to macroeconomic conditions, several researches argue in favour of the 
agglomeration effect, that is, previous investments in the area is also critical in the choice of 
location of FDI. Head et al. (1995) examined the location choice of 751 Japanese 
manufacturing plants worldwide and found a strong agglomeration effect, with companies with 
similar industrial backgrounds tending to cluster their FDIs in a common location. This is 
supported in further country studies, for example, using a sample of French companies between 
1985-1995, Crozet et al. (2004) confirmed the positive effect of agglomeration. This is even 
stronger in situations where the country of origin and industrial sectors are common. Inward 
FDI to China is particularly characterised by an agglomeration effect. With a sample of 931 
foreign ventures in China, Head and Ries (1996) found that even though government policy 
plays a significant role in attracting foreign investment into the country, the spatial distribution 
of FDI is influenced by existing patterns of industrial concentration. Cheng and Kwan (2000) 
support this view and point out that except for the attractiveness of macroeconomic conditions, 
existing FDI in China generates further investments. 
However, government policy that establishes a favourable environment for foreign 
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investment can provide a significant incentive and does attract FDI to a specific location. 
Generally, this policy is in the form of tax benefits and improved infrastructure. In terms of tax 
benefits, Hines (1996) found that bilateral agreement between the US and elsewhere granting 
foreign tax credits was an important factor in encouraging inward FDI to the United Stated. 
Glass and Saggi (2000) support this with empirical evidence that with government policy 
directed at reducing taxation on multinational production, countries benefit from further FDI 
compared with competitive locations. Haufler and Wooton (1999) compared the tax burden in 
two countries with unequal market size and demonstrated that FDI is more likely to be located 
in the country with a large market, however, the link between corporation tax and consumption 
tax was a contributory factor in the decision model. On the other hand, Barrell and Pain (1999) 
found that except for the macroeconomic reasons, Japanese FDI in EU countries and in the US 
is significantly motivated by the inefficiency of local markets that arises because of trade 
protection measures. Buckley et al. (2003) explicitly argued that the establishment of NAFTA 
and the EU form a significant trading bloc increasing discrimination against outsider firms to 
compete in the integrated area. Meanwhile, the preferences of local production can be 
increased, thus enhancing the motivation of inward FDI from the outsider companies. 
In a comprehensive study, Crozet et at. (2004) suggested that the determinants of FDI 
location choice can be classified into four. The first are two macroeconomic factors, market 
demand and factor costs. The third is the agglomeration effect, determined by the number of 
local and foreign firms, and finally, public policies designed to support FDI activity in the 
location. Applying these four determinants into Dunning's eclectic paradigm, FDI motivation 
can be explained. Factor costs are a resource seeking motive, local demand conditions are a 
market seeking motive, agglomerate effects explain the motive to seek strategic assets related to 
exploiting FDI investment and favourable policies are and efficiency seeking motive. This 
confirms that location choice is a meaningful element in the FDI decision, which can be 
represent and explain features of strategy designs related to FDI. 
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With respect to the critical decision to allocate corporate resources globally, the 
preferences of the upper echelon team, reflected by governance characteristics, can be 
responsible for the spatial distribution of corporate FDI. Moreover, the firm-specific advantage 
of corporate governance is likely to interact with the location-specific advantages of host 
countries and is a determining factor in the FDI location decision. This questions remains 
neglected in most empirical studies but can be essential in understanding the impact of 
governance mechanisms on internationalisation strategy. Meanwhile, the study can also have 
potential to model the simultaneous effects between the three FDI-specific advantages in terms 
of ownership, location and internalisation in Dunning's eclectic paradigm. 
Conclusion 
This chapter began with a review of the literature on international business and the operations 
of multinational enterprises. The history of internationalisation theory can be traced back to the 
late eighteenth century, although the early theories concentrate trading advantages and are no 
longer as powerful in the current global economy. Dunning's eclectic paradigm that 
encompasses internationalisation theory has provided a valuable analytical framework in which 
to study current international activity. Moreover, the perspectives of the transaction costs, 
resource-based and Uppsala internationalisation models are included and are directed towards 
the literature on strategic decision theory as a crucial factor in determining corporate outcomes. 
The chapter also includes the literature on the role of the top management team and the impact 
this has on the nature and effectiveness of corporate governance. 
The latter part of this literature review links internationalisation with corporate 
governance. In particular, the existence of the multinational enterprise is linked to the 
motivation to internalise cross-country transactions into the established hierarchy of 
organisational structures. However, large amounts of governance costs can arise from this 
process of internalisation in the operations of internationalisation, in ways that not occur to 
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purely domestic enterprise. Therefore, more robust governance mechanisms are required for 
multinational enterprises to facilitate these internal transactions. Finally, the chapter reviews 
the existing literature that tests corporate governance effects on the strategic decisions relating 
to internationalisation and proposed potential research topics that remain neglected so far. 
Chapter 5- Data and Methodology 115 
Chapter Five: Data and Methodology 
Introduction 
This thesis investigates the impact of corporate governance on performance and on the 
strategic decisions relating to the international business activities of listed companies in 
Taiwan. Of the three empirical chapters, the first -is concerned with performance, the 
second with the FDI decision and the third with the location of that FDI. The models used 
in the empirical analysis include a number of control variables, as well as various measures 
of corporate governance. There is considerable overlap in the data used in these chapters, 
and consequently a general description of the data construction, any transformations that are 
undertaken, and the definitions of the control variables are prior dealt in this chapter. A 
full explanation of the data is essential, as this is an important part of the study and the 
resulting data is both rich and unique. 
The econometric methods used vary in each case although some of the problems and 
solutions are also common to all three empirical chapters. Therefore, a general overview 
of the estimation and testing methods will be presented here, although more detail 
specifications will be given in each separate chapter. 
Sample Selection 
Process 
The primary criterion for sample selection in this thesis was that the firms should be listed 
on the TSE. This excludes privately-owned firms that have less rigorous reporting 
requirements, and access to data for publicly-traded firms is also considerably easier than 
for those that are not accountable to the SFC. Financial firms were excluded because of 
their different reporting requirements, and the fact that they are accountable to the Ministry 
of Finance directly rather than the SFC, but also to ease comparisons with other studies of 
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corporate governance in the literature. A final criterion in selecting the sample was the 
availability of a panel dataset for the performance measures. If a company obtained a 
listing, or was de-listed, within the sample period, then it is excluded from the sample. 
The period of the data used in the performance study is from 1995 to 2000, while 
additional data up to 2002 were added for the internationalisation studies. One important 
aspect of this research is the Asian Financial Crisis, which occurred in 1997-98 directly in 
the middle of this estimation period. While this may be a disadvantage in terms of a tidy 
econometric model, one positive result is the plethora of papers that have been published on 
the topic of corporate governance and international investment strategies, making this one 
of the important issues in the economic development of the area. Although the direct 
impact of the crisis on Taiwan was relatively low, it is important to consider the results of 
this study in that context. 
At the beginning of 1995, there were 299 companies listed companies on the TSE, of 
which 25 were financial and a further 46 had incomplete records, leaving 228 companies in 
the sample. These represented a number of industrial sectors, as follows: textiles (54), 
construction (40), electrical (54), services (36), and the remaining 44 were unclassified. 
Dimensionality and Sample Period 
To maximise the information content of the data, a panel dataset was obtained for much of 
the secondary data. Panel data, and panel data estimation techniques, have a number of 
advantages, although limitations in the data meant that it was not possible to exploit the 
econometric advantages to any great extent. However, it was useful to be able to have the 
time series available, since any year in the period close to the crisis is not wholly 
representative and using the mean of the years covering the crisis did reduce any potential 
bias. 
One reason why the whole study was not fully able to exploit panel data methods was 
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that the data to construct the ownership data on the controlling families was only available 
for a single date 31st March, 2000. This restricted all of the family-based variables 
including family ownership and control and some of the board characteristics. The 
numbers of employees were also only available for one year and hence the labour intensity 
ratio is for a single year. However, the data on institutional investor shareholdings are 
taken directly from the TSE, and are available for the full five years, as are all the financial 
accounting items. 
To deal with the unbalanced structure of this data sample, which provides panel data 
for certain variables but only a single year of data for the rest, the mean was computed and 
adopted where panel data was available, and then combined with the single year data to 
construct the total dataset. Further, 1998 was chosen as the base to calculate the age of 
firms since the establishments. The business group dummy depends on the measure of 
corporate ownership and control and so matches the year these data were accessible. 
Further data relates to the foreign investments undertaken by the firms in the sample. 
This data includes investment location, investment value, ownership in joint-venture 
investment and the number of FDI projects undertaken. As the year of establishment for 
each FDI case is crucial in the analysis and the information is not reported, the list of 
corporate investments for two successive years was compared, and the increments were 
defined as initiated in the second year. When this data was acquired, the corporate foreign 
investments were disclosed only from 1998 to 2001. Therefore, the FDI cases undertaken 
in 1999,2000 and 2001 were identified 
Sources of Data 
The data were obtained from four main sources: the SFC, the Taiwan Economic Journal, 
the China Statistics Yearbook, and the 2000 World Development Indicators. 
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The Taiwan Security and Future Commission (SFC) 
The majority of the firm level data was acquired from the SFC. Listed companies disclose 
their financial report and accounts, subject to a common accounting principle. The 
government agency actively involved is the market regulator and the data are officially 
monitored and acknowledged. 
The general statutory mandate of the SFC is to protect investors' interests, and the 
Commission is responsible for the development, regulation and supervision of the capital 
market in Taiwan. All publicly-traded companies have a legal responsibility to submit 
reports to the SFC on a regular basis. Based on the reports, the SFC have constructed a 
database beginning in 1995, which consists of information about public trading companies, 
and make this available for public access through the internet. This provides a very 
comprehensive set of information, which is invaluable for undertaking research on the 
impact of ownership on performance. This data also includes details about international 
investment flows, the amounts invested, the numbers of projects undertaken, and the 
location of these projects. 
While corporate ownership information was provided by the SFC database, this is 
limited to shareholdings by corporate insiders, including managers, directors and 
supervisors and significant shareholders with holdings greater than 10%. Information in . 
cases where the equity is distributed in the market, particularly to institutional and 
individual investors, is excluded. Thus, other data sources were required. 
Subsidiary Data Sources 
To collect the market information to construct the ownership variables, it was necessary to 
access the internal library of the TSE and refer to the historical market records for data on 
the trading situation of the sample companies. In addition, price data was collected from 
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the Taiwan Economic Journal, which is an on-line database covering the information of 
security trades in Taiwan, Hong Kong and China. Finally, for the country information in 
the internalisation studies, macro economic indicators relating to the FDI destinations 
within the PRC were obtained from the "China Statistical Yearbook". The Yearbook is a 
government publication from the Statistics Bureau, which provides province level data for 
China. For other country destinations, the World Bank database, "2000 World 
Development Indicators", provides 551 economic indicators for 206 countries between 
1960 and 1998. 
The Construction of Corporate Governance Variables 
A critical series of measures in this thesis are those relating to ownership, since they are 
central to the investigation of the impact of corporate governance on firm strategy and 
performance. These were constructed as follows. 
Status of Controlling Shareholder 
It was necessary to develop a measure of the degree of ownership held by one family, or by 
family associates, so as to define a "family-controlled firm". There is a precedent in the 
literature. Both La Porta et at (1999) and Claessens et al (2000) identify a family, or 
individual, that hold either 10% or 20% of the equity, is able to substantially control a 
publicly-traded company. This study follows the spirit of these papers, although a 
different cut-off point is used. As noted in the previous chapter, the Securities & Exchange 
Law requires members of the board of directors and the supervisors to hold a minimum 
amount of equity in the firm. The amount is a function of the size of the firm and Table 
4.1 in previous chapter denotes this. Given this legal requirement, a family-control firm is 
defined as that the family holds the largest volume of shares, in excess of the minimum 
legal requirement. For example, the directors and supervisors of a company with a market 
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capitalisation below NT$ 300 million are required to hold 15% and 1.5% of equity, 
respectively. So, if the shareholding of the family is greater than 16.5%, the company is 
considered to be family-controlled. If the shareholding is less than 16.5%, the firm is 
considered to have a widely-dispersed ownership structure. 
To identify family control, the largest shareholder and the associated family members 
were obtained from a detailed list of the significant shareholders. This list is available 
from the details provided to the SFC on insider ownership, and includes the CEO, 
individual directors and supervisors, and significant shareholders with shareholdings over 
10%. When the insider is an organisation, the list further specifies the names of its 
representatives in the firm. This enables us to identify whether the representative is a 
family member, and thus whether the organisational ownership is part of the shareholding of 
the family. After the family members have been identified, their shareholdings are 
summed to provide a proportion of total family ownership, and consequently, whether they 
have overall control or not. 
Where one organisation is found to have a shareholding more than that of any other 
person or group, the organisation is defined as the ultimate owner. If this is a state or local 
government or equivalent, the controlling status is defined as state-controlled firm, and 
likewise, if a foreign institution, the definition is a foreign-controlled firm. For the 
remainder, it was not possible to trace the ultimate owner and these are defined as 
widely-held firms. 
With the methods described above, 154 of the 228 samples are recognised as 
family-controlled firms, 6 as state-controlled, 26 as foreign-controlled, and the remaining 42 
are treated as widely-held companies. Three Dummy variables were used to represent the 
effects of alternative modes of control. 
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Although the effect of ownership concentration on corporate value has been extensively 
discussed in the literature, the measurements of ownership vary considerably. Some 
studies include the shareholdings of board members (Arthur 2001, Mak & Li 2001), others 
the CEO shareholding (Core et al. 1999, Zhou 2001), and others the shareholding of senior 
managers in total (Himmelberg et al. 1999, Hanson & Song 2000). Where the theory is 
based on the argument that large shareholders are essential to ensure good governance, such 
studies use the shareholding of significant shareholders to examine the incentive structures 
(Demsetz & Lehn 1985, Ang et at. 2000). Still others are interested in the role of outsiders, 
and thus consider the shareholdings by outside block-holders as a proxy for their 
participation on corporate governance (Faccio & Lasfer 2000). 
In this study, we follow Claessens et al. (2000) in identifying the membership of 
controlling families. We use the last name of the insider shareholders, including the board 
members, directors and supervisors, the CEO, the board chairman, the honorary chairman, 
the vice chairman, the organisational shareholder representatives, and any stockholder with 
over 10% ownership, 'and then match these with the largest owner. As the five major 
Chinese family names are Lin, Li, Chen, Chang and Wang, which are very common in 
Taiwan, it is not used to consider that all individuals sharing each of these five last names 
are from the same family. A further criterion is added to identify family members from 
these named families, that is, a shared first name. In traditional Taiwanese families, a 
common first name implies kinship and also has the role of indicating the generation of 
each individual within the family. After identifying all the family members related to the 
largest shareholder, the shareholdings of all the individuals within the family were added 
together to calculate the ownership of the family in total. 
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Institutional investors tend to be more aware of the fluctuations of the market, and objective 
in their valuation of corporate performance. Therefore, they may be expected to play an 
important role in providing better discipline than insider shareholders. 
Basically, the status of institutional investors in the data was divided into three groups: 
financial institutions (banks and investment trusts), government agencies and other firms. 
However, the operation of foreign financial institution in the TSE has been permitted since 
the early 1990s. Considering the different investment strategies between domestic and 
foreign financial institutions (see Chapter 1), their shareholdings may impact distinctively 
on corporate governance. Similarly, the bank and the investment trusts are, involved in 
security trading but from different motivation, their shareholdings are not likely to impact 
equally on corporate governance. Therefore, the final dataset for this variable has six 
elements: firms, government agencies, domestic banking institutions, foreign banking 
institutions, domestic investment funds and foreign investment funds. 
The Composition of the Board of Directors 
Five variables represent the characteristics of the board of directors: the independence or 
otherwise of the board chairman, the dual leadership structure of firm, the number of 
directors and supervisors, the family control of the board, and the proportion of equity held 
by the board members. Some of these variables are categorical, whilst others are 
quantitative. 
"A dummy variable is used to represent the independence of the board chairman. This 
value has a value of 1 if the position is held by a member of the largest shareholding, 
and 0 otherwise. This variable depends only on the identification of the family with 
the largest shareholding, regardless of whether the family controls the firm. 
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"A dummy variable is used to denote whether the positions of Chairman and CEO are 
held by the same individual. This value has a value of 1 if the two positions held by 
the same individual and 0 if this is a dual leadership structure. 
" Board size is an important characteristic and affects the efficiency of the board and the 
ability of members to undertake their responsibilities. With the two-tier board 
structure that exists in Taiwan, the operations of the board may be a function of the 
numbers involved. Thus, this variable is a separate count of the number of directors 
and supervisors associated with the firm. 
" Family control on the board is measured by the number of family members on the 
board of directors, and also acting as supervisors. The directors and supervisors are 
considered separately and then summed. This is extended to account for other entities 
on the board and/or as supervisors from the state or financial institutions. In some 
cases a firm may have several different legal representatives on the board, although' in 
this study, they are aggregated to form a single number. 
" Finally, shareholding is considered as a board characteristic. Board ownership is 
measured by the total shareholding of directors and supervisors, again first separately 
and then jointly. 
Control Variables for Performance Study 
A number of controls are used in the regression models to capture specific contextual effects 
and to account for differences that are exogenous to the firm. There are four industry 
dummies representing n-1 sectors: textiles, construction, electrical goods, and services. 
The textiles sector includes the manufactures of clothes, natural fibres, chemical fibres, and 
plastic material. The construction section includes companies engage in real estate 
construction, and also manufacturers of building materials including cement, glass, and steel. 
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The electrical goods section is very diverse, and incorporates manufacturers of machinery, 
electrical appliances & cable, computers and semiconductors. The service sector is also 
highly heterogeneous, encompassing transportation, tourism, and both wholesale and retail 
trade. 
Other control variables are the measure of labour-intensity, the employee scale of the 
firm, the age of the company, whether the company is a part of a group of businesses, the 
gearing ratio, and profitability. The labour-intensity is issued capital divided by the 
number of employees. The rationale for the group dummy is to see whether the ultimate 
owner is also the ultimate owner of another public trading firm in the TSE. It is not 
unreasonable to suppose that profitability could impact the effectiveness of governance 
mechanisms, particularly in a declining industry, short termism may accelerate the fall in 
firm value but be followed rather than a longer-term recovery plan. Two financial 
measures, the gearing ratio and profit margin, allow for the effects of performance on 
corporate governance. 
Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Governance Variables 
Table 5.1 reports descriptive statistics for the corporate governance factors and the control 
variables. As shown in the Table, there is 68% of the firms in the sample is 
family-controlled, and these families hold 17.5% of the equity, on average. Financial 
institutions (foreign or domestic banks and investment funds) are not significant 
shareholders, accounting for only 5.33% of the total equity issued, while "normal 
corporations" have an average 18.63% shareholding. 
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Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables and Data - Corporate Governance 
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Corporale Controllers Data Max StdDev Max Min Number Ratio* 
Family Controlled Firm 31/Mu/00 - - - - 154 0.68 
State Controlled Firm 31/Mu/00 - - - - 6 
0.03 
Foreign Controlled Firm 31/Mu/00 - - - - 26 
0.11 
Family Shareholding 31 /M er100 1759 133 72.75 0.42 - - 
Instltational Ownership 
Domestic Banks Average 1995-99 1.63 2.12 19.08 0 - - 
ForeignBanks Average 1995-99 0.27 1 9.41 0 - - 
Domestic Funds Average 1995-99 1.84 1.9 828 0 - 
ForeignFunds Average 1995-99 1-59 29 3138 0 - 
Governmental Agency Average 1995-99 1.02 3.73 38.98 0 - - 
NormalCorporation Average 1995-99 18.63 11.68 56.13 0.42 - - 
Board Cbaracteristies 
Independent Chairman 31/Mar1OO - - - - 52 
0.23 
CF Chairman 31/Mer1OO - - - - 41 
0.18 
Director Size 311Mar100 822 4.44 26 3 - - 
Supervisors Size 31/Mar100 2.05 1J02 8 1 - - 
FamilyControl- Director 311Mar100 46.88 27.44 100 0 
FamilyControl-Supervisor 31/Mar/00 42.02 40.83 100 0 - 
LegalPerson-Director 31/Mar100 48.92 3531 100 0 - 
LegalPerson-Supervisor 31/Mat100 59.81 42.4 100 0 - - 
Board Shareholding 31/Mar/00 20.67 12.48 72.75 0.61 - - 
Control, Variables 
Textiles Base Year-1998 - - - 54 
0.24 
Constructions Base Year-1998 - - 40 
0.18 
ethics Base Year- 1998 - - - - 54 
0.24 
Services Base Year-1998 - - - - 36 
0.16 
IssuedCapital(NT$) Average 1995-99 544m 786m 78223m 35m - - 
Employee Number 1998 Average 1330 1947 17860 29 - - 
ompanyAge Base Year-1998 31 10 55 11 - - 
Business Group 31/Mar100 - - - 83 
036 
Bring Ratio Average 1995-99 0.76 0.48 3.68 0.13 
rofit Margin Average 1995-99 5.18 16.43 77.36 -169.9 - - 
Note: * the ratio is "number" of the variable divided by total sample size 228. 
It is notable that 23% of the firms in the sample have an independent board chairman, 
and another 18% have a joint chairman and CEO. The members of the board of directors 
far outnumber the supervisors, with mean values of 8.22 and 2.05 respectively. 
Furthermore, the controlling families are influential in management positions, controlling 
47% of board seats and 42% of supervisors. On average, the extent of family control on 
the board far surpasses the level of shareholding, which bodes ill for governance and may 
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give rise to serious agency problems. Perhaps surprisingly, the organisational shareholders 
(legal persons) are also influential, accounting for 49% of directors and 60% of supervisors. 
The managerial power of this group of shareholders is dominant, especially compared with 
the 25% of institutional shareholding in total (financial institutions, government agencies 
and other corporations). Finally, the average shareholding of the board members is almost 
21%. 
The industry dummy variables show a reasonably representative selection, with a range 
of 16% to 24% across the sample, and 18% not specified. The size of firm, both measured 
by market capitalisation and number of employees indicates a range of small and large firms, 
with an average age of 31 years, although none are established less than 11 years. Finally, 
36% of the sample is part of specific business group in which the largest shareholders also 
effectively control other listed-firm in Taiwan. 
The Construction of FDI Variables 
Testing the corporate governance effect on FDI strategic outcomes and the locational 
distribution of FDI projects is another aspect of this thesis. To conduct the relative 
analyses in the following chapter, the FDI variables were constructed in the manner 
described below: 
FDI Data Structure 
In order to capture the causal links between the structure of firm ownership an FDI decision 
outcomes, data on international investment projects two years after the identification of the 
form of control. Data is available in two forms, the total value of overseas investment and 
the number of projects undertaken. In this study, the FDI panel data is cumulative, ending 
in December 2001, compared with the ownership data that was reported in March 2000. 
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The financial data and firm characteristics are as before, with the mean of the period 
1995-99 used when suitable. This is justified by the fact that FDI decisions are made as 
part of a longer-term strategy, although the actual investment may not take place in the 
period the strategy was approved. 
The FDI cases in this thesis do not refer to any project with 0 or negative book-value in 
2001, and the measure of the value of corporate FDI is based on the initial investment of 
each specific case. In the 228 firms used here, 166 firms were recorded to have foreign 
investment in China and 122 companies engaged in FDI in other countries, with several in 
both groups. The total amounts invested in China was approximately US$ 3,364 million, 
with the largest single investment US$ 375 million and the smallest US$ 10,000. For the 
firms investing elsewhere, the total was US$ 10,719 million, ranging from US$ 836 million 
to US$ 11,200. Considering the number of projects undertaken, 444 were initiated in 
China from the 122 firms, whereas 559 were initiated in the rest of the world by the 166 
firms. However, the original FDI dataset was reported in cumulative form and disclosed 
after 1998, the annual basis of FDI information can only be recognised since 1999. Any 
international investment prior to that is not date specific and was only available as a total 
value of investment and number of projects. Thus, for the analysis, cumulative measures 
are appropriate. For the available annual data of the 444 FDI projects in China, there were 
39 in 2001,48 in 2000,62 in 1999 and the remaining 295 in 1998 and before. For the 559 
in the rest of the world, 18 were in 2001,19 in 2000,69 in 1999 and the remaining 453 in 
1998 and before. 
FDI Decisions Variables 
There are three measures representing corporate FDI decision outcomes. The first is a 
binary dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if there is FDI and 0 otherwise., The second 
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counts the number of FDI projects undertaken by the firm until 2001, and if the book-values 
of the projects were 0 or negative in the year, they are excluded from this measure. Finally, 
the third represents the extent of corporate commitment to foreign investment and measures 
the accumulative value of each company in 2001 divided by the average capitalisation of 
the firm from 1995 to 1999. The accumulative value of corporate foreign investment is 
based on the initial investments of all foreign investment projects, and again, the projects 
with 0 or negative book-values in 2001 are not included in the calculation. Then, this 
series was split into groups determined by the first quartile, the mean, the third quartile and 
the maximum. These boundaries were named group1,2,3 and 4. A further group of 0 was 
added for completeness and to account for those firms that did not undertake FDI in China 
or anywhere else. 
FDI Location Variables 
As a special history and politic relationship exists between Taiwan and China, the FDI 
location options of Taiwanese firms in China are separated from the others. Further, the 
exact locations of Taiwanese FDI are generalised into several conceptual options reflecting 
common geographic and economic characteristics of host provinces. 
One particular feature in the location choice may be the provision of a tax shelter, and 
tax-haven countries can provide an advantage in countries other than China. The 
identification of tax-haven countries in this study follows the list of Eiteman et al. (1998, pp. 
549). Next, Singapore and Hong Kong are frequently desired choices for Taiwanese FDI. 
While these two countries are in the tax-haven list of Eiteman et at (1998), they are also 
close to Taiwan in culture and geography and traditionally play an intermediary role to 
connect Western and Eastern businesses. Thus, Taiwanese FDI in these two places can 
carry a unique strategic meaning. Then, South-east Asian countries are economic in 
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production cost and also geographically and culturally approximate to Taiwan, so again are 
a suggested location target for Taiwanese FDI. Moreover, the US, Japan and the EU are 
advanced economies that provide markets and technology for Taiwanese companies. 
These countries are grouped into another variable, with the control being all other 
destinations. Thus, there are five locational categories for Taiwanese FDI including (1) 
tax-haven countries, (2) Singapore and Hong Kong, (3) Southeast Asia, (4) Advanced 
Industrial Countries and (5) the rest. 
Other location variables are functioned as different motivations for FDI, simply within 
China. The provinces vary considerable, with some economically vibrant and others 
lagging behind in economic development (Chadee, 2002). Because a dummy variable for 
all provinces would create degrees of freedom problems, China is divided into subsets that 
reflect the degree of development. In the study, the location choices of Taiwanese FDI in 
China are generalised into six groups: (1) north coast, (2) middle coast, (3) Fujian province, 
(4) Guangdow province, (5) metropolitan cities and (6) the remaining inland areas. The 
north coast (Hebai and Shandong provinces) and middle coast (Jiangsu and Zhejiang 
provinces) rely on heavy and light industries respectively, which can attract Taiwanese FDI 
in different manner. In addition, the business culture relies on Guanxi in the middle coast 
provinces, so they are open to other cultures with similar values, such as Taiwan. This can 
create an advantage for FDI activity. The north coast and central coast are separated as 
two individual location options for Taiwanese FDI. Fujian province in Chinese south coast 
is where many Taiwan nationals are originated, and so there is a similar culture and 
identical dialect, making this a familiar environment for Taiwanese business. Alternatively, 
Guangdong province is also on the south coast and has a long history in attracting foreign 
investments, particular from neighbouring Hong Kong. With the influence of Hong Kong 
business, Taiwanese firm. can suffer particular competition in this area, and so this region is 
in a group. Finally, the metropolitan areas of China (Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai Cities) 
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have huge populations, relatively advanced infrastructure and a lot of multinational 
businesses facilities, which can provide and opportunity and also a challenge for Taiwanese 
firm. Thus, the three biggest cities of China are also delineated. 
Control Variables for FDI Decisions 
The control variables described above are in the FDI analysis too, although the justification 
for their inclusion needs discussion. Firstly, the industry dummies are simply sector 
identifiers although it will be seen that there are inherent differences in the attractiveness of 
FDI as an international strategy in some sectors compared to others. Secondly, the size of 
the firm, whether measured by number of employees or issued equity, is important as some 
investment opportunities are available to large firms that are simply not an option for 
smaller ones. Equally, the years of establishment may be a factor in the FDI decision, 
since the historical background of the company may include a good or bad experience of 
international diversification that will influence future strategy. Finally, the performance of 
the firm may encourage an active involvement overseas if the domestic position is good, as 
is noted by Vernon (1966), Caves (1971) and Teece (1981), and not otherwise. Thus, 
financial measures, such as gearing levels, profitability and Tobin's Q (market price to book 
value ratio), based on the domestic performance of investing firms can be used to control 
for the relative effects of FDI decisions. 
Descriptive Statistics for FDI Decision Data 
Table 5.2 reports the descriptive statistics with respect to the FDI decision data. Of the 
122 firms investing in China, 28 are in the textiles sector, 16 in construction, 29 
manufacture electrical goods and 17 are in the service sector and the remaining 32 
undefined. The mean market capitalisation is close to NT$ 504 million, with a range of, 
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NT$ 78 million to NT$ 60 million. The average number of employees is 1,456, which 
indicates a very diverse group, ranging from nearly 18,000 to 46, while the age profile and 
performance reflects the previous data. 
Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables and Data - FDI Decisions 
FDI In China Data Mean SM Dew Max Mix Ninier Ratio 
Companies Number 2001 - - - - 122 0.54* 
FDI Value inChina (Nf$) 2001 827m 1348124 11,263m 382.000 - - 
Ownersbip of FDI in China 2001 70.08% 2633% 100% 3.60% - - 
FDIProject Number inCh{na 2001 3.52 3.78 26 1 444 - 
Textiles 2001 - - - 28- 0.23** 
Constructions 2001 - - - - 16 0.13** 
ectrics 2001 - - - - 29 0.24** 
Services 2001 - - - - 17 0.14** 
Issued Capital (NT$) 1995-99 504m 562m 78233m 60m - - 
'mployee Number 1998 1456 2055 17860 46 - - 
ompanyAge 1998 31.17 9.58 51 12 - - 
aring Ratio 1995-99 0.76 0.43 2.84 0.13 - 
rofitMargin 1995-99 6.58 11.77 77.56 -22.42 - - 
robins Q 1999-00 1.52 139 11.02 0.4 - - 
FDI in O, erseas 
ompanies Number 2001 - - - 166 0.73* 
I Value in overseas (NT$) 2001 1937m 3517m 23,087m 334,000 
Ownership of FDI in overseas 2001 91% 13.87% 100% 11% - - 
I Project Number in overseas 2001 3. 239 13 1 - 
Textiles 2001 - 34 0.2** 
Constructions 2001 - - 25 0.15** 
ectrics 2001 - - - 46 028** 
services 2001 - - 25 0.13** 
ssued Capital (NT$) 1995-99 624m 893m 78223m 412m - 
Employee Number 1998 1541.9 2089 17860 29 - - 
ompanyAge 1998 309 10.16 54 11 - - 
aring Ratio 1995-99 0.81 03 3.68 0.13 - - 
rofitMargin 1995-99 6.02 17.63 77.56 -1699 - - 
obid's Q 1999-00 1.69 1.74 11.02 0.4 - - 
Note: " the ratio is divided by total sample number of this thesis 228; ** the ratio is divided by sample number 
involved in FDI in China - 122, and in overseas -166. 
Of the 166 firms that invest overseas in countries other than China, 34 were in textiles, 
25 in construction, 46 manufacture electrical goods and 25 are in the service industries. 
The remaining 36 firms were undefined. The average market capitalisation was NT$ 624 
million, ranging from NT$ 78,223 million to NT$ 412 million. Compared to the China 
FDI, there is clearly a higher threshold for Taiwanese firms. On the other hand, the 
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average number of employees of these firms is 1,542, with a similar maximum of 17,860 
but a much small minimum of 29. The period of establishment for these firms was similar 
to that for the China FDI firms. Finally, there are some differences in performance profiles, 
with a lower mean but higher dispersion for firms operating in the rest of the world, and 
interestingly, the least profitably is reporting a substantial loss. 
Control Variables for FDI Location Choice 
The spatial distribution of FDI has been studied extensively in the field of international 
business and various factors have been suggested as possible determinants of location 
choice. Much of the literature investigating the motivation for FDI and the direction of M 
international expansion has been discussed in Chapter 3. The data and variables selected 
here follow much of this literature, particularly that of Dunning (1993), and consequently, 
four aspects of FDI are represented in the data. These are: resource seeking, market 
seeking, efficiency seeking and strategic asset seeking measures. 
To investigate FDI location choice in China, macroeconomic data is useful, particularly, 
"average wages", "per capita consumption", infrastructure such as "transport links" and 
"total FDI inflows into the area" are used to represent the attractiveness of specific locations. 
The data in the China Statistical Yearbook are reported at the province level, however, some 
aggregation was necessary to create regions of homogeneity to fit for the setting location 
options. 
Slightly different variables were required for the non-China FDI location decision 
model. The four location specific factors are replaced by a set of national macroeconomic 
data for the target country including the "balance of importing and exporting resources", 
"GDP per capital", "tax levels on goods" and "transport services exports" (the services 
performed by residents of one economy for those of another). The data was obtained from 
the World Bank 2000 World Development Indicators. However, to match the 
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macroeconomic data at year end 1999 with the investment year, given the precise year is 
unknown prior to 1999, the sample are divided into two groups, investment prior to 1999 
and that later. 
In addition to the pull factor of locational attractiveness, further variables are included 
in both the China and rest of the world FDI models to account for the push effect caused by 
firm characteristics that encourage overseas investment. The size and age are included, 
but also the distribution of shareholding, since this may influence FDI decisions. Finally, 
annual FDI value from Taiwan to China is used as indicator of the political tension between 
the countries. This represents the something of the conflict between the pushing effect of 
Taiwan's FDI and the pulling effect from China. 
Descriptive Statistics for FDI Location Choice Data 
Table 5.3 reports the descriptive statistics used in the analysis of FDI location choices, 
which includes both the total value of the investment and the number of projects involved. 
Since choice of location is determined in part by the economic environment, in terms of 
labour and infrastructure for a resource based approach and disposable income in a market 
based approach, this data is an important input. From the Table, the mean wage in the 
regions where FDI projects are located in China is 8,712 RMB (approximately US$ 1,050) 
and the mean per capita in consumption in those provinces is 6508 RMB (approximate US$ 
784). The mean annual value of FDI inflows from all international sources is US$ 4,907 
million and the mean distance available for transport 67,144 km, both of which are an 
indication of the overall attractiveness or limitations of the region. 
Of the firms investing in international projects in this sample, the average 
capitalisation for those choosing FDI China is NT$ 809 million (approximately US$ 30 
million), with an average age of 32 years. Further, the average investment value for a 
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single FDI project in China is NT$ 352 million (approximately US$ 11.7 million) and on 
average, the project was conducted through a joint-venture where the Taiwanese firm holds 
70% ownership on the project. Finally, between 1990 and 2002, the total annual value of 
FDI from Taiwan to China was US$ 1,942 million. 
Table 5.3 Descriptive Stat istics of Variables and Data - FDI L ocation Choices 
FDI Cases in China Data Meax Sid Dew Max mix Number Ratio* 
otalCaseNumber Feb-99 - - - - 444 - 
avesting Ye ar -1998 and b efore 1999 - - - - 295 0.66 
Investing Year-1999 2000 - - - - 62 0.14 
Inve sting Ye ar - 2000 2001 - - - - 48 0.11 
Investing Year - 2001 2002 - - - 39 0.09 
verage Wage (RMB) Feb-90 8712 2045 16641 32763 - - 
ercap aConsumption(RMB) Feb-90 6508 1349 8868 3358 
Total Traffic Length** (1u) Feb-90 67144 45087 140601 4352 - -" 
I Reception (US$) Feb-90 4907m 3843m 12019m 45.2m - - 
Capital Scale of Investor (NT$) 1995-99 809m 874m 78223m 60m - - 
Age ofInvestingFirm 1998 32.2 9.06 51 12 - - 
avestingValue ontheFDI(NTä) Feb-99 352m 312m 5783m 1.7m - 
Ownership on the FDI Case Feb-99 6994% 31.61% 100% 1% - - 
aiwanese FDI in China (US$) Feb-90 1942m 525m 2915m 1583m - - 
FDI Cases ix Overseas 
otalCaseNumber Feb-99 - - - 539 - 
nve sting Year -1998 and before 1999 - - - 453 0.81 
Investing Year-1999 and after Feb-00 - - - - 106 0.19 
Resource Balance*** (US$) 1987-99 -910m 33680m 64500m -110200m - - 
P per capita (US$) 1987-99 13284 7172 29605 991 - - 
Tax on good and service 1987-99 14% 10.70% 59% 29'0 - 
Transport Service gzport**** 1987.99 18.40% 14.70% 84.80% 295 - - 
apital Scale of Investor (NTS) 1995-99 7708m 12784m 78223m 412m 
Age of Investing Firm 1998 29.76 10.03 54 11 - - 
nvesting Value on the FDI (NT$) Feb-99 420m 999m 13750m 282000 - 
Ownership on the FDI Case Feb-99 87.70% 23% 100% 2% - - 
Note: * the ratio is divided by FD[ case number in China, 444 and in overseas 559; ** Total tratic length 
includes railway and highway; ***Resource balance equals exports of goods and services minus imports of 
goods and services; ****Transport service export covers all transport services (sea, air, land, internal 
waterway, space, and pipeline) performed by residents of one economy for those of another. 
In terms of the 559 occurrences of FDI from Taiwan to the rest of the world, 81% were 
undertaken in or before 1998 and the remaining 19% in or after 1999. This was a very 
uncertain period, particularly as a result of the South-east Asian crisis, and the balance of 
trade figures are, on average, negative for the period (US$ -910 million). The deviation in 
the current account data is high, with a wide range between maximum and minimum values. 
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Since this data represents FDI countries, the mean GDP per capital is not very meaningful, 
however, the range of countries is and here the maximum figure of nearly US$ 30,000 and a 
minimum of less than UD$ 1000, shows the diversity of locations'that are deemed attractive 
investment opportunities. 
Two factors that may provide strong incentives to undertake FDI in a chosen location 
are taxes and the ease and cost of transport. Again, the mean values are not very 
interesting, 14% and 18%, respectively, but the range is large. Locations with the 
minimum of 2% in taxes cost provide a considerable advantage over others with more 
progressive tax regimes. On the other hand, the location with transport provision for 
foreigners, with maximum of 84.8%, creates a strong incentive for FDI activity. The 
characteristics of the firms include market capitalisation, with mean of NT$ 7,708 million 
(approximate US$ 257 million) and age close to 30 years. The average investment value 
of a single FDI project outside China is NT$ 420 million (US$ 14 million) and on average, 
this investment is conducted through joint-venture partners holding 87.7% of shares on a 
single investment. Compared to the data on FDI in China, firms in Taiwan appear to 
retain a higher proportion of shares when FDI is elsewhere. With the exception of the 
macroeconomic variables, there is a common theme with respect to the characteristics of 
firms investing, whatever the location. 
Research Methodology and Econometric Modelling 
This section provides an overview of the methodology used and justifies the choice of 
technique. General issues are discussed and the models described, although the 
specifications used are presented in each of the empirical chapters that follow. The study 
aims to investigate the impact of models corporate governance on performance and on the 
strategic decisions make within the firm with respect to international business expansion. 
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The sample is taken from listed companies on the national stock exchange and as such, they 
are subject to disclosure requirements. Thus, information on accounting statements, 
capital structure, domestic and international business activities, ownership and the 
composition of the board of directors and supervisory members is publicly available. 
Because of the availability of data, and the focus on explaining performance and decision 
outcomes, modelling firm behaviour is approached using quantitative techniques. 
Although regression analysis appeared to be the method of choice, it was important to 
consider other approaches. Survey methods were not judged to be appropriate as the 
research aims to explain ex post observations from a set of ex ante organisational structures 
and strategic decisions. Company level case studies are useful in some instances where it 
is necessary to understand the decision process, but when not in a study interested in final 
outcomes rather the path taken to achieve those outcomes. Furthermore, it was necessary 
to have as large a sample as possible in order to make inferences about the business sector 
in general, thus leading to the decision that statistical methods were the most suitable. 
For this type of analysis, panel data economics is very appealing and the advantages of 
such methods are well known and discussed in detail in Baltagi (1995). Pooling cross 
section and time series lets both variances add explanatory power to the regressions, as well 
as ensuring ample degrees of freedom. The most valuable aspects are that panels give more 
informative data, more variability, less collinearity amongst the variables, more degrees of 
freedom and more efficiency in the estimates. It is also useful to be able to separate the cross 
section and time series effects. 
However, when the population from which the sample is taken is a single country, with a 
common economic and cultural environment such as in this study, most of the variance is in 
the cross section. Not accounting for firm-specific differences in economic or behavioural 
assumptions, such as firms operating under different management systems or more or less 
restrictive regulations, can cause serious mis-specification. Behavioural models such as 
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those in this study can be enhanced by the ability to measure over heterogeneous operational 
structures. Therefore the data limitations here are less critical, since the sample size is 
sufficiently large and the sectoral differences provide an added dimension that is not available 
through a time series. This is a useful source of additional variation, although not one that 
introduces econometric problems. ' 
Therefore, instead of panel data analysis, numerous cross-section regressions were 
estimated, with the variables constructed as a five years average where available and a 
single year otherwise, as noted in the Tables. The general approach was to use ordinary 
least squares as an initial method, then to check for any econometric difficulties. The most 
common were heteroskedasticity, which was corrected using White standard errors, and 
endogeneity, discussed below. 
In Chapter 6, the generalised instrumental variables estimator (GIVE), or two-stage 
least squares, method was used. The value of the IV estimator is fairly robust to changes 
in specification, although large standard errors may occur, due to a fairly low correlation 
between the instruments and the endogenous regressors. But, the estimators are consistent, 
although possibly at the expense of efficiency. One further problem in practice is that the 
choice of specification is not so easy to determine as there is no unique definition of R2 or 
adjusted R2 if the model is not estimated by ordinary least squares. However, where the 
estimates are obtained by the instrumental variables method, the goodness-of-fit is not the 
major objective, but rather a consistent estimation of the causal effect of corporate 
governance factors on performance and decision outcomes of the firm. 
For the analysis in the remaining chapters, a different approach is used, although the 
problems with endogeneity persist and are dealt with in a similar way to that in Chapter 6. 
1A testable assumption is that the form of the estimating equation is the same for each firm: that is, the data must be poolable 
(see Baltagi (1995), Chapter 4, for a discussion of poolability tests). 
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However, in this section of the thesis the nature of the dependent variables means that OLS 
regression is inadequate (Verbeek, 2000) and instead, a range of limited dependent variable 
models is used. In Chapter 7, the relationship between corporate governance and decision 
to pursue an international strategy through FDI is examined. This is in three parts. 
Firstly, a dependent variable that is a binary YES/NO response and a binomial logit 
regression is appropriate; the second uses a count variable, for which a Poisson model is 
adopted; and the third is a grouped set of outcomes that is estimated as an ordered logit 
regression. Chapter 8 extends the study of FDI by considering choice of location, again 
with categorical data used in the dependent variable. Here, binary and multinomial logit 
are the methods of choice. All of the methods in the three empirical chapters are 
supported by the empirical literature. The precise specifications are presented in the 
appropriate chapters, but the general models are briefly discussed here, much of which is 
taken from Kennedy (1998), Greene (2003) and Verbeek (2000). 
Binomial& Multinomial Logit 
In this model, predicted values of the dependent variables are interpreted as the probability 
of the individual to make either choice. The logit model is based on a logistic function that 
constrains the estimated probabilities to be between 0 and 1, increasing the robustness of the 
results. As with other econometric applications of qualitative dependent variables, 
binomial logit is based on the hypothesis that individual will maximise personal utility and 
thus the choice reflects a preference set and is not simply an unexplained residual. The 
model is stated 
Xg 
prob(y =1) = LOGIT (X/3) =1 
+ eXQ 
5.1 
where y is the YES/NO choice and X is a matrix of explanatory variables and $ is a 
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vector of estimated coefficients. 
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In common with other specifications using qualitative dependent variables, a linear 
utility maximising model is latent in the logit regression and represents the probability that 
the selection identified is preferred to the alternative. The latent function is stated 
U=Xß+e 5.2 
where the function is determined by a set of explanatory variables, X,, 8 is a vector of 
estimated coefficients and an error term, e. Hence, to maximise utility given choices A 
and B, option A will be chosen when the utility derived is greater than that of B 
UtilityB(Xoße +c8) <UtilityA(Xo/A+eA) 5.3 
and se -EA< Xa(/3A-* B) 
5.4 
Unique to qualitative dependent variables,. where the error term of the individual utility 
function is independently and identically distributed as a log-Weibull distribution, the logit 
model results and is the cumulative density of the difference between any two observations. 
Following from 5.3,5.4 specifies how the log-Weibull distribution of error terms determines 
the probability of an alternative choice. The probability that option A is chosen is given by 
the cumulative density of c8 - CA to Xo (/34 - /3B) . Moreover, as the cumulative 
density 
of error terms, EB - CA, is given by the logistic function, the logit model in 5.5 defines the 
probability that choice A results. However, coefficients for latent utility-functions in 5.5 
cannot be estimated directly. Rather, one of the possible choices acts as a base alternative 
and estimated coefficients of the logit model, (ßA - ß) are determined by the difference in 
the coefficients between the two possible outcomes. In 5.5, B is the base alternative and A 
is chosen alternative. 
prob(A) =1+exo(Q. 4-Qa) 
5.5 
In equations 5.6,5.7, and 5.8, the multinomial logit models measure the probability an 
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individual chooses one option, A, B and C. Among the three options, the option C is 
treated as a base alternative in the analysis. With different options as base alternative, the 
estimated coefficients of the multinomial logit model, 8, will change accordingly. On the 
other hand, the explanatory variables X in the multinomial logit equations consists of a set 







prob(B) = Xa. ý xße 
5.7 
1+e +e 
=15.8 prob(C) 1+eX, 6. a +ex°' 
Poisson Regression 
The second dependent variable is a measure of the number of events and are is therefore a 
series of non-negative integer values. Greene (2003) notes that the Poisson regression 
model is widely used to exploit individual choice behaviours in count data format. In this 
model, the Poisson distribution determines the probability of a specific number of 
occurrences and the Poisson parameter corresponding to this number is modelled as a 
function of a set of explanatory variables related to the testing event. 
The primary equation of the Poisson model can be stated 
prob(Yi = yi) = Of 
5.9 
where the probability of Y' is predicted by a Poisson distribution with the parameter X; 
corresponding to a set of explanatory variables X. The probability 0 to y occurrences of a 
given outcome i is given by the Poisson function e-')J '. 
In Possion regression, both the mean and variance of the function e-a'2i''' are a,; and 
Chapter 5- Data and Methodology 141 
the most common form of ? is loglinear, shown as 
Inki = ß' Xi 5.10 
and X= exp (Xß) 5.11 
where X is a row vector of explanatory variables and ß is a vector of estimated coefficients. 
Ordered Discrete Choice Models 
The third dependent variable of this study consists of five dummy variables that represent 
firm commitment to FDI, measured as set of ranked groups, in which the order must be 
retained. OLS or multiple choice models are not appropriate here and ordered logit, based 
on the logit function, is required. The latent utility function in ordered logit is stated 
y* = Xß'+s 5.12 
where yi =J if pj_i < yi* s p1, J=O, 1,2,... j 5.13 
This is identical to the binomial logit model, where the utility y* derived from a chosen 
alternative is determined by a set of explanatory variables X, and estimated coefficients ß', 
with an error term, E. Further, the probability an individual selects option J (0, or 1, or... j) 
is determined by setting criteria defined as utility levels between u, _, and p, within 
the 
testing frame. Particularly, in the ordered discrete choice model, all the utility values 
between the interval uj_, and Pj are treated equally and coded by the responding 
alternative, such as 0 or 1 or... j. For example, where the firm has four ordered choices, 
including the option of choosing none, values of J in the 5.10 are 0,1,2 and 3, and the 
associated benefits can be placed into four categories 
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y*= o. y* =1 y* =2 y* =3 y*= xßß+E 
PI 
Thus, the probability that a specific level of FDI is undertaken fits into a single category is 
prob(y* = 0) = prob(Xß'+c < 0) = prob(s < -Xß') 
prob(y* =1) = prob(0 < Xß'+c 5 p1) = prob(-Xß'< c: 5 p1- Xß') 
prob(y* = 2) = prob(1t1 < Xß'+s 5 p2) = prob(pl - Xß'< c: 9 p2 - Xß') 
prob(y* = 3) = prob(p2 < Xß'+e) = prob(p2 - Xß' < E) 
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Assuming a model with an error term of a latent utility maximisation function has a logistic 
distribution, the function can estimate the probability of a occurrence of an ordered 
alternative. The primary- equations are stated in 5.14 - 5.17, where the probability of 
choices from 0 to 3 are determined by the logistic function with the coefficient of the 
parameter of latent regression, 0. This parameter is derived from the set of explanatory 
variables X and estimated coefficients ß' that measures the influence of X on the 
probability of falling into a particular interval 
prob(y* = D) =1 
+ en("ß'X ) 
5.14 
prob(y* =1) =1 
+ 
5.15 
prob(y* = 2) =1 + eýcký-Q x>-nca: -v'xý 
5.16 
-ncN: -ý'x) 




Any study of the impact of forms of corporate governance on performance and on FDI 
decisions, raises the issue of endogeneity. Clearly, where firm performance is the outcome 
of the strategic decisions made by various stakeholders, and where some of these 
stakeholders are involved in a firm because it is performing well, endogeneity in the 
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estimating equation is likely. Equally, foreign institutions may be more interested in firms 
that have an international profile, and thus have already made the decision to undertake FDI. 
Again, endogeneity is a possible outcome. In this study, the family have input into firm 
decisions because they are owners and have an inherent interest in the business, but 
financial institutions are responsible to their clients and are selective about which firms they 
invest in. Thus, tests of endogeneity are critical, and if positive, instrumental variables are 
substituted for the exogenous variables and the model re-estimated, with further tests to 
confirm this has been an effective way of neutralising the problem. 
The general approach, known as a limited-information method for a single equation 
model, is as follows. Let the estimating equation be written as 
y=ß+ßx, +ßw, +u 5.18 
where the potentially endogenous variables are x; and the truly exogenous variables are w;. 
First, each of the potentially endogenous variables is regressed on the available instruments 
and the truly exogenous variables in the model. These single reduced form or artificial 
equations are estimated for each potentially endogenous variable, using OLS. In all cases, 
the instruments for the potentially endogenous variables, x;, are the lagged values, x; (-1) and 
x; (-2), as in (2). 
x, = b, + bw, + b, x, (-1) + b, x, (-2) + v, 5.19 
These equations give estimates z, , the predicted value of x; and 
v,, the predicted 
value of v;. The saved residuals are then included in the original equation, and a 
Wu-Hausman test (Wu, 1973, Hausman, 1978) is used to determine whether the variables 
are endogenous. If the S's in (3) are jointly different from zero, then the variables are 
endogenous. 
Y-Q+fix, +Q, W, +8, V, +u 5.20 
To measure the effectiveness of the instruments, the Sargan-Basmann procedure tests 
whether the instruments are now independent of the errors. Using the coefficients that 
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were estimated from the fitted values for the endogenous variables, the error is calculated 
by subtracting the iproduct of these estimated coefficients and the actual values of the 
dependant variable. This calculated error is then regressed on the genuinely exogenous 
variables and all the instruments and testing the hypothesis that these coefficients are jointly 
zero. 
Conclusion 
This chapter described various data sources of this thesis and also the measurements to 
define testing variables and various contextual controllers. The variables produced in this 
chapter will be used in the following empirical tests. This chapter also provided 
preliminary analysis of descriptive statistics to present the structure of data and crucial 
variables of this thesis. This leads to, the research questions of following chapters and 
benefits to generate relative study hypotheses. In the final part, the econometric 
methodologies that will be adopted in the following empirical chapters were introduced 
while the details of the analytical model are left to the appropriate chapter. 
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Chapter Six: Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
Introduction 
This chapter is the first of three empirical studies that extends the literature presented in 
Chapters 3 and 4 on the corporate governance impact of ownership on firm performance, with 
a specifically Asian focus. There is a growing body of research in the economics and 
management literatures that links the pattern of corporate governance with strategic decisions, 
and, eventually, corporate performance. However, despite this wealth of research, little is 
known about ownership-performance inter-relationships outside an Anglo-American 
environment of widely-owned public corporations. More specifically, there is a dearth of 
information on the determinants in family-controlled but publicly listed firms, which 
represent a significant part of the corporate sector in many developed and developing 
countries. Daily et al. (2002) note that "agency effects may function differently in this 
context and those prior findings from non-family samples may not readily generalise into this 
setting". Thus, while the approach taken here has its foundations in the established literature, 
additional sources are used in the development of the research questions in this empirical 
work on Taiwan. 
Family-controlled firms play a particularly important role in Asian countries (Chang. 
2003; Joh, 2003), but with the exception of Japan, most studies of corporate governance 
related to Asian countries prior to 1998 rely on case study methods of specific industrial 
sectors (for example, Taniura, 1989; Taniura, 1993; Numazaki 1993). While many have 
produced interesting results the overall picture of corporate governance in the region remains 
ambiguous. 
The South-east Asian crisis has also resulted in a number of papers that have noted. the 
effects of ownership and the increased vulnerability of a corporate sector that has high levels 
of family control (Piesse and Khatri, 2002; Dhnadirek and Tang, 2003). However, a number 
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of Asian countries did not experience a dramatic fall in economic performance during the 
crisis period, while still maintaining a close family ownership structure (Rajan and Zingales, 
1998). This is not totally surprising, since the economic environment within countries of the 
region is substantially different, despite common elements such as cultural background, the 
nature and extent of institutions and the level of economic development. A single model of 
corporate governance for all of Asia is unlikely although Mitton (2002) found that governance 
mechanisms, especially monitoring activity, are critical to corporate performance. However, 
to what extent this varies across individual countries is still unclear. Thus, focusing on a 
single country, Taiwan, enable this thesis to examine links between family control and 
performance in firms operating in the same legal and institutional environments. Further, 
this decision permits the corporate governance study to hold constant a number of important 
contextual factors and avoid endogeneity problems between ownership structure and 
country-specific institutional characteristics (Carney and Gedajlovic, 2003; Joh, 2003). 
Building on agency and institutional perspectives, this chapter makes a number of 
contributions. First, it analyses corporate governance effects on performance in situations 
where the managers are frequently family members, where families are also represented on a 
supervisory board, and where they are often the major providers of capital, if not directly, then 
through relational holdings in other firms (Bruton et al., 2003, Carney and Gedajlovoc, 2003). 
Second, building on an integrated research framework developed by Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) the study examines to what extent concentrated shareholdings by institutions can 
provide an effective counter-balance to families' opportunism and so improve firm 
performance, as can outsider representation on corporate boards. This concern has been 
neglected in previous work on Taiwan (Yeh et al., 2001). Finally, this study provides 
empirical analysis of governance-performance relationships using the longitudinal 
multi industry dataset of 228 firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) described in 
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detail in Chapter 5. 
Research Hypotheses 
In this chapter, the aim is to examine situations where the managers are frequently family 
members, families are also represented on a supervisory board, and they are often the major 
providers of capital, if not directly, then through relational holdings in other, firms (Bruton et 
al., 2003, Carney and Gedajlovoc, 2003). At the same time, family-controlled firms that are 
listed on the stock exchange also have minority shareholders to whom managers are 
accountable, and governance effects of an interaction of family control with external share 
ownership on performance, therefore, is an important research issue. The following 
hypotheses are constructed to tackle numerous critical aspects relevant to the research topic. 
The Relationship between Family Control and Corporate Performance 
Small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) comprise the majority of firms in Taiwan, 
probably over 90% of the total corporate sector. Thus, the family provides investment 
capital and controls the operations of the firm. In these cases, boards are mainly composed 
of family members and decisions are made within a family dominated environment. 
Interestingly, this structure of corporate governance is maintained even when the business is 
successfully expanding and obtains a listing on the TSE. Thus, in this sample, 154 (68%) of 
the 228 firms retain their status as family controlled enterprises. 
A number of papers, particular from North America (for example, Morck et al. 1988, 
Smith and Amoako-Adu, 1999), express concerns about the problems associated with family 
control, and the increased likelihood of the abuse of managerial power. In addition, family 
interest may dominate over the interest of non-family shareholders, since the concentration of 
personal and family wealth in owner-managed firms normally creates a preference for income 
and for wealth preservation over other dimensions of firm performance such as maximisation 
t 
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of dividend payments to outside shareholders (Carney and Gedajlovic, 2003). Finally, 
family control tends to shield a firm from the disciplinary pressure of the market for corporate 
control since concentrated share ownership reduces the probability of a hostile take-over 
(Gomez-Mejia et al, 2003). 
However, whether families or professional managers run companies better for society in 
general is still open to debate. Specifically, with the extension of altruism from the family 
system to the firm, owners in the current generation have the tendency and obligation to 
reserve wealth for the next generation, particularly in a Confucian society such as Taiwan. 
As a result, family firms often possess longer horizons compared to non-family firms (James, 
1999). Further, studies on emerging economies have uncovered specific contextual factors 
may contribute to governance outcomes of family control, such as the development of market 
institutions, the level of government involvement, industry structures, ownership patterns and 
enforcement of business laws (Chang and Hong, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 1997; 2000; La 
Porta et al, 1998). Generally, Filatotchev et at. (2000) indicate that external monitoring in a 
developing country is constrained by contexts of weak legal framework, inefficient capital 
market and volatile product markets, thus suggests family ownership can work as 
counterbalance to alleviate potential problem of family control. Consequently, the retention 
of control by founding families may be positively associated with performance outcomes. 
In addition, family control potentially provides more useful resources for corporate 
development, which can be an enhancement of firm value (Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002). 
In fact, La Porta et al. (1997) find that poorer investor protection by national legal systems is 
associated with smaller and more illiquid capital markets supporting the view that private 
finance could be vital and a scarce resource for corporate growth in these countries. In 
economies with immature capital markets and a few professional managers, many family 
firms are established by obtaining capital and human investments from families and personal 
networks (McConaughy et al., 2001). 
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Furthermore, the presence of undiversified corporate owners, such as a controlling family, 
can support the company in cultivating a long-term and stable relationship externally. 
Through business networks, uncertainties and complexity are reduced because information is 
shared and circulated among the participants in the network, resulting in better monitoring of 
activities both within and between firms. This is especially effective in East Asia where 
Guanxi influences commercial activities. A number of more recent empirical studies 
provide evidence that controlling family ownership is associated with better performance in 
South Korea (Chang, 2003) and Hong Kong (Carney and Gedajlovic, 2003). Yeh et al. 
(2001) also confirm this point for Taiwan, however, their argument is based on all 
family-controlled samples, rather than a comparison of the different impacts between 
family-controlled and widely-held companies. 
This suggests an ambiguous assessment of performance effects of family ownership and 
control, and that the results are contingent on a specific legal and institutional environment in 
the country under review. Hence, two conflicting hypötheses are suggested in this study: 
H. 1. Family ownership and control are positively associated with performance. 
H. 2. Family ownership and control are negatively associated with performance. 
In addition, toward the governance effect of managerial ownership, Morck et al. (1988) 
and McConnell & Servaes (1990) argued that any relationship to firm value can be non-linear, 
leading to a third hypothesis: 
H. 3. The relationship between controlling family ownership and corporate performance is 
non-linear. 
The Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance 
When organisations grow, the family ownership is gradually diluted and the interests of the 
controlling family become less aligned with the interests of minority shareholders (Filatotchev 
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and Bishop, 2002). As a result, the primary interest conflict in this governance framework is 
not the failure of professional managers to satisfy the objectives of diffused shareholders, but 
rather the expropriation of minority shareholders by the family interests (Bruton et al., 2003; La 
Porta et al., 2000a). Therefore, divestments through sales of large blocks of shares to 
institutional investors may be a viable alternative to ownership dispersion from the minority 
shareholders' point of view (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
A number of studies suggest that large block outside ownership can be an effective 
counter-balance to managerial opportunism (for example, Hoskisson et a1,1994). Companies 
have large groups of undiversified shareholders can play a critical leadership and monitoring 
role, and they have both the incentives and the means to restrain the self-serving behaviour of 
managers (Maug, 1998). However, little is known about the possible role of institutional 
investors in an environment of family-controlled firms. 
In Taiwan, the relatively small capital market provides an effective constraint on 
institutional investors' ability to create and manage a risk-free portfolio. At the same time, 
institutional investors acquire shares in listed-firms that also have a substantial family 
block-holding (Bruton et al., 2003). When control is dissipated among several large 
investors, a decision to expropriate minority shareholders requires the consent of a coalition 
of investors, and this coalition might hold enough cash flow rights to limit expropriation of 
the remaining shareholders and pay the profits as efficient dividends (La Porta et at., 2000a). 
Accordingly, the presence of institutional investors with sufficient corporate shareholding 
may provide an effective counter-balance to a family's opportunism (Gomes-Mejia et al., 
2003) and resolve what Young et al. (2002) call a "principal-principal" agency relationship. 
This suggests a fourth hypothesis: 
H. 4. The volume of shares held by outside institutional investors is positively associated with 
firm performance. 
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Corporate governance research increasingly recognises that boards of directors have a central 
role in reducing agency problems and the relative characteristics can therefore be constructed 
as an effective mechanism. A number of studies try to examine governance effects of board 
characteristics and many of find that board independence enhances the quality of strategic 
decisions and firm value (for example, Brickley et al, 1994; Xie et al., 2003). Yermack (1996) 
reports an opposite effect where the number of independent directors on the board has no 
impact on firm performance although the size of the board did affect corporate governance 
outcome significantly. On the other hand, there is a paucity of studies of this kind from 
countries other than the US that support the view that control of the firm is affected by the 
independence of board composition (Arthur, 2001; Mak and Li, 2001). 
While the monitoring effect of independent directors and supervisors may be still 
controversial within the existing literature, the mandatory shareholding by these board 
members in Taiwanese public trading corporations leads to the conclusion that board 
independence is unlikely to exist. More generally, existing research on corporate 
governance in family-controlled firms in South and East Asia suggests that family members 
dominate the boards of directors (Bruton et al., 2003; Young et al., 2002). Management is 
exercised through a senior owner-manager who typically assumes the presidency of the firm 
and concurrently holds the top executive position and, therefore, has complete control of the 
firm and its decisions (Carney and Gadajlovic, 2003). This family control over boards leads 
to greater executive entrenchment and poorer operating performance (Anderson et al., 2003; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001). Given an emphasis in the literature on the links between 
controlling coalitions of large block shareholders and the effectiveness of monitoring by the 
board, it is possible to suggest that independent boards are most appropriate as a mechanism 
which reconciles the potentially different interests of the family and outside block-holders and 
leads to more efficient organisational outcomes. Thus, the hypothesis is suggested: 
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H. S. The extent of board independence is positively associated with performance. 
The Governance Effect of Board Ownership 
Although independent directors may provide an important contribution to corporate governance, 
the effect is often passive and contingent on the context of corporate controllers (Golden and 
Zajac, 2001). On the other hand, at a critical moment of corporate development, the board of 
directors is required to be concerned with the long-term performance of the organization rather 
than short-term financial control (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 
1990; Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001). To participate actively in corporate governance, 
directors and supervisors need strong incentives and their shareholdings can be the best 
motivation (Hambrick and Jackson, 2000; Geletkanycz et al, 2001; Shivdasani and Yermack, 
1999). Specifically, with the mandatory required board shareholding in listed firms in Taiwan, 
it is possible that within this specific context, the board shareholding has a particular effect in 
aligning interests of controlling families and external shareholders. Thus, the sixth hypothesis 
of this chapter suggests that: 
H. 6 The extent of board shareholding is positively associated with corporate performance. 
Choice of Variables and Estimation Methods 
Dependent Variables of Corporate Performance 
Drawing on the existing literature, a number of measures of firm performance are included in 
this study. The ratio of Tobin's Q is the most frequent measure used in empirical corporate 
governance studies (e. g. Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Cho, 1998). The 
Tobin's Q ratio is defined as following equation. 
i. Tobin sQ= Market Value of Firm /Replacement Cost of the Firm's Assets 
However, according to Chang et at. (2000), a significant herding effect on the part of 
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investors can be found in Taiwan. Therefore, pricing on the TSE may not be efficient, which 
can cause Tobin's Q to be an inappropriate measure of firm performance in this market. 
Accordingly, three accounting measures are also used, all of which are common in the 
empirical literature (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Ang et al, 2000): 
ii. Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) = Profit before Tax / Total Corporate Issued 
Capital 
iii. Return on assets (ROA) = Profit before Interest /Annual Average of Total Assets 
iv. Return on equity (ROE) = Profit before Interest /Annual Average of Owner Equity 
Apart from Tobin's Q and the accounting rations, corporate dividends are another 
possible performance meäsure. La Porta (2000b) notes that corporate dividend policy is 
significantly linked to the quality of institutional protection on investor rights and the ability 
of dividend payments to explain the effect on corporate governance has been proven 
empirically. Thus, dividends are also used as a measure of firm performance here. The 
performance measure of dividend used here is the sum of the cash dividend, the stock 
dividend and the dividend gained from capital surplus: 
v. Dividends = Cash Dividend + Stock Dividend + Gains from Capital Surplus 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
The correlations between dependent and independent variables and descriptive statistics are 
shown in Table 6.1. Most of the contextual variables are highly correlated with all five 
performance measures, validating the choice of these variables. But it can also be seen that 
only some of the corporate governance variables have significant correlations with 
performances. Also, the correlation matrix of the exogenous variables is in the Table and it 
can be seen that there are high levels between the controls and corporate governance measures. 
To avoid possible bias in the analysis caused by these correlations, the level values of the 
control variables are replaced by the natural logarithm in the following analyses. 
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On average, controlling families hold 17% of equity and institutional investors hold 5%. " 
In terms of corporate control, 68% of the sample is controlled by families, 3% are 
state-controlled, and 11% are controlled by foreign . organisations or individuals. 
Even 
compared with other Asian countries, the percentage of family controlled companies in 
Taiwan is extremely high. According to Claessens et al. (2000), out of nine Asian countries, 
only Indonesia and South Korea have similar levels of family control, whereas the extent of 
state control in Taiwan is second lowest after Japan. Clearly, Taiwan represents a typically 
Asian corporate governance model, with a combination of controlling family and minority 
shareholders dominating firms. 
In terms of general board characteristics, only 23% of samples have a board chairman 
that is independent of the controlling group. However, the dual leadership structure is 
relatively common in Taiwan, with only 18% of the sample having the CEO serving 
concurrently as the board chairman. The extent of family control on the board is 
considerable, and on average, 44.5% of director and supervisor positions are held by 
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This chapter uses regression analysis, with a number of specifications estimated, 
tested and compared in order to select the model of best fit. The initial approach was 
ordinary least squares but these were all tested for endogeneity, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, and when this was found to be exist, instruments were used to re-estimate 
using a generalised instrumental variable (GIVE) technique. 
The general form of the model is as follows. The five dependent variables 
noted above were regressed on four industry dummies, the capital/labour ratio 
(logarithm), the age and affiliation. of the firm, the gearing level, profit margin and a 
number of corporate governance variables. The corporate governance factors were 
measures of family ownership and control and board characteristics. The estimating 
equation can be stated: 
Performances = X30 + /, Textiles + /32Constructions + fJ3Electrics + /34Services + fi5Capital - Incens 
+ X36 Age + /37 Af l iation + ß8Gearing + /39 profit + f310C. G. Factors + e, 
where: 
Performance = Tobins Q, or ROA, or ROE, or ROCE, or Dividend 
Textiles = Dummy Variable for Textiles Industry (1 =yes, O=no). 
Construction = Dummy Variable for Construction Industry (1=yes, O=no). 
Electrical = Dummy Variable for Electrics Industry (1 =yes, O=no). 
Services = Dummy Variable for Services Industry (]=yes, O=no). 
Capital-Intensity= Ln (Issued Capital /Employee Number) 
Age = Age of Corporate History 
Affiliation = Dummy Variable for Controller own another company in TSE (1 yes, 
O=no). 
Gearing = Corporate Debt l Issued Capital (Gearing Ratio) 
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Profit= Net Profit l Turnover (Profit Margin) 
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C. C Factors = Family Control (Dummy), or Family Ownership, or Institutional 
Ownership, or Board Independence, or Board Shareholding 
Finally, the expected sign on the impact of the corporate governance factors in 
the model are summarised in the Table 6.2 for the six hypotheses. 
Table 6.2. Expected Associations between Corporate Governance Variables and 
Firm Performances 
H. 1 H. 2 H. 3 H. 4 H. 5 H. 6 
Family-Controlled Firm Positive Negative - - - - 
Controlling Family Ownership Positive Negative Non-U= - - - 
Foreign Invest Fund Ownership - - - Positive - - 
Foreign Banks Ownership - - - positive - - 
Domestic Invest Fund Ownership - - - Positive - - 
Domestic Banks Ownership - - - positive - - 
Independent Board Chairman - - - - Positive - 
CEO=Chairman - - - eve - 
Legal Person on Baord - - - - Positive - 
Family Control on Board - - - Negative - 
Board Size - - - - Positive - 
Board Sharehol - - - - positive 
Results and Interpretation 
The following tables report the results of the formal hypothesis tests in this chapter. 
After the initial OLS regression, the Wu-Hausman test confirmed that several 
variables were considered to be endogenous and so 2SLS regression with instruments 
was used. The endogenous variables are replaced by lagged observations for two 
years (identified by IV in the Table), which were then found to be satisfactory solution 
to the problem. Table 6.3 provides results of the 2SLS estimation. As it clearly 
shows, the ownership variables of foreign investing funds, foreign banks and 
4" 
domestic investing funds are positively and significantly related to all performance 
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measurements. Conversely, while the shareholding of domestic banks is negatively 
linked with corporate performance, the relationship is not significant. The findings 
in this section can directly verify the governance effect of institutional investors, 
especially in the case of family dominated firms, which is suggested by hypothesis 4 
of this study. 
Table 6.3.2SLS Estimation of Stockholders Ownershin and Firm Performance 
RO CE M. Eel ROA Model ROE Model. DIwMend Mo e1 Tabu Model 
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Moreover, as Table 6.3 indicates, there is no significant association between 
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controlling family ownership and all measurements of performance. To explore this 
issue further and test for a possible non-linearity in this relationship, the family 
ownership is transformed into four interval dummies indicating the family 
shareholding on the amount of 5-15%, 15-25% and 25-35%. With the interval 
dummies, a piecewise linear regression is conducted. However, as the results shown 
in the Table 6.4, none of these dummies have any significant impact on firm 
performance, which eliminates the possibility that the insignificance of family 
ownership on firm values is caused by a non-linear relationship. 
Table 6.4. OLS Estimation of Non-Linear Associations between Family 
uwnersm ana r ir m reriorman ce 
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***p<=0.001; Standard Errors in parentheses. 
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On the other hand, dummies for state control, foreign control and family control 
for the status of sample companies are tested for their associations with firm 
performance. As Table 6.5 indicates, family control has positive effect on all 
corporate performance measures. Moreover, except for the dividend equation, all 
the regression coefficients for the family control dummy are significant at least at 
10% level. While the family ownership did not show a significant association with 
firm performance, the results in this section indicate the significant relation is 
contingent on sufficient firm control. Accordingly, the positive association of family 
ownership is sustained by the result, which support hypothesis 1 and rejects 
hypothesis 2 of study. 
Table 6.5. OLS Estimation of Controlling Status and Firm Performance 
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Table 6.6 2SLS Estimation of the Interaction between Institutional Shareholding 
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Further, Table 6.6 represents the 2SLS regression results for interactions between 
the family control dummy and institutional share ownership. 
. 
According to the Table, 
the interaction between foreign banks ownership and family control dummy is highly 
significant related to performance measures, while the rest of the interactions do not 
show significance in the analysis. The result suggests those foreign banks positively 
moderate potential problems arisen from family control of Taiwanese business and 
thus enhance firm value. With the finding, hypothesis 4 that outside institution is 
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promising to counterbalance the abusing power of corporate controllers is further 
sustained, particularly in the circumstances of foreign financial institutions in the 
context of the family-controlled firm. 
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Table 6.7 in above provides test results with respect to the association between 
governance effects and board characteristics. In terms of board independence, 
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neither an independent chairman nor a chairman sharing a dual role as CEO provides 
significant relationship with any firm performance. However, the percentage of 
board seats held by a controlling family is negatively and significantly related to all 
measurements of corporate. Compared with the positive association of family 
ownership, the test result indicates the interference of controlling family on board 
structure can cause agency problems, which confirm a negative effect of the family in 
terms of management. Finally, board size is introduced as a control variable. As 
indicated in the Table, larger board size is significantly associated with poor 
performance. This supports the assumption that large and diverse boards may be 
counterproductive by not allowing sensible and efficient communication (Daily et al., 
1999; Priem, 1990; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990). 
When considering the two-tier board structure in Taiwan, the relative 
characteristics of director and supervisor are also tested separately. As shown in 
Table 6.8, bigger director board size and a higher level of family control are 
significantly correlated with negative corporate performance, which is consistent with 
the above findings. Moreover, the result reveals that a "legal person" as director can 
significantly enhance corporate performance, particularly in the ROCE, ROA and 
dividend equations. This finding indicates that the relative resources and 
professional experience of an institution can help to bring a discipline and better 
governance in corporate management, while the institutions here are both internal and 
external to the organisations. On the other hand, none of the supervisor 
characteristics significantly impact on corporate performance, revealing the weak role 
of the supervisor in the corporate governance of Taiwan. 
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Table 6.8. OLS analysis of Separate Board Characteristic and Firm Performance 
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Interestingly, after separating the characteristics of director and supervisor, the 
negative association of independent board chairman with firm performance becomes 
significant. This implies that independent senior managers in Taiwanese firms will 
encounter mistrust or even challenges from subordinates. There are a number of 
empirical studies that have confirmed that communication amongst board members is 
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a crucial factor in achieving decisions that enhance shareholder value (for example, 
Ensley et al, 2002; Schwenk, 1990a; 1990b). To achieve efficient communication, 
board chairman play a critical role in smoothing the strategy agenda and preventing 
potential conflict. However, without predominant power and prestige, the board 
chairman may find it difficult to win the trust of subordinates and thus fail to enhance 
communication efficiency. In a Confucianism society like Taiwan, the symbolism of 
controlling family plays a crucial role in cultivating networks outside the firm. An 
independent firm leader without absolute power to make decisions can hinder the 
company in joining any informal coalition in business and this can have a negative 
impact on corporate performance. 
Finally, in terms of the associations between controlling variables, the test results 
show that electrical companies in Taiwan significantly outperform than others. By 
contrast, companies in traditional industries including textiles and construction are 
associated with worse performance. Further, responding to the finding relative to 
traditional industries, the companies with a longer history in Taiwan are significantly 
associated with worse performance. On the other hand, larger scale and higher 
capital-intensive firms are significantly performing better than others. In terms of 
financial control, the level of gearing has a negative impact on corporate value and 
this relationship is strongly significant. Moreover, profit margin is positively and 
significantly associated with firm value. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Previous research on the effects of ownership structure and board characteristics on 
performance has been predominantly a Western, particularly Anglo-American concern. 
However, firms elsewhere, and in East Asia in particular, operate with a distinctive 
culture and in different legal and institutional environments, which may have an 
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important impact on the governance-performance relationships suggested by agency 
and strategy research. Thus, the applicability of the Western models should be tested 
in different context environments. Therefore this study has examined 
inter-relationships between general governance factors and firms' performance in the 
context of family-controlled and publicly listed firms in Taiwan. 
Table 6.9. Summary of Testing Results 
Detecting Effect Hypothesised Result with Firm Per brmance 
Cent ufing Fassily 
............................................ ............................. ................................................................. Family Shareholding 
" ........................ "------............ 
Insignificant 
.............................. 
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.............. ---................................................. Family Control Status Positive AcceptedH. 1. 
Family Control on Board Negative Accepted H. 2. 
Invervals of Family Ownership Insignificant Rejected H3. 
Institutional Ixaester 




"-------"--................................................. Accepted H. 4. 
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... .. .................................. -"-----"------....... 
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........................................ Domestic Investing Fund ....................... --- Positive ---........................................................... Accepted H. 4. 
Beari Characteristics 
........... . ........... ........ .......... .... Independent Chairman 
................................... 
................ ---........... Insignificant 
. 
....................................... ---........................ Rejected HS. 
........ CEO also Chairman 
....... . 
. ........................... Insignificant .................................................................. Rejected HS. 




................. ................................................ Rejected HS. 
.................................................................. Family Controon Board Negative Accepted Hi. 
Board Shareholding Positive Accepted H. 6. 
Generally, the testing results on the hypotheses are summarised in Table 6.9 
above. The two conflicting hypotheses related to the association between controlling 
family and corporate governance are respectively supported in different contexts - the 
financial commitment of a controlling family is positive for corporate value while 
family interference in management erodes governance efficiency. Further, the result 
rejects the hypothesis that controlling family ownership impacts on corporate 
governance in a non-linear manner. Apart from that, the positive association of 
institutional investor ownership and corporate performance is verified in Taiwanese 
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case, thus the relevant hypothesis is accepted. However, the argument that board 
independence enhances firm performance is not supported here, while the results 
indicate that the interference of a controlling family in board can hinder corporate 
profitability from most efficiency. Finally, the positive linkage between board 
shareholding and performance is supported. 
Contrary to the assumption of the fast growing research in law and economics 
(for example, Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1997; 1998,2000a), the study did 
not find a direct association between family ownership and the abuse of power which 
can be detrimental to financial performance. Moreover, the results suggest that the 
family-controlled firms in Taiwan outperform their peers with a diffuse pattern of 
ownership. Recent corporate scandals and the collapse of stock markets have 
provided a new impetus to the debate about whether families or professional 
managers run companies better for society in general. These debates have resulted 
in the growing importance of the kind of values prevalent in family-owned companies 
(Anderson et al. 2003; Bruton et al., 2003; James, 1999). These results contribute to 
this literature by providing empirical evidence on the links between family control 
and performance in a specific institutional setting. 
Although previous research provides ambiguous results in terms of the possible 
effects of external block-holders on performance, the results of this study confirm a 
positive and significant relationship between institutional share ownership and all 
performance proxies after controlling for potential endogeneity. Further, the findings 
from the separate board characteristics analysis validate the importance of foreign 
institutional investors to managerial discipline. These results are consistent with a 
block-holder coalition framework that suggests the incentive alignment effect of a 
coalition of large shareholders that is a positive relation between the cash flow stake 
of the controlling coalition and total firm value. In other words, the presence of 
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institutional investors may provide an effective remedy for the principal-principal 
agency relationship in family-controlled firm, especially in the absence of a market 
for corporate control. 
The study also provides evidence of selectivity in terms of the effects of various 
board characteristics on firm performance. Although previous research does not 
generate compelling evidence supporting the positive governance effects of board 
independence, the findings of this study suggest that family interference over the 
board mechanism is detrimental to performance. In addition, the absolute number of 
directors seems to provide a negative effect on the performance indicators used in this 
study. This may be linked to investors' evaluation of board efficiency in relation to 
the board size, suggesting that beyond a certain threshold, this factor can compromise 
directors' effectiveness. Moreover, after separating the board characteristics of 
directors and supervisors, it was found that the governance effect of the board arises 
largely from directors rather than supervisors. This may imply either the function of 
supervisor is seriously neglected or the arrangement of supervisors is fundamentally 
redundant with respect to discipline. 
In addition, the board characteristics of independent membership seem to affect 
performance in a significantly negative manner. This finding contradicts Western 
based research on publicly owned organisations that examines the impact of chairman 
independence on efficient monitoring and control of managerial discretion. 
However, in the context of these Taiwan firms, the chairman's connections and social 
capital is important, and the removal of such an individual may have a negative 
impact on the firm. Finally, this study represents an important step in the 
understanding of financial dependence, as suggested by Hambrick and Jackson (2000), 
by providing strong evidence of links between the financial commitment of board 
members and organisational performance. 
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Previous research has been focused on separate organisational outcomes of 
family/insider owners, outside block-holders and board characteristics. This chapter 
indicates the need to develop an integrated conceptual framework that brings together 
the analysis of simultaneous performance effects of various inside and outside 
investors, as well 'as their participation in corporate management through their 
position on the board. 
However, this chapter has several limitations. Although in all regression 
models the inclusion of the main regressors provided an increase in the adjusted R2, 
the actual level of variance of the dependent variables explained by each model was 
modest. However, the aim was to test the possible associations of corporate 
governance characteristics and performance rather than to provide a complete account 
of all factors that may affect performance of firms listed on the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange. Further, although an initial attempt has been made to take account of 
possible endogeneity of share ownership when examining how large, outside 
shareholders may affect the performance of these firms, the retained share ownership 
provided a very crude measurement of the power of their control. Therefore, a more 
refined analysis of the possible effects of different groups of outside investors should 
be necessary in any future study. In addition, the regression analysis provided 
evidence of strong links between board characteristics, financial interests and 
performance, but the various hypotheses tested in this study were far from 
comprehensive. For example, studies in the literature on networks have suggested 
that indirect, or third party board ties can strongly moderate the effects of board 
characteristics (Daily et al., 1999) and that analyses may be useful in further empirical 
research. 
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Chapter Seven: The Association between Corporate Governance and FDI 
Decisions 
Introduction 
Corporate governance mechanisms are designed to limit the potential for expropriation of 
shareholders by managers and thus enhance managerial efficiency and firm advantage. 
Therefore, it should be possible to measure the quality of governance within the firm by the 
strategic decision outcomes that occur. However, in recent corporate governance studies, 
there is a tendency to discuss the effectiveness of corporate governance by firm performance 
rather than on strategy decision outcomes. Theoretically, the impact of corporate 
governance factors on performance is a reflection of an improvement or deterioration in 
managerial competence. The finding of a non-linear relationship between governance 
factors and firm value would support this indirect relationship (see Short and Keasey, ' 1999; 
McConell and Servaes, 1995; Kole, 1995). Furthermore, the performance measures of 
recent corporate governance studies are usually restricted to domestic operations. 
Considering that companies involved in multinational operations required higher costs to 
maintain a similar quality of governance as do domestic operations, this international 
dimension cannot be ignored by measure domestic performance alone. Poor domestic 
performance can be even detrimental for a corporate governance study based on a country 
with a small domestic market and local firms that are highly dependent on an international 
trading environment, such as Taiwan. Following the analysis in the previous chapter, the 
corporate governance characteristics of publicly-listed and family controlled firms in Taiwan 
are further examined here. Using the same sample of firms, the analysis in this chapter 
examines the motivation of firms that undertake FDI in China and elsewhere. 
As discussed earlier, the trading surplus from international markets was crucial in 
promoting the industrial transformation of the Taiwan economy after the Second World War. 
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To further this prosperity, many firms have made the decision to internationalise operations 
and gain access to overseas resources and markets. Previous research has supported the 
view that corporate governance is a major factor in specific strategic outcomes (for example: 
Pfeffer, 1972; Daily et al, 1999) and this relationship is particularly significant during periods 
of change within the firm (see Daily and Dalton, 1992). Based on these arguments, this 
chapter investigates the effect of the existing models of governance within the firm on FDI 
decisions. This presents a unique study of the links between governance and overseas 
investment in a sample of family owned and managed listed firms. 
Research Hypothesis 
The Role of the Controlling Family on FDI Decisions 
Privately-owned Chinese family businesses, including those in Taiwan, represent the fourth 
most powerful economic group after North America, Japan and Europe (Kao, 1993). Within 
these family businesses, the values of Confucianism are highly relevant to the support of rigid 
hierarchies, mutual obligation and benevolent autocracy. At the same time, these family 
enterprises are very dependent on commercial networks to settle business activities (Wong et 
al., 1992; Hwang, 1995; Hamilton, 1996), and the controlling family plays a very close role in 
the management of the firm. Family members, particularly the head of the family, assume 
overall control within the firm by occupying the senior management positions. Furthermore, 
the controlling family arranges commercial contacts outside the firm, and takes full advantage 
of the experience and resources within the extended family group (Tsang, 2002). There is a 
high level of central authority, and, in contrast to Western-style firms, the controlling family 
in Taiwan has almost sole authority over the operations of the firm, and shapes administrative 
and strategy decisions. 
In comparison to firms with widely-dispersed ownership and state-owned status, 
family-controlled businesses tend to have low levels of bureaucracy. This results in 
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flexibility for decisions to be agreed and executed, which is a valuable resource in a 
rapidly-changing international environment. Furthermore, given the relationship of the 
family with the firm, the current generation of owners has an obligation to reserve wealth for 
the next generation. As a result, family-controlled firms often posses longer planning 
horizons compared to non-family firms (James, 1999). Given the innate constraints of the 
domestic market, internationalisation is the preferred route to development and expansion. 
Based on the view that corporate controllers are aware of strategic problems and of their role 
in finding a solution, (Huff, 1990; Porac and Thomas, 1990; Voyer, 1993) this study predicts 
that family controlled firms will be more active in foreign investment. Hence, the first 
hypothesis is: 
H. I. The extent of family ownership and control in Taiwanese firms is positively associated 
with the decision to undertake FDL 
The Role of Institutional Investors in FDI Decisions 
The collection of views of disparate groups of individual shareholders is often inefficient, 
despite the benefits with respect to corporate governance. However, institutional investors 
are better able to coordinate shareholders' views (Diamond, 1984). Empirically, the impact 
of institutional investors on encouraging good governance has been extensively examined (for 
example: Young et al, 2002; Hoskisson et al, 1994; Wruck, 1989), although the issue remains 
highly controversial in Western economies. The results of the previous chapter suggest that 
the presence of outside institutional investors, with significant shareholdings, significantly 
enhances firm performance. However, it is likely that firms with superior performance are 
more likely to face limited domestic opportunities, and consider foreign expansion. Thus it 
is expected high levels of institutional shareholding to be associated with a greater possibility 
that the firm will undertake FDI. 
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As well as promoting firm performance, the resources provided by institutional investors 
can also encourage foreign investment. As suggested in the resource-based views, firms are 
a mechanism to combine bundles of resources to create organisational core competencies 
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Grant, 1991; Teece, 1997). Firms with higher levels of 
resources will be more able to engage in foreign expansion (Trevino and Grosse, 2002; 
Oxelheim et al, 2001). This argument is particularly appropriate to Taiwanese firms, which 
are usually small-scale and less experienced, in comparison with enterprises from developed 
countries. External resources are crucial in order for such firms to compete internationally, 
and institutional investors can be the intermediary to inject such resources into the firm. 
Institutional investor can therefore play a significant role in fostering internalisation decisions. 
Many researchers have argued that the impact of institutional investors on corporate 
governance is contingent on their organisational status and objectives (Woidtke, 2002; 
Kroszner and Strahan, 2001; Faccio and Lasfer, 2000). Empirical studies have confirmed 
that different policies are adopted by institutional investors, dependent on their status (Shu et 
at, 2002). Therefore, institutional investors can impact corporate internationalisation 
differently, and this can be an important factor in their association with FDI decisions. This 
leads to the second hypothesis: 
H. 2. The ownership of outside institutional investors is positively associated with FDI 
decisions, while the significance of this relationship varies according to the status of the 
institution. 
The Association of Board Characteristics and FDI Decisions 
According to upper echelon theory, the specific characteristics of the senior management 
team have an impact upon strategic decisions (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1996). Many studies (for example: Carpenter, 2002; Mueller and Barker III, 1997; 
Elron, 1997; Sheppard, 1994) have shown that specific features of the board of directors are 
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reflected in strategic decision outcomes. However, it is difficult to predict the impact of 
board characteristics on FDI decisions. Independence and diversity enhance management 
efficiency (Nemeth, 1986; Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990), but 
the increasing heterogeneity causes conflict between board members that is detrimental to the 
quality of decisions made (Smith et al., 1994; Zenger and Lawrence, 1989; O'Reilly and Flatt, 
1989). 
As noted in the previous chapter, firms in Taiwan operate under a two-tier board 
structure, with a board of directors and numerous supervisors. However, the governance 
system in Taiwan has been criticised on the grounds of inefficiency, largely as a result of the 
lack of independent board members. This lack of external discipline was found in the 
previous chapter to have a negative impact on performance. Here, similar ideas are tested, 
with respect to international investment strategies. 
On the other hand, the shareholding of individual board members can be a strong 
incentive, not just for those committing financial resources but also intangibles such as time, 
knowledge, expertise and experience, which are 'fundamental in generating a strategy of 
long-term development of the firm. Where foreign expansion is the chosen strategy for 
firms to compete, careful decision-making is crucial and the benefits of a committed senior 
management are clear. Thus, a third hypothesis states: 
H. 3. A board of directors that has some members independent of the family, but with higher 
levels of shareholding, is positively associated with FDI decisions. 
Methodology 
In this study, the major explanatory variables are several corporate governance factors, in 
common with the previous chapter and as defined in Chapter 5. In addition, there are several 
contextual variables introduced as controls, again as defined in Chapter 5. The overall 
methodology has also been described earlier and will not repeated here, but the construction 
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of the dependent variables and the model specification will be outlined in the following 
sections. 
Dependent Variables 
Three different models are used, as discussed below, each addressing a different dimension of 
the FDI decision. For each model, two separate regression equations were estimated (one for 
China and one for the rest of the world). All the dependent variables were discrete rather 
than continuous. In the first model, the dependent variable was a binary variable to denote 
whether a company had undertaken FDI or not, and took the values of one or zero 
respectively. In the second model, the dependent variable was the cumulative number of 
international projects undertaken. In the China sample, the values ranged from 0 to 26 with a 
mean of 3.516 projects per company. In the rest of the world sample, the values ranged from 
0 to 13 with a mean of 3.16 projects per company. The dependent variable in the third model 
measured the importance of overseas investment to the company's activities (FDI density), 
and was calculated by dividing the cumulative FDI at the end of 2001 by the average issued 
capital of the parent company over the period 1995-99. These ratios were then ranked, and 
distributed divided into quartiles. Values were calculated for the minimum, first quartile, 
mean, third quartile and maximum within this distribution. For those companies that had no 
FDI projects, the FDI density was denoted by 0, and there were 106 such companies in the 
China sample and 62 in the rest of world group. The FDI density was denoted by 1,2,3 or 4 
for companies falling in each of the respective quartiles: a further 59 firms in the China 
sample were thus denoted by 1,30 by 2,31 by 3, and 2 by 4. In the rest of the world sample, 
the corresponding figures were 60,96,25,43 and 4. 
Contextual Variables 
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As described in Chapter 5, ten firm-specific control variables are used in this study, including 
four sectoral dummies (Textile, Construction, Electrical, Services), issued capital, employee 
number, company age, gearing ratio, profit margin, and Tobin's Q. In the second model, the 
"average size of project" was included in order to provide an implication of quality. In the 
third model, "issued capital" is omitted because of the high level of correlation between 
issued capital and the dependent variable (FDI Density). 
Descriptive Statistics and Hypothetic Associations 
Table 7.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the corporate governance variables and the 
expected associations with the FDI decision according to the hypotheses. 
Table 7.1 Mean, Standard Deviation and Expected Association between Corporate 
Governance Variables on FDI Decision 
Mean St Dev Rl 1L2 H. 3 
Family Controlled Firm 0.68 0.47 Positive - - 
Cont Ug Fam1y Ownership 1759 133 Positive - - 
Foreign Invest Funds Ownership 159 29 - Positive - 
Foreign Banks Ownership 0.27 1 - Positive - 
Domestic Invest Funds Ownership 1.84 19 - Positive - 
Domestic Banks Ownership 1.63 2.12 - Positive - 
Independent Chairman 0.23 0.42 - - Positive 
Inds r dent CEO 0.54 0S - - Positive 
CEO--Chairman 0.18 038 Negative 
Y. Controlling Famiil as Director 46.88 27.44 - - Negative 
Y. Contro ' RrAy as Supervisor 42.02 40.83 - Negative 
Director Number 8.22 4.44 - - Positive Supervisor Number 2.05 1.02 - - Positive 
Board Shueho! lrl 20.67 12.48 _ Positive 
Correlations 
The two sections of Table 7.2 show the correlation matrices of the dependent and independent 
variables. According to the table, many of contextual variables are significantly correlated 
with FDI decisions. In contrast, significant correlations between the dependent variables and 
the corporate governance factors are limited, although for other variables there is a clearer 
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relationship. Finally, the correlations between corporate governance factors and contextual 
variables are weak, lessening potential heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the regression. 
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Chapter 7- Effect of Corporate Governance on FDI Decisions 
Binomial Logit Models 
180 
Binomial logit was used to analyse the decision choice of firms, that is, whether or not the 
firm had undertaken FDI. As stated in Chapter 5, the binomial logit is the probability that an 
individual firm will select one of two alternatives, where the decision is a logistic function of 
the explanatory variables. In equation 7.1 





y denotes the observed outcome, 1 for foreign investing company (detected alternative) or 0 
for purely domestic firm (base alternative) X is a matrix of explanatory variables including 
the attributes of individual firms as controls, and several corporate governance factors, 
including ownership and control by the leading family, shareholding of institutional investors 
and board characteristics. Finally, ß is a vector of estimated coefficients, determined 
by (ß, -, 60), which is the difference in the coefficients between the utility functions of two 
possible choice outcomes for a firm (see equation 7.2). 
Utility, - Utilityo = Xßß - X, 8o =X (f11- ßo) 7.2 
Count Data - Poisson Models 
The second specification models the FDI decision in two stages, that is, whether the firm 
undertakes FDI at all, and if so, to what extent in terms of the number of projects. 
Accordingly, the dependent variable consists of a series of non-negative integer values 
representing the number of FDI projects, as described above. A Poisson model was used to 
estimate the impact of firm characteristics, corporate governance factors and controls on the 
observed decision outcomes. 
The model is shown in equation 7.3, in which the probability of Yi is predicted by a 
Poisson distribution with parameter . %; which is a utility function of a matrix of explanatory 
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variables X1, as equation 7.4. In equation 7.3, the probability of 0 to y non-negative integer 
numbers occurring in firm i is given by the Poisson distribution e-ß'2i''', stated 
prob(Yi = yl) = 
e-A`2iy' 7.3 
yi! 
and = exp (X, 8 ) 7.4 
where X is a row vector of explanatory variables (corporate governance factors and 
controllers) and 8 is a vector of estimated coefficients. 
It should be noted that Poisson regression methods have been criticised, for example 
Kennedy (1998), on the basis of some of the necessary assumption, the use of the model here 
seems particularly appropriate in this case. It is useful to include not only those firms that 
have chosen FDI as an expansion strategy, but also those that have not. Sample selection 
would be an obvious result if the purely domestic groups were not included. Furthermore, it 
is valuable to be able to estimate the extent of the FDI, conditional on the decision to invest 
internationally at all. 
Ordered Discrete Choice Models 
The third specification considers the density of FDI activities, using order logit. This is 
different from the other discrete choice models, as it reflects a ranking within the FDI firms 
and multiple choice models fail to reflect this. As other logit models, ordered logit model is 
based on the logistic function, shown in equation 7.1. However, firm outcomes are 
represented by series of codes conforming to an ordered sequence of available alternatives. 
This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
This chapter tests the effect of corporate governance on the relative importance of FDI 
within the firm. Four ordered choices are defined by three boundaries, p, u2, and p3 
(see 
Dependent Variables section), plus the decision not to undertake FDI. Accordingly, the four 
categories of decision are assigned values of 1 to 4 and 0 for the firms not conducting FDI at 
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all. Individual companies are given selected specific choices from 0 to 4, determined by the 
latent utility function of ordered logit, which is stated as 
y*=xß+c 7.5 
where yi =J if p; _, < yi* <_ p j, 
J=O, 1,2,3,4 7.6 
yi represent the five available options for a company, X is the set of explanatory variables as 
in the previous two models (contextual controls and corporate governance factors), and $ is 
the vector of estimated coefficients. Any utility of a firm will be locate in one of the 
intervals as shown below, thus the five categories of choice outcomes (0,1,2,3, and 4) are 
achieved. 
y*=0 1 y*=1 y*=2 y*=3 I y*=4 y*=x/l+E 
lU' P2 P3 
The probability that a firm achieves a specific decision outcome is estimated by the 
ordered logistic model with the coefficient of the parameter of latent regression, 0. This 
parameter is derived from the set of explanatory variables X and estimated coefficients ß 
that measure the influence of X on the probability of falling into a particular interval. The 
equations 7.6 to 7.10 present the estimations. 





prob(y, =1) = prob(0 < y* < p1) =e7.7 1+ en(PI-Q'x)-n(-Q'x) 
n(N: -R'x)-A(Ný-ý'x) 
prob(Yý. 8 ,= 2) = prob(ft, < Y* < {tz) ° 





el-n(N, -ß'X) prob(y, = 4) = prob(p3 < y*) =i (w, -ß'X) 
7.10 
1+e- 
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Results and Discussions 
The Status of Corporate Control 
The results show interesting, although at times ambiguous, effect of governance structures on 
FDI outcomes. Table 7.3 reports estimated coefficients and all three models indicate that 
there is a significant relationship between strategies directed at international investment and 
the systems of control with the firm. This relationship is also seen to vary depending on the 
destination of the FDI. 
In the Table, it is clear that state-controlled firms are significantly unlikely to undertake 
FDI in China but they do in other foreign countries, although here, this is a weak association 
only. Traditionally, state-owned enterprises in Taiwan play a crucial role in the 
implementation of government policy. Even though most state-owned enterprises are now 
privatised, and many listed on the TSE, the state still holds a large proportion of equity and 
thus retains control of the firm. However, governmental policy is often opposed to political 
pressure from China, and therefore state-controlled firms are reluctant to invest in China. In 
contrast, to become more integrated into the international financial and business community, 
state-controlled firms are encouraged to invest in foreign countries. In these regressions, the 
signs reflect this, with a negative association in China and a positive one elsewhere. 
However, the significance levels are statistically rather low. 
A different conclusion can be drawn for foreign-controlled firms, for FDI in China and 
elsewhere. Foreign control has a negative influence on FDI, and particularly so in the case 
of China. Since the 1960s, foreign investors have been attracted to Taiwan for cheap labour 
and competitive production costs. However, these investments are mostly concerned with 
production, which is then returned for sale on foreign markets. There are no final good 
export problems or barriers due to local markets. These owners are already involved with 
foreign commercial activity by their involvement with Taiwanese firms and are reluctant to 
take this any further. Particularly, the unstable relationship between Taiwan and China can 
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be a cause of concern for multinational enterprises. For many years, the government in 
Taiwan tried to position the country as a link between the West and the Chinese markets, but 
this has not been wholly successful. 
Table 7.3. The Associati on between Corporat e Status and FDI Deci sions 
Biisoj&al Legit Poisson Cotud Data Orderei L it 
Rest World I Ciiaa Rast World Ckina Rad World Caine 
Textiles -0971-_1 
31 I 






--- _--- - -1 -0.67* 3 
onstructions 
----- -- -127* 
1 




























IssuedCapitel. 1999 0.00* -0.00 _ 




















































obin's Q -July 1999 -0.05 1 -0.15 0.041 1 . 0.071 0.24* -0.09 
.1 (0.11) 
ý _ (0.04) _ 
.1 . OM Late-Controlled Firm 
----- ---- ---- -- - -- 
0.81 1 
-- -0.29 
0.47 . 1.37* 0.4 . 0.44 
(13) (01M (D 29) (0.61) 








-0.41 . 1.23* 
Family-Controlled Firm 039 






fi 1 _ 
0.73* 
. __. 3 
-s are 33.59 30.75 13358 255.59 48.06 33.27 
2 Lo likelihood 233.24 I 284.20 1 
likelihood - 
11 
- -463.64 -483.3 -298.36 . 296.33 
Note: An coerticients are standardised; Level of 5ignitlcance: ' p<=0.10; * p<=0.05, ** p<=0.01, *** p<=0.001; 
Standard Errors in parentheses. 
The family-controlled firms do appear to be positively associated with the FDI decision 
outcomes and this is particularly significant in the ordered logit model. This positive linkage 
may be due to the aspirations of the controlling family, where business expansion is 
motivated by self-interest. On the other hand, to overcome the limitations of the domestic 
market and to maintain their own wealth prospects, controlling families are willing to look 
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further afield in order to develop the firm (Carney and Gedajlovic, 2003). Investing in 
foreign countries to access advanced technology and cheap resources can be a possible 
strategy for the family-controlled firm. In any event, the particular management 
characteristics based on the framework of Chinese family businesses, are likely a significant 
increase the competence of the Taiwanese firm to actively participate in FDI. The finding 
supports the resource-based perspective on corporate internationalisation (Park, 2000; 
Fladmoe-Lindquist and Tallman, 1994; Rumelt, 1987). 
The Structure of Corporate Ownership 
Table 7.4 shows the linkage of firm ownership and FDI decisions. The model implies that 
ownership by foreign banks is negatively linked with the FDI outcomes, particular with 
respect to the number of FDI projects in China. Banks are by nature risk-averse, and tend to 
secure the interests of their clients so may well advise again foreign expansion. The 
presence of foreign banks is relatively new in Taiwan and their activities are still somewhat 
constrained, perhaps adding to their conservatism. In contrast, ownership by domestic banks 
indicates a significant level of encouragement of FDI in foreign countries, with the exception 
of China. Of course, many of the domestic banks in Taiwan are under state control and as 
such, are influenced by the government and thus likely to follow strategies that support policy. 
The state will be very keen to avoid the corporate sector being too dependent on China and so 
positive results for FDI in countries other than China and negative ones for China is entirely 
predictable. Further support for this result is that, apart from the underlying political unease, 
legal systems between Taiwan and China are not mutually acknowledged, for example, 
depositors rights that are protected in banks in Taiwan do not extend to China. This concern 
about the lack of legal protection can be another reason by firms with high levels of domestic 
bank ownership are unlikely to invest in China. 
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Table 7.4. The Associati on between Ownershi p Structure and FD1 D ecisions 
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On the other hand, ownership by domestic investment funds significantly enhances the 
likelihood of FDI projects. Compared with foreign financial institutions, domestic 
investment funds have a history of experience in the commercial environment in Taiwan and 
thus can have stronger incentive to advice the senior management in the firms for which they 
have an equity interest. Unlike the banks, investment funds have a greater emphasis on 
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profitability and they are willing to take international opportunities even though they may 
present some risk, since they are able to justify this higher level of risk by their investment 
portfolios. This explains the statistically significant effect of domestic investment funds' 
positive influence on FDI decision outcomes. 
Finally, the Table indicates that controlling families have a positive association with FDI, 
although the significance is confined to that in China. This finding reflects the view that 
firms with high levels of family control are more likely to undertake foreign expansion. As 
with previous arguments, families that can appropriate high returns from the firm tend to 
support foreign investment. Where they are limits to growth in the domestic environment, 
families can be increased wealth for themselves and for future generations in foreign 
opportunities, whether these are in China or elsewhere. 
The findings in this part support the resource-based perspective in corporate foreign 
expansion (Fladmoe-Lindquist and Tallman, 1994; Tallman, 1992; Hitt et al, 1997) and 
validate the financial resource injected by the controlling family and domestic financial 
institutions that are critical in promoting internationalisation of firms in Taiwan. In contrast, 
the funds provided by foreign institutional investors is limited to enhance the transfer of 
competences to Taiwanese firms engaging in FDI. 
Corporate Board Characteristics 
Table 7.5 presents the impact of board characteristics on FDI decisions. Independent 
leadership appears to have a negative influence on FDI decisions, which is perhaps a 
surprising result. The explanation can be that independent chairman or CEOs have a 
different objective function from the controlling family. Contrary to that, independent 
leaders can act as a counterbalance to prevent self-interested decisions being taken by the 
family. Further, according to the agency perspective, independent managers tend to be 
risk-averse (Hill and Snell, 1988; Hill and Snell, 1989; Hoskisson et al., 1993) and thus more 
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likely to reject a strategy involving foreign investment projects. In particular, independent 
leadership in a Taiwanese firm can be a sign that the company has difficulty in settling inside 
disputes amongst stake-holders or family members. Therefore, independent CEO and 
chairman in Taiwan are often a temporary situation only, injecting a short-term aspect to 
decision making, while FDI tends to be a long-term strategy. The finding supports the upper 
echelon perspective that the characteristics of senior managers can achieve significant impacts 
on corporate development (Slatter, 1984; Michel and Hambrick, 1992). 
Also seen in the table is the result that the number of directors has a negative association 
with FDI, other than for China, and this is particularly significant in the ordered logit model. 
This negative association can be caused by communication inefficiencies that occur with a 
large and heterogeneous board (see: Priem, 1990; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990). With 
the exception of the China market, Taiwanese firm face a complete alien business 
environment. Therefore, a board with poor communication will perform less well, resulting 
in different outcomes, where complex decisions need to be made. By contrast, supervisor 
number is positively linked with FDI in the countries except for China, which is completely 
opposite to director number. Supervisors are generally far less numerous and thus the 
number may have a different effect. Rather, the more supervisors that can enhance corporate 
decisions, the more likely the firms are able to address the concerns of conducting production 
in a strange environment. These findings indicate that an intermediate board size is the most 
favourable (Jehn, 1994; Jehn, 1995; Amason et al., 1995; Amason, 1996), if the firm decides 
to undertaken corporate expansion through FDI. 
Family control on the board is negatively related to FDI decisions, according to this 
analysis. The negative relation is particularly significant where the number of FDI projects 
is concerned. Unlike the resource-commitment of family ownership, high level family 
interfere on the board can be problematic, indicating the controlling family is keen to secure a 
leading role in determining management decisions. This may cause a conservative strategy, 
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rather than the one that undertakes risky foreign expansion. With this finding, the negative 
impact of family control on corporate governance has been confirmed (Morck et al., 1988; 
Yeh et al., 2001; Gomez-Mejia et al, 2003). Moreover, the finding verifies the reluctance of 
a homogenous board to generate a competitive strategy, particularly for one that is dominated 
by controlling manager (Hambrick and D'Aveni, 1992; Daily and Dalton, 1994b). 
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Although the results in the previous chapter show that board shareholding can impact the 
performance of the firm significantly, the opposite result is found here. It has been argued 
that the board shareholding is an incentive to motivate directors and supervisors to act in a 
manner conducive to good corporate governance (Hambrick and Jackson, 2000; Boyd and 
Finkelstein, 2001), especially where strategy decisions are relating to long-term development 
(Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). However, the finding in this part proves that FDI 
decisions are independent from this financial incentive of board members. 
Robustness Tests 
These results have revealed that features of corporate governance can be influential on FDI 
decisions. However, as indicated above, these effects differ, depending, on whether FDI is in 
China or elsewhere. One particular positive effect of family control on FDI is found to be 
inherent self-interest and accordingly, investments tend to be located where production costs 
are low or there are tax advantages. Also, this impact is determined by whether the location 
of the FDI. This sensitivity can be examined further by considering the non-China models. 
Two additional location variables were introduced, one representing location in a tax-haven 
country and the other in Singapore/Hong Kong. These results are in Table 7.6. 
The estimated coefficients show that both these variables are positive and highly significant, 
both in terms of the number of FDI projects and the value of foreign investment as a 
proportion of total. This suggests that operations that are part of a tax minimisation strategy 
are found in this sample. In addition, the political disputes between Taiwan and China, 
means it is more secure for Taiwanese firms to enter the Chinese markets through a third 
country, and the neighbouring countries of Singapore and Hong Kong can enable them to 
realise this advantage. Thus, inward FDI to Singapore. and Hong Kong may, be a step 
towards China, rather than FDI motivated by the desire'. to open production operations in a 
foreign location because of cost advantages. 
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Table 7.6. The Association between Location Choice and FDI Decisions 
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Table 7.7 compares the results with and without the two location dummy variables. 
The hypothesised associations of family control on firms, the number of supervisors and the 
extent of family members on the board of directors are insignificant when the location 
variables are included, so the locations variables are the stronger of the influences. 
Specifically, for the most fundamental decision relating to FDI, should the firm undertake this 
strategy or not, add the two location controls seems to generate a stronger corporate 
governance effect. However, for the more sophisticated decisions about number of projects 
or relative levels of commitment, the corporate governance effect is constrained. These 
findings support the view that the corporate governance effect on FDI decisions is determined 
by the location of that investment. This will be investigated in more detail in the next 
chapter, where the emphasis is firmly on internationalisation strategies. 
Table 7.7 Corporat ion Governance Effects with/without Location Control 
Binomial Logit Poisson Count Data Ordered Logit 
No Controls ! Controls No Controls Controls No Controls Controls 
State Controlled - 
Foreign Controlled - 
Family Controlled - +t +* 
Foreign Invest Fund 
Foreign Banks 
- 
Domestic Banks +* +t +* 
Domestic Invest Fund +* 




Independent Chairman _ +* 
CEO = Chairman 
Directors Number 
_t 
Supervisors Number +t _ 
Family on Board 
Board Shareholding 
Note i: All coemcients are standardised; Level ot Significance: T p<=0.10; * p<=0.05, ** p<=0.01, *** 
p<=0.001. 
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This chapter considered the impact of corporate governance factors on the decision to 
undertake foreign investment, using a number of measures of the extent of that investment, 
and matching the precise research questions with the appropriate estimating specification. 
The summary of these results is given in Table 7.8. 
Tahle 7_R Summary of Hvnntheses Examination Results 
FDI Decisions Hypothesis Examination Results 
CLina Overseas 
Controlling Family H. I. Positive Effect of Controlling Family 
amilyControl Status Positive Positive Accepted 
Family Shareholding Positive Insignificant Accepted 
Family Control on Board Negative Negative Rejected 
Institutional Investor H. Z. Positive Effect of Outside Institutional Investors 
Foreign Investing Fund Insignificant Insignificant Rejected 
ForeignBenk Negative Insignificant Rejected 
Domestic Bank Insignificant Positive Accepted 
Domestic Investing Fund Positive Positive Accepted 
Boars Cbaracteristies H3. Positive Effect of Board Independence & Shareholding 
IndependentCEO Negative Insignificant Rejected 
Independent Chairman Insignificant Negative Rejected 
Board Shareholding Insignificant - Rejected 
The first hypothesis suggested a positive the relationship between the controlling family 
and FDI decisions and the data supported this. While private resources provided by 
controlling families enhance corporate foreign expansion, the association can be conservative 
when the family overwhelmingly dominate the board of directors. The second hypothesis 
suggested a positive effect of outside institutional investors on FDI decisions. This too was 
supported, although there was a difference between foreign and domestic institutions. 
Finally, the third hypothesis suggested that an independent chairman would have a positive 
impact on FDI decision, but this was rejected. Although the previous chapter confirmed 
board shareholding to be a positive influence on firm performance positively, this is not 
extended to decisions on international operations. 
Chapter 7- Effect of Corporate Governance on FDI Decisions 194 
The effect of specific board characteristics is highly controversial in much of the existing 
literatures. This, the results found here are at present confined to these Taiwanese data. 
However, it is not surprising the results do not conform to accepted theory. The structure of 
ownership and control in a country where family dominated firms are listed on the exchange 
is likely to be different from the diverse-shareholding in western economies. 
In this chapter, the impacts of various corporate governance variables on FDI decisions 
have been examined. There is a paucity of research into the international strategies of 
owner-controlled family firms, such as these in Taiwan. Previous research has investigated 
decisions about FDI, but all focussing on Western economies, where corporate governance 
mechanisms are complete and transparent. The extension of these established theories to an 
entirely different environment raises some interesting questions. The next chapter extends 
this analysis further by examining the influences related to corporate governance structures 
that may impact location decisions in much greater detail. 
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Chapter Eight: The Association between Corporate Governance and FDI 
Location 
Introduction 
Given the inherent limitations of the domestic market, Taiwanese firms rely heavily on 
foreign trade to maintain corporate growth and development. However, since the late 1980s, 
exports have suffered due to the strong domestic currency and increasing production costs and 
many firm's found their previous comparative advantage was gradually diminishing. Thus, 
many firms in Taiwan have adjusted their strategy to include a more robust approach to FDI. 
One of the critical factors in the decision to undertake FDI is the choice of location, 
addressed to an extent in the previous chapter. Buckley (1996) noted that FDI is a major 
strategic decision, which can lead to increased profitability. In the vast majority of cases, the 
FDI decision is motivated by either the need to access cheap resources or consumer markets. 
As discussed in the literature review, while few studies link FDI decision outcomes and 
location choice to corporate governance, numerous studies show that governance 
characteristics can significantly impact corporate decision-making (for example: Berger and 
Ofek, 1995a; 1995b). Trevino and Grosses - (2002) showed that several aspects of 
governance can impact firm level efficiency and these can be extended to FDI decisions. 
The analyses in the previous chapter have shown that corporate governance factors can impact 
FDI decisions. This chapter extends this analysis by. examining the extent to which the 
location of the FDI activity can be influenced by the model of corporate governance that 
exists within the firm. 
It has already been established that in this sample, corporate governance is dominated by 
the controlling family and the owner-managers typically assume the overall management of 
the firm, frequently assuming complete control. - Thus, it is not unreasonable to suggest that 
this group will exert a considerable influence on FDI decisions (Carney and Gadajilovic, 
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2003). Therefore, in this particular context, all strategic decisions effecting FDI, including 
location choice, will be made by the dominant family. Thus, this chapter contributes to the 
literature on FDI by investigating the corporate governance characteristics that have an impact 
on location choice for those firms that choose to undertake FDI. 
Research Hypotheses 
The Association between of Family Control and FDI Location Choice 
According to Claessens et al. (2000), publicly-listed companies in many East-Asian countries 
are managed by founding families, and Taiwan is no exception. With the power associated 
with this dominant position, family members' preferences can easily interfere in corporate 
strategy decision and settle the outcome (Lyles and Schwenk, 1992; Prahalad and Bettis, 
1986). This is not surprising in a developing country, where traditionally, the firm depends 
on resources provided by the family to undertake any corporate restructuring to enhance 
efficiency (Bruton et at, 2003; Carney and Gedajlovic, 2003; Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002; 
McConaughy et al, 2001). Therefore, this, simply reflects any other principal and agent 
relationship, where the suppliers of capital have an input into the use to which these funds are 
allocated (Wong et al., 1992; Hwang, 1995; Hamilton, 1996). The interesting question is 
whether cultural and other influences that families bring to the decision of FDI location 
choice fit strictly within the models prevalent in less family dominant firms. 
In terms of FDI location choice,, previous studies have argued that managerial 
preferences can be an important factor (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Sethi et at., 2002). , 
Using a sample of Chinese-style family businesses where companies tend to draw upon the 
overseas experience and knowledge within the family, empirical studies have detected 
self-interested behaviour in FDI strategy (Tsang, 2002). To enhance the inherent knowledge 
base and reduce risk, the controlling family may prefer a familiar location or one where close 
family are already established in their investment choices. The relational networks 
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associated with Guanxi have been widely adopted by Chinese family businesses in various 
forms of commercial activity. Applying the Guanxi network to FDI strategy, the controlling 
family in Taiwan may show a strong preference for investment in areas where there are 
long-term relationships between the controlling family and the local community. Thus, the 
first hypothesis in this chapter is: 
H. I. For Taiwanese firms, the extent of family ownership and control is positively associated 
with FDI location choices that reflect family links. 
On the other hand, the altruism with regard to family members stressed by the traditional 
Confucian society can also as a strong incentive for current controlling family members to 
pass on the wealth derived from the firm to the next generation. This can influence 
long-term strategy, including FDI location decision, particularly in terms of the acquisition of 
technology available in developed countries. Much of the growth of the Taiwanese economy 
has been due to the ability of the country to make the transition from a low cost producer to a 
world-class brand and the investment in advanced countries has assisted in this. Therefore, 
the next hypothesis suggested is: 
H. 2. For Taiwanese firms, the extent of family ownership and control is positively associated 
with FDI location choices in advanced countries. 
Another issue of importance to the current and future wealth of the firm is the extent of 
tax liability. To smooth the transfer of controlling rights to the next generation, the location of 
FDI may feature the benefits of a tax shelter. Hence, the third hypothesis suggested is: 
H. 3. For Taiwanese firms, the extent of family ownership and control is positively associated 
with FDI location choice in the tax-haven countries. 
The Role of Institutional Investors in FDI Location Choice 
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Compared with other investors, the financial institutions are more sophisticated in their choice 
of target firms and their ability to assess the future value of those firms. Thus, many studies 
argue that the institutional investors with block shareholdings that represent the interests of 
minority investors can play a significant role in ensuring good standards of corporate 
governance, especially where there are controlling families (Hansmann, 1996; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). Particularly, for a publicly-listed company with a dominant founding family, 
the primary agency problem is the expropriation of minority shareholders by the family 
(Bruton et at., 2003; Young et at, 2002;. ' La Porta et al, 2000a). The participation of 
institutional investors can be an effective force in corporate governance to restrain corporate 
strategy from opportunism (Maug, 1998; Hoskisson et al., 1994; Zeckhauser and Pound, 1990; 
McConnel and Servaes, 1990), provide a counterbalance to the agency problem. In addition, 
the subjective opinion from an outside institutional investor can be beneficial in enhancing the 
quality of strategic decision-making (Amason et al., 1995; Amason, 1996; Jehn, 1995). 
In comparison with foreign competitors, many Taiwanese companies have only begun to 
undertaking FDI recently. Therefore the : involvement of institutional investors can 
compensate for any lack of experience in the firm, assisting them to adapt to foreign 
environments (Nemeth, 1986; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990). This can be a valuable 
asset, strengthening confidence and improving the outcomes for firms facing highly 
competitive markets abroad. In addition, for firms in an emerging country such as Taiwan, 
maintaining a good relationship with a major financial institution can help in the acquisition 
of external finance, which is essential for international expansion (Oxelheim et al, 2001). 
However, in empirical research, these issues are still not commonly resolved and much 
ambiguity remains. Some studies even argue i that outside institutional investors tend to 
concur with senior managers within the firm and are thus, unable to perform as efficient 
monitors (Woidtke, 2002; Faccio and Lasfer, 2000; Admati et al., 1994). Following this 
argument, the institutional investor. can concede to the decision of the dominant family and 
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encourage conservatism as an overriding strategy. Indeed, financial institutions tend to be 
risk-adverse (Woidtke, 2002) and therefore will advise against potentially uncertain 
investments abroad. This risk aversion is compounded by the inexperience and reluctance of 
Taiwanese firms to undertake FDI at all. Given the arguments above, the governance effects 
of institutional investors can be hindered by concerns about the choice of FDI location. 
Therefore, two conflicting hypotheses are suggested: 
H. 4. For Taiwanese firms, the extent of ownership and control by outside institutional 
investors is positively associated with the choice of FDI location in developed countries, 
and 
H. 5. For Taiwanese firms, the extent of ownership and control by outside institutional 
investors is not associated with the choice of FDI location. 
The Association between Board Characteristics and FDI Location Choice 
The board of directors is an important internal mechanism to ensure the protection of 
shareholders' interests. Many studies have argued that the characteristics of the board can 
impact the effectiveness of corporate governance (for example: Xie et at, 2003; Young et al, 
2002; Daily et al, 1999; Yermack, 1996; Brickley et al, 1994), with each of these emphasizing 
the governance effects of leadership, composition, size and ownership structure. Further, 
board characteristics have been widely adopted in empirical tests related to the top 
management team (TMT) (for example: Daily and Schwenk, 1996; Mueller and Barker, 1997). 
In these studies, board characteristics are used in tests of strategic decision outcomes and are 
found to be significant in numerous cases (for example: Michel and Hambrick, 1992; Zahra 
and Pearce, 1989; Bantel and Jackson, 1989). Furthermore, a number of authors argue that 
in a crucial transition phase of corporate development, the board characteristic can even 
perform an active role in ensuring good corporate, governance (Daily and Dalton, 1992; 
Warther, 1998; Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002). This leads to the proposition that board 
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characteristics are influential in determining strategies related to FDI location. 
In previous studies, heterogeneity in board composition result from independent 
directors and was found to be positive with respect to corporate governance (Brickley et al, 
1994; Priem, 1990). Thus, the composition of boards in Taiwan, where that board is 
independent from the controlling family, is likely to be heterogeneous and high quality 
strategic decision will result. Particularly, Taiwanese firms rely on the foreign markets of 
North America and Europe to develop and build up direct access to the market, achieving 
greater efficiency. However, to survive in the highly competitive environment of advanced 
markets, Taiwanese firms need the vision and knowledge to generate a flexible strategy. A 
board that is composed of members that are independent of the controlling family is necessary. 
Thus, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
H. 6. Boards that are composed of members independent of the controlling family are 
positively associated with FDI location choice in advanced countries. 
Board size can be also a critical factor in determining the quality of corporate 
governance and a number of studies show a positive relationship between the number of 
members on the board, which contributes to diversity, and good practice (Nemeth, 1986; 
Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990). However, there are limits to 
this and beyond a certain threshold, the efficiency of communication can be diminished until 
it is detrimental to quality strategic decisions (Daily et al, 1999; Shivdasani and Yermack, 
1999; Smith et al., 1994; Zenger and Lawrence, 1989). This is a dilemma as where where 
there is considerable uncertainty, such as may arise in discussions of FDI location with a 
number of unfamiliar and worrying environments, the decision process may be made more 
difficult by the communications problems associated with a large number of board members. 
In contrast, where there is less-uncertainty, discussions involving a large board size can be 
controlled by a task-focused approach, but can also be enriched by sharing a range of opinions 
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from a diversified group of board members. This can be tested as follows: 
H. 7. Board size is negatively associated with the decision to locate FDI in a complex and 
uncertain environment, but positively associated with the decision in a simpler location. 
In making strategic decisions, board members play a central role, contributing their 
personal expertise and contacts to acquire external resources (Daily et al., 1999). However, 
board involvement in policy-making may be passive and relies on the decisions of the 
controlling group (Golden and Zajac, 2001; Warther, 1998; Baysinger and Butler, 1985). To 
encourage directors to be more vigilant about the quality of governance within the firm and be 
generous with their time and attention, increased shareholding can be an effective incentive 
(Hambrick and Jackson, 2000; Oswald and Jahera, 1991; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). 
However, the connection between directors' wealth and the value of the firm can also 
stimulate risk-aversion. Under these assumptions, it is likely that where a potentially risky 
foreign investment is necessary to develop the future of the firm, those with a higher 
shareholding will be more likely to select a secured location with a familiar environment. 
This leads to the following two conflicting hypotheses: 
H. 8. The extent of board shareholding is positively associated with FDI location choice in 
high competitive markets. 
H. 9. The extent of board shareholding is positively associated with FDI location choice in 
secure markets. 
Methodology 
Using the sample of FDI projects undertaken by the 228 firms in this sample, this chapter 
investigates the corporate governance effect on the spatial distribution of corporate foreign 
investment. The explanatory variables are a. number of corporate governance factors and 
several contextual variables used as controls, all of . which are defined in Chapter 5. The 
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models are also outlined in that chapter and therefore the explanation here includes the 
construction of the dependent variables specific to this chapter and also details of the 
estimating equations. 
Dependent Variable 
Since there has been a long-standing special historical and political relationship between 
Taiwan and China, it seems appropriate that the choice of location of FDI projects into China 
requires a separate examination. Thus, the analysis in this chapter considers location choice 
in China and elsewhere is a parallel set of regressions. Furthermore, even within China, the 
analysis is divided into province-specific regions, as in such a large and diverse country, the 
particular characteristics of the various provinces may influence different kinds of investment 
decisions. 
From the discussion of tax-havens earlier in the chapter, it is clear that this factor needs to be 
considered, certainly in the estimation of location choice for investment outside China. 
Tax-haven countries are generally a first option for FDI location and the data used here uses 
that in Eiteman et 41. (1998, pp. 549). Singapore and Hong Kong are frequently seen as 
tax-haven countries. However, they are very similar to Taiwan in terms of culture, and are 
located a relatively short distance to both China and Taiwan. Therefore, both countries can 
be used as a convenient link between Taiwan and China. Further, Southeast Asian countries 
can attract Taiwanese FDI by both low-cost production and the familiar environment. 
Therefore, these countries are represented in the estimation by a dummy variable in the 
specification to denote their particularly, importance in Taiwanese FDI location decisions. 
One additional factor is the group of advanced economies, such as the US, Japan and the EU, 
which provide consumer markets and production technology for Taiwanese companies. 
Therefore, a strategic choice based on the acquisition of these attributes is also recognised. 
In summary, there are five locational categories for Taiwanese FDI in this section including (1) 
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tax-haven countries, (2) Singapore and Hong Kong, (3) Southeast Asia, (4) Advanced 
Countries and (5) the rest (base-alternative). 
As noted above, the diversity of China demands a region-specific approach, thus the 
location choices of Taiwanese FDI in China are generalised into six groups that reflect 
different motivations for FDI. Inland areas of China lag behind in economic development 
(Chadee et al, 2003). The northern coast (Hebai and Shandong provinces) and middle 
coastal areas (Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces) rely on heavy and light industries respectively. 
Further, business in the middle coastal provinces has traditionally been rooted in Guanxi 
traditions and also has a strong connection with overseas Chinese communities, including 
Taiwan. Fujian province on the south coast is where the majority of Taiwanese people 
originate, sharing a similar culture and identical dialect. Guangdong province is also on the 
south coast and has a long history of attracting foreign investments, particular from 
neighbouring Hong Kong. Finally, the metropolitan areas of China (the cities of Beijing, 
Tianjin and Shanghai) have huge populations, a relatively advanced infrastructure and a 
considerable multinational business sector that can be both an opportunity and also a 
challenge for Taiwanese firm. Thus, these six regions are included in the analysis of FDI 
location choice in China. In summary, the six location categories in China are (1) north 
coast, (2) middle coast, (3) Fujian province, (4) Guangdow province, (5) metropolitan cities 
and (6) the rest inland areas (base-alternative). 
Correlation Matrices 
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 show the correlation matrices for the variables used to model FDI location 
in China and the rest of the world. As indicated in both tables, the control variables (four 
investment motives, two sectoral dummies, company age, value of FDI, firm capitalisation, 
ownership of the investment and annual Taiwanese FDI to China) are strongly correlated with 
FDI location choices, particularly for those representing motives for investment. On the 
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other hand, the corporate governance variables (company control status, ownership structure 
and board characteristics) are weakly correlated with FDI location decisions in China and are 
neutral with respect to the rest of the world. The low correlations are frequently a result in 
discrete choice models due to the nature of the dependent variable, since the variance is 
restricted compared with a series of real values., The implications of this will be included in 
the later discussion. 
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Amongst the FDI location choices in China, Fujian, and Middle Coast are the regions 
reflecting family links for Taiwanese families. Unlike the middle coast area, Fujian 
is not 
popular destination of FDI, so Taiwanese -investment will face less competition and 
subsequently less risk in this location. On the other hand, the three biggest cities and the 
north coast present more opportunities due to the huge consumer markets, openness and 
accessible information and potential for development. However, these environments are 
relatively more complicated for Taiwanese firms. Competition is most likely to be 
particularly strong in the metropolitan cities and in Guangdow. Table 8.3 indicates the 
expected impacts of the corporate governance variables on FDI location choices in China, for 
each of the stated hypotheses. .... 
.'_a,. 
Table 8.3 The Expected Association between Corporate Governance and FDI Location 
in China 
Guangdow Cities Fujain M. Coast N. Coast 
Family Controlled Firm - H2. Positive H1: Positive H1. Positive H2. Positive 
Controlling Family Ownership - H2. Positive H1. Positive H1. Positive H2. Positive 
Family Control onBoerd - H2. Positive H1. Positive Hl. Positive H2. Positive 
Institutional Ownerships - H4. Positive - - - 
Institutional Ownerships H5. Insig. H5. Insig. H5. Insig. H5. Insig. H5. Insig. 
Independent Chairman - H6. Positive H6. Positive 
Independent CEO - H6. Positive - - H6. Positive 
DirectorNumber - H7. Negative H7. Positive - - 
SupervisorNumber - H7. Negative H7. Positive - - 
BoerdShareholding H8. Positive H8. Positive H9. Positive - - 
111. Family Ownership and Contro l are positive for Family-Linked Location. 
112. Family Ownership and Control are positive for Advanced Marketed 
113. Family Ownership and Control are positive for Tax-Haven countries. 
114. Institutional Ownership is positive for Advanced Marketed. 
115. Institutional Ownership is insignificant for FDI Location Decision. 
116. Independent Board is positive for Advanced Market. 
117. Big Board Size is negative for Complicated Location but positive for Simple Location. 
118. Board Shareholding is positive for high-Competitive Market. 
119. Board Shareholding is positive for Secure Market. 
For FDI locations outside China, Southeast Asian countries provide low-cost production 
and a similar cultural environment to Taiwan. ' These therefore present a relatively secure 
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and straightforward choice for Taiwanese FDI. Also, tax-haven countries provide tax 
benefits for investors. Moreover, both the option of Singapore / Hong Kong and Southeast 
Asia reflect a familiar environment for Taiwanese dominant controlling families. In contrast, 
the developed countries are unfamiliar, complicated and high competitive locations. Table 
8.4 indicates the expected impacts of the corporate governance variables on the FDI location 
choices, for each of the stated hypotheses. 
Table 8.4. The Expected Association between Corporate Governance and FDI 
Location (outside China) 
Sing ! HK .- 
S E. Asia Developed Tax-Hehren 
Family Controlled Firm H1. Positive H1. Positive H2 Positive H3 Positive 
Controlling Family Ownership H1. Positive H1. Positive H2 Positive H3 Positive 
Family Control on Board H1. Positive H1. Positive H2 Positive H3 Positive 
Institutional Ownerships - - H4. Positive - 
Institutional Ownership s H5. Insig. H5. Insig. H5. Insig. H5. Insig. 
Independent Chairman - - H6. Positive 
Independent CEO - - H6. Positive 
DirectorNumber - H7. Positive H7. Negative H7. Positive 
Supervisor Number - H7. Positive H7. Negative H7. Positive 
Board Shareholding - H9. Positive H8. Positive H9. Positive 
Hi. ramify Ownership and Control are positive for Family-Linked Location. 
112. Family Ownership and Control are positive for Advanced Marketed 
113. Family Ownership and Control are positive for Tax-I laven countries. 
114. Institutional Ownership is positive for Advanced Marketed. 
115. Institutional Ownership is insignificant for FDI Location Decision. 
116. Independent Board is positive for Advanced Market. 
117. Big Board Size is negative for Complicated Location but positive for Simple Location. 
118. Board Shareholding is positive for I ligh-Competitive Market. 
119. Board Shareholding is positive for Secure Market. 
Binary & Multinomial Logit Model 
In the review of the literature, the 'method of conditional logic devised by McFadden (1974) 
dominates studies of FDI location choice (for example: Head and Ries, 1996; Ford and 
Strange, 1999; Chadee et al., 2003; Crozet et al., 2004)., However, this study aims to test the 
influence on choice outcomes from firm level differences in corporate governance, and the 
conditional logit that is used to capture, the' effect of location-specific attributes (Greene, 
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2003), can be inappropriate here. Therefore, multinomial logit is used to address the effect 
of firm-specific characteristics on discrete choice outcomes. Further, the alternative choices 
in this study are based on innate differences in FDI location, which should be moderated on 
the methodological problems arising from the independence of possible alternatives. 
The selection of this particular econometric approach is supported by previous empirical 
studies that model similar sets of alternatives (for example: Hensher, 1986; Terza, 1985; 
Schmidt and Strauss, 1975a; 1975b; Boskin, 1974). The details of the logit model have been 
presented in Chapter 5, and thus the primary equation can be specified. The probability that 
firm, i, with characteristics X;, that include corporate governance characteristics, plus a 
number of controls, selects a specific location for FDI, given options J, chosen from j+l 
alternatives, can be written. 
eßJxI 
prob(Y, = J) _j, J=O, 1, .., j 8.1 e6rXi 
k=0 
For FDI located in China, there are the five stated available options , plus one 
base-alternative, giving J=0,1,..., 5. The X, in the case of FDI in China are: the total value 
of annual FDI from Taiwan to China, the textile and electrical industry dummies, issued 
capital, age of firm, the value of all FDI investment, the proportion of ownership in the case 
of a joint venture, average wage at the FDI location, per capita consumption at the FDI 
location, transport related infrastructure, the'value of FDI inflows to the region in total and a 
number of the of the corporate governance factors used in the earlier empirical chapters, for 
example, controlling status, ownership structure and board characteristics. 
For FDI location choice in the rest of the world, four options are available, 
Singapore/Hong Kong, Southeast Asia, Japan/US/EU, and tax-haven countries, plus one 
base-alternative, giving J=0,1,..., 4. The Xi in this model are: the proportion of ownership 
in the case of joint venture, value of investment, the textiles and electrical industry dummies, 
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issued capital, age of firm, GDP per capita in the FDI location, balance of resources 
(measured by the country's exports of goods and services minus imports of goods and 
services), transport service exports (measured by all transport services provided by residents 
to foreigners), tax on goods and services, and finally, several of the corporate governance 
factors used in the earlier empirical chapters, such as controlling status, ownership structure 
and board characteristics. 
Further, based on equation 8.1 and the same regressors outlined above, a binomial logit 
model is estimated for both FDI to China and the rest of the world, where J=O, 1 and I is the 
testing option and 0 otherwise. 
Results 4 
Table 8.5 reports the results of the association between ownership by significant shareholders 
and location choice in the respect to outward FDI of Taiwanese firms to China (the base 
alternative is not shown). It is clear that apart from domestic banks, which have a significant 
effect, particularly in Fujian province, the other institutional investors are either unimportant 
or ambiguous in their influence.. These results reveal that foreign institutional investors have 
little impact, confirming H5 stated above. Importantly, the controlling family has a strong 
impact on the decision to undertake FDI in Fujian province. This not surprising, as the 
common cultural and business environment between Fujian and Taiwan and the strong 
community connections make this a less uncertain setting, and thus Ill is supported. There 
is also support for the view that the controlling family has a moderate effect in the decision to 
locate FDI in metropolitan areas. These are the regions of China that are more closely 
aligned with developed countries, presenting the same opportunities and challenges, thus 
supporting H2. 
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Table 8.5 Logit Regression: Association between Ownership and FDI Location Choice 
(China) 
GUANGDOW CITY FUJIAN - MIDDLE Coast NORTH Coast 
Bi Multi Bi Malta Bi Multi Bi Multi Bi Multi 
TeiwanFDlinChina . 0.00** 1 0.00*** -0.000 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00* 0.00*** I -0.00* 0.00** 0.00 
(0"00) 1 (0"00) (OM 1 (0"00) (0"O0) ( 
666 6.6 (0 1 (0 
Textiles -0.38 233 1.68 _ 
216 0.49 231t 1 0.5101 _3.55* 1 -026 
r 0.80 
1 
tp. 84) (139) (2.45, (2.43) (0.65) (134) (037) (1.57) (32() (1.13) 
Electrics 0.18 -2.72 0.45 1 3.79 -1.13 1. -163 0.04 1 1.07 -139 1 -111 
N. 87) r (196) (101) r (2.36) N93) 1(1. ß) (038) (183) (1.727) (183) 
Corporate IssuedCapite1 0.00 -0 . 001 -0.00 I -0.001 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 I -0.00* 0.00 -0AO 
N ý, N N1N 0"00) 1 0"00) (o. oo) (P. oo) 0.00) (OM Finn Age 0.06 0.08 0.19 026** 
+ ý - 
0.03 0.18** 1 -0.03_1 0.20** 1 0.02 0.04 1 
(OAS) (0.07) (0.16) ( 0 09) (U 0) (0.07) (0.02) 1P. 10) (OA5) (0.07) 
Investing Value 0.00 -0A0 0.00 1 0.00 -0.00 1 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(p. oo) ; (0.00) (0.00) 0(1) (. 0(1) r (o. ooý (o. ooý r (0 . 0a) (p. oo) 
r (0-00) 
Ownership of Investment 0.021 1 0.03** -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01 1 OM* -0.021 0.01 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.01) I (0.01) (D"00) I (0.07 (OAl) 1N 02) 
Average Wage -0.00** 0.00* -0.01* -0 Olt 0.00* 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0001 0.00* 
ßo. 00) (0.00, (o. 6a1 (0.00) ) (o. 00) (o. 00) (0.00) (0.00) (0-RD 1 (p. 00) 
per capitaConsumption 0.00*** 1 0.00 ,10.02** O02* -0.00** 1 -0.00 . 0.00'** 0.00* -0.01* -0Al* 
(U OOj r (O. OO) (0.10) r (1) 01) (0(7) r (0.00) ý -(Ö. OÖj r (0.00) (0, r (0.00) 
Traffic Length 0.00*** I -0.00* -0.00** -01)0*** 0.00* 1 -0.00* -0.00*** 1 -0 00*** 0.00* 0.00 
FDI R i 
(P. 00j (0 
*** *** 
(n"o l N"00) 
1 *** 






ecept on 0.00 0.00 0.001 0.00 -0.00 0.00 ** 0.00*** 0.00*, ** 0.00 0.00*0 
(0-00) 0 00 
Foreign Investing Funds "129 I 036 434 `I0.11 161 -0.04 -034 I 039 053 -0.166 
IV (0.87) r (148) (3.77) r (O S3)- (68) r (0 3ý _ (0.36) r ý (0,4.5) (0.42) (093) r 
Foreign Beaks IV . . _.. 020 ( -2.17 -0.03 0.43 -0.62 -032 
ý. .. 
-0.20 ( -033 
..,.. ý 2.81 *f1 AS 
(0.91) (IA'7) (23) (135).... 
ý 
(0.81) 1 (o (039) (021) (1.12) (1.74).... 
Domestic Banks IV -0.86 0.13 -10901 -0.09 231 ** -0.12 0.17 7 0.55 ' 0.27 
) (5.97)' ( 
1 
3 43) 
0 Domestic InvestangFund -0 -0.25 0.28 0.76 1 -0 -002 
Z12 0.11 OA3 
IV (p. 17) (038) (0.30) [ (p ) 6ir (0 38) (110.03 r (037) (0.14) r (0.12) 
Government Agency ...... 0.23 f 0.29 -0.88 1 0.83* -0.07 0.26 
ý,.. 
. 0.22 ( 0.44 . 029 0.11 
Normal Corporation 
(0 I (0 
0 00I -0 11* 
17) 39) 
02.1 -0 012 
(038)-_l (031) 
0 00 r -0 
(0.24) (B (O. SI) (0 
* (T . . I . (, _. 
t . (, 05 -0.00_ .0 07t _OM 
-0.04 
u (. 01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.07) (101) r (0.03) (0.00) (0.0ý (0.01) (0.03) 
. 
ontrolling Family IV 
- -- - -- -- -- 
-0.03 I 
- 
0.00 0.14t OÄ8** 0.07 -0.01 0.06 0.06 1 0.0 - 
s are 433.87 1 1152.70 '45897,1152.70 6937' 1 1152.70 16298.1 1132.70 84.58 1 1152.70 
-2 Lo likelihood 103.04 - 26.76 ' 128.64 359.12 66.07 
ox & Snell RS uare 0.62 - 0.64 - 0.14 031 0.17 
a elkerke R Square 0.89 1 097 0.40 1 0.44 0.60 1 
Lo likelihood - -124.19 . 124.19 -124.19 . 124.19 -124.19 
Restricted lo likelihood -700.54 . 700.54 . 70034 . 700.34 , 700.54 
iIOLC: Levey of bIgnuicance: - ps=u. iu; { p<=u. u5, ** p<=0.01, *** p<=0.001; Standard Errors in parentheses; 
IV are instrumental variables. 
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Table 8.6 Logit Reg ression: Owners hip Factors and F DI Location (res t of the world) 
Sing ! HK S. E. Asia Japan 1 US / EU Tax Haven 
Bi 1 Multi Bi I Multi Bi I Multi Bi I Multi 
Ownership of investment 0.02** 0.01 
01 01) (0 
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100 00) (0 
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-0.06t 1 ýý 
0.01 0.05 
X00 )1 . _ 
J 
_ " . '- ...;. _ Normal Corp oration 0.00 I 
0.02- 
01) 00? ) (0 
01)1 0.03 ýº _ .. _. _. _ .. . 
01 -0.01 0.01 01 w. -0.02 
0.05* 
(0 ý 02) (0 . . .... . Controlling Family IV -0.02 0.01- -0.00 
03 
0A2 002 0.06* 
.. 1 
O"06* 
Chi s uare 135.42 1004.75 265.69 1004.75 42635 1004.75 67637 11 1004.75 
-2 Lo likelihood 395.76 
1 111.19 I 200.68 I 80.22 1 
Cox & Snell R Square 0.22 038 - 033 0.70 
Na elkerke RS uare 035 I- 0.77 -1 0.79 1 0.95 1 
Lo L - -289.37 - 
11 
-28937 -28937 -28937 
Pseudo Rs uared -I0.63 -10.63 -10.63 1 0.63 
Note: Level of Significance: ' p<=0.10; * p<=0.05, ** p<=0.01, **. * p<=0.001; Standard Errors in parentheses; 
IV are instrumental variables. 
Table 8.6 reports the results of a similar analysis with respect to FDI located in countries 
other than China. In this case, none of the institutional investors appear to have a significant 
effect. This may reflect the conservative role of this group on FDI decisions, again 
supporting H5. On the other hand, the controlling family are strongly motivated by tax 
Chapter 8- Effect of Corporate Governance on FDI Location 213 
benefits, when choosing an FDI location. This finding directly validates the argument 
presented that families wish to transfer corporate wealth from current to future generations, 
and clearly taking advantage of a tax shelter will facilitate this. However, the analysis does 
not support the view that the controlling family seeks a familiar environment, as locations 
such as Singapore, Hong Kong and other South-east Asian countries are not significant factors 
in the FDI location decision. Equally, no evidence is found for the controlling family to 
prefer the location of advanced countries, as these were also insignificant. 
Table 8.7 Logit R egression: Con trolling Status and FDI Loca tion (China) 
GUANGDOW CITY FUJIAN MIDDLE Coast NORTH Coast 
Bi 11 Multi Bi Multi Bi Multi Bi Muhl Bi Multl 
TaiwenFDlinChina -0.00** 1 -0.00*** -0.00 I -0.00** -0.00 -0A0* 0.00*** 1 -0.00** OA0** 1 0.00 
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Textiles 1 -0.61 
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FDIReception 0.00"** 1 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 1 0.00*** 0.00*** 1 0.00"** 0.001 0.0000 
tate Controlled -220 1 3.78 0.16 3397 3271 34.64 0.14 35.06 0.15 I 3039 
(23.14) 1 (116) (5.80) (2345) (197) (2345) (130) (234.3) (195) 1 (234.5) 
Foreign Controlled -4.66** 1 -1124*** 0.63 1 -7.481 4.79** . 2.65 0.54 1 -7330 . 4.42 1 -30.19 
(1.73) (3.06) (231) (397) (133) (2.45) 0.72) (323) (27.44) (349) 
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1 3301 2.131 236 134** 2.770 0.46 0.42 
23) 
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Table 8.7 above shows the results of modelling the influence of corporate control on FDI 
location choice in China. Family controlled firms in Taiwan have a significant degree of 
influence, leading to investment project in the middle coastal region, where local businesses 
have strong connections with overseas Chinese communities. Family controlled firms also 
have a significant tendency to invest in Fujian province from where many Taiwanese families 
originated. Further, the analysis reveals that family-controlled firms are weakly related to 
the location choice in metropolitan cities. This supports the argument that family control is 
more likely to generate long-term strategies by investing in areas where there are markets, 
information, technology and higher levels of competition, such as developed countries and the 
metropolitan cities in China. 
Table 8.8 below shows the results of the influence of corporate controlling status on FDI 
location choice in the rest of the world. Firms with controlling families have a significant 
association with the decision to locate FDI in South-east Asia and Singapore and Hong Kong. 
With close proximity in terms of geography and, culture, these environments are very familiar 
for Taiwanese firms. Thus, the behaviour indicated here support H1. On the other hand, 
the analysis reveals that family control can also significantly influence FDI in advanced 
countries including Japan, the US and the EU, supporting the' willingness of controlling 
families to choose a strategy of entry into highly competitive markets. Finally, there is a 
strong association between family . controlled status and 
investment in tax-haven countries. 
This finding again supports the argument that motives to transfer corporate control rights to 
the next generation are paramount. 
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Table 8.8 Logit Reg ression: Controll ing Status and F DI Location (rest of the world) 
S' 1 HK S. L Asia J an 1 US 1 EU Tax Haven. 
Bi I Multi Bi I Multi Bi I Multi Bi I Multi 
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The final set of estimates result from an examination of the board characteristics of these 
firms and the impact they may have, on FDI location choices. Table 8.9 shows their 
associations with FDI in China. Independence of board leadership appears not to be 
important, whereas in contrast, possible interventions by' the controlling family board 
members do influence decisions to invest in'the northern coastal regions. Considering that 
this region is a relatively new area for, Taiwanese firms and the fact that it is a heavy industrial 
area, this can imply that it is attractive for development, again indicating a long-term strategic 
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plan. Thus, a hypothesis that independence on the board leads firm's to search for 
potentially highly competitive FDI locations, where they can exploit R&D, compared with 
non-independence, is rejected. 
Table 8.9 Logit Regression: Board Charact eristics and F DI Location (C hina) 
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On the other hand, a larger number of directors on the board do have a significant and 
negative linkage with the decision to locate FDI in metropolitan cities, curiously contradicted 
by the impact of a large number of supervisors. In the sample used in this thesis, the average 
number of directors is eight and of supervisors only 2. Considering this disparity, it is clear 
that a large board can block FDI in contentious locations, such as highly competitive 
metropolitan cities in China, and an optimal number of members can enhance decision 
making is this area. Further, the results indicate that the boards with higher levels of 
shareholding can significantly influence -ML ; in Fujian province, which is especially 
sympathetic to Taiwanese firms. Conversely, firms with a board where shareholding is high, 
significantly avoid investing in Guangdow province, where Taiwanese firms face competition 
from Hong Kong. Thus, these results support the hypothesis that board shareholding causes 
risk-adverse strategies and a reluctance to enter an especially competitive business 
environment. 
Table 8.10 completes these results with the parallel models of FDI location outside China. 
Here, an independent CEO is positively related to the location of FDI in developed countries. 
On the other hand, boards that are largely composed of members from the controlling family 
show a strong tendency to invest in tax-haven countries reflecting the family intention to 
retain control of the firm for future generations. Interestingly, an independent board 
chairman acts in a similar way, favouring investments in tax-haven countries. The findings 
indicate that while board independence potentially encourages the firm to. pursue an active 
FDI strategy, the influence from the controlling family remains the major determinant. This 
may explain why even an independent chairman still retains the motives of the family. As in 
the previous set of results, the number of supervisors is significant in achieving FDI in 
South-east Asia, for the same reasons. Also reflecting the previous discussion, boards with 
high levels of shareholding are also inclined' towards tax-haven countries, reflecting the 
risk-adverse nature of the board and the benefits of owner wealth maximisation. 
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Table 8.10 Logit Regression: Board Characteristics and FDI Location (rest of the world) 
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Discussion and Implications 
The Controlling Family 
A summary of the tests results in this study related to the controlling families associated with 
FDI location choice for the Taiwanese firms is in Table 8.11.. The hypothesis that controlling 
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families undertake FDI in areas with cultural and family ties (Fujian and Middle Coast of 
China and the Southeast Asian countries) is strongly supported. Previous work has argued 
that overseas Chinese nationals have a preference for investment in the south coast, rather 
than other areas in China (Chadee et, al, 2003; Head and Ries, '- 1996). This study further 
verifies the concern that specific historical and cultural connections have led 
family-controlled firms in Taiwan to favour Fujian and the middle coast provinces, rather than 
the whole of south-coast China including Guangdow, where local communities have a greater 
connection with Hong Kong. 
Table 8.11 Summary of Associations between C ontrolling Family an d FDI Loc, - 
Family Characteristics Location Choice in China H. I. H2. H3. 
Family Control Status Positive 1. Cities 
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Family Characteristics Location Choice in Overseas H. I. H3. H3. 
Family Control Status Positive 1. TaxHaven 











FamilyShareholding Positive 1. TaxHaven - = Accepted 
FamilyControlonBoard Positive 1. TaxHaven - - Accepted 
tic. ramuy uwnersnip ana control are positive tor tramtly-Linked Location. 
112. Family Ownership and Control are positive for Advanced Marketed 
113. Family Ownership and Control are positive for Tax-haven countries. 
ition 
Uppsala theory (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Johanson and Vahlnc, 1977; 
1990) suggests that to reduce : potential risk, multinational enterprises initially make 
investments in countries that are geographically and culturally proximate. Based on this 
argument, controlling families prefer to choose locations that are familiar, reflecting risk 
aversion that ensures a more certain approach to expansion; However, the influence of 
controlling families on strategic outcomes is not solely of a' conservative nature. The results 
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in this study show that controlling families can also undertake FDI in advanced markets. 
Given that advanced markets, such as those in developed countries, and metropolitan cities in 
China) are generally more competitive, the decision to enter reflects the confidence and 
ambition of these families to earn some of the surplus gains in the international arena. The 
findings in this chapter support the view that controlling families do have a long-term 
strategic vision suggested by James (1999), and construct an FDI portfolio containing both 
secure and competitive locations. 
The analysis also confirms that controlling families are significantly associated with the 
motive to gain a tax advantage. This finding supports the concerns in the law and economics 
literature that such a model of ownership and governance can lead to abuse of controlling 
rights (see Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1997; 1998; 2000a). Moreover, the 
traditional Chinese style family has been found to limit knowledge and experience of FDI to 
members of the family (Tsang, 2002). Thus, foreign investment can be an efficient indicator 
that the controlling family has entrenched managerial rights. The preference of the 
controlling family to invest in tax-havens and or countries with close family contacts, which 
ensure such information stays within the designated group, is further evidence of the 
self-interested nature of the family and the impact this may have on strategy decisions related 
to FDI location. 
The Institutional Investors 
Table 8.12 summarises the results of the test on the relationship between institutional 
investors' shareholdings and FDI location choices. As shown in the table, institutional 
investors do not have a significant input in location choice, supporting the argument that 
outside block-holders exert a conservative impact on corporate governance (Woidtck, 2002; 
Faccio and Lasfer, 2000). 
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Table 8.12 Summary o f Associations of Institutio nal Investo r and Hit 
Institutional Status Location Choice in China HA. H5. 
Foreign Investing Fund Insignificant Rejected Accepted 
ForeignBank Insignificant Rejected Accepted 
Domestic Bank Insignificant Rejected Accepted 
Domestic Investing Fund Insignificant Rejected Accepted 
Institutional Status Location Choice in Overseas HA. HS. 
Foreign Investing Fund Insignificant Rejected Accepted 
Foreign Bank Insignificant Rejected Accepted 
Domestic Bank Insignificant Rejected Accepted 
Domestic Investing Fund Insignificant Rejected' Accepted 
114. Institutional Ownership is positive for Advanced Marketed. 
115. Institutional Ownership is insignificant for FDI Location Decision. 
Location 
221 
The insignificance of the coefficient on financial institutions can be explained by their 
risk-adverse nature and a reluctance to support foreign expansion, but also that these 
institutions may have little input into firm strategy in Taiwan. Although the previous 
chapters have revealed that institutional investors have an ownership share in firms that are 
performing above average, and that these firms are the ones more likely to consider FDI, there 
is nothing to suggest that the decision to select a particular investment location was affected 
by outside influences. The outside institutional investors may play a role in disciplining the 
firm, or attempt to pressure the firm towards a particular strategy. However, to participate in 
detailed decisions to realize strategic value, such as the selection of an optimal FDI location, a 
high level of understanding of the management style, the structure of internal hierarchies and 
the cultural background is required, and this can efficiently block any input from neutral 
outsiders. The finding here reveals the importance of strategic alignment in achieving good 
governance by outside block-holders, as found in Kroszneryand Strahan (2001), La Porta et al 
(2000a) and Short (1994), but also their inability to participate in detail decisions made at the 
firm level. 
The Board Characteristics 
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Table 8.13 summarise the results of the analysis related to the associations of board 
characteristics and FDI location decisions. The analysis in this study does not support the 
view that board independence encourages ambitious expansion, with respect to FDI located in 
advanced countries. The finding indicates the relative governance functions of independents, 
argued by Brickley et al. (1994) and Xie et al. (2003), has limited significance in the decision 
on FDI location. On the other hand, the model proposed by Warther (1998) that 
demonstrated that outsider directors tend to compromise with corporate controllers to ensure a 
continuance of their personal position is verified in this case of Taiwan. 
Compared with the independence issue, this study verifies that board size is strongly 
linked with the FDI location decisions, supporting the arguments about the pivotal role this 
plays in corporate governance (Daily et al, 1999; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). In 
particular, a board with many members tends to reverse FDI decisions, where these are 
directed at complex and competitive environments; but to agree to expansion in relatively 
unsophisticated markets. A large number of supervisors can result in support for FDI in 
highly competitive markets associated with the metropolitan areas of China, although the 
number of supervisors is in fact very much lower than that of directors. This finding reveals 
that communication inefficiency may be a concern in a large management teams (Cho et al, 
1994; Priem, 1990). 
Further, the results reveal that the proportion of total shareholding owned by board 
members has a significantly positive influence on FDI location choice, where tax benefits can 
be achieved and indeed serves as a motivation for further participation in strategic decisions 
(Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Oswald and Jahera, 1991). However, this finding rejects 
the hypothesis that higher levels of financial alignment between board members and the value 
of the firm reflects active involvement incorporate governance (Hambrick and Jackson, 2000; 
Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990) and encourages ambitious expansion into advanced markets. 
By contrast, the preference of a high-shareholding board for tax-havcns confirms that owners 
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have an incentive to increase the value of the firm without taking undue risks. This 
relationship is similar with the controlling family, indicating that where there are high levels 
of shareholding by board members, the likelihood of board independence is small. Thus, the 
strategic decisions of the board reflect self-interest on the part of the controller, rather than 
any motive of using sound governance as a means of providing discipline within the firm. 
rave ts. 13 summa ry of Associalion of tsoa ra L uara cteristic a na r lii Location 
Board Characteristics Location Choice ix China H. 6. H. 7. H8. H9. 
Independent CFA Insignificant Rejected - - - 
IndependentChairman Positive 1. North Coast 
2. Middle Coast 
Accepted 
Rejected 
- - - 
CEO also Chairman Insignificant Rejected - - - 
Directors Size Negative 1. Cities - Accepted - - 
Supervisor Size Positive 1. Cities - Rejected - - 
BoardShareholding Positive 1. Fujian 
Negative 1. Guangdow 




Board Characteristics Location Choice in Overseas Hb. H7. H8. H9. 
IndependentCFA Insignificant Rejected - - - 
Independent Chairman Insignificant Rejected - - - 
CEO also Chairman Insignificant Rejected - - - 
Directors Size Insignificant - Rejected - - 








..,.. _- .. 
- 
= 
11Board Shareholding Positive 1. TexHaven - - Rejected Accepted 
116. Independent Board is positive for Advanced Market. 
117. Big Board Size is negative for Complicated Location but positive for Simple Location. 
118. Board Shareholding is positive for high-Competitive Market. 
119. Board Shareholding is positive for Secure Market. 
Conclusion 
The previous chapter confirmed that corporate governance factors can be significantly related 
to the decision to undertake FDI. In this chapter, the same corporate governance factors are 
examined with respect to the choice of location for FDI. The results show that in many 
cases, the model of corporate governance within the firm does have significant association 
with the spatial distribution of FDI. In particular, the existence of a controlling family tends 
to achieve a long-term vision of FDI as a firm strategy, focusing the distribution of investment 
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to secure, competitive markets and also tax havens. : However, the associations also suggest 
the self-interest motive of controlling families and this may result in managerial entrenchment. 
On the other hand, institutional investors are unimportant in decisions at this level. Finally, 
board independence is insignificant, although the number of board members and their 










This thesis has examined well-established theories of corporate governance and the impact of 
agency conflicts that can arise from owner-manager separation in an entirely new manner. 
There are two major differences: the national and cultural context of the business community 
and the type of decision outcomes considered. The context is unique in this kind of study. 
The sample uses the total population of non-financial firms listed on the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange, a very large proportion of which are owned and controlled by a dominant family. 
Thus, business in conducted within traditions that retain the hierarchical system that reflects 
the power structure of Chinese families and organisations and also reflects the Confucian and 
Guanxi culture that is enshrined in the vast majority of the Taiwanese people. The second 
major contribution is to link the theory and practice of, corporate governance with the 
international business literature. This allows a study of the initial motivation and the location 
of to the ownership and control mechanisms that exist within these firms. Finally, much of 
the analysis takes account of the particular historical, political and economic relationship 
between Taiwan and China by separating strategic decision outcomes into two distinct sets of 
estimates. The results of the . empirical analysis . 
highlight the differences between the 
international relationships within these two separate geographical groups. 
A sample of publicly listed, family owned firms in Taiwan provides the opportunity to 
investigate the "principal-principal" relationship in corporate governance, which is far 
removed from the Berle-Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) models., Interesting 
effects are found where incentives 'are not purely personal and motivation is prompted by 
inter-generational wealth transfers.. However, the existing western models may not transfer 
easily to East Asia. There is evidence that corporate governance systems are crucial and have 
an influence on the economic competitiveness of nations and companies (Mitton, 2002; 
Claessens et al., 2000), although none have examined directly, the effect of the most important 
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features of family control on performance or internationalisation outcomes. This thesis 
contributes to the literature by investigating the effects of the controlling family on the way 
strategic decisions are made and the implications of these to the firm. 
The fundamental argument of this thesis is that while controlling families are assumed to 
abuse the power invested in them, the resources provided by the family are important to 
sustain the development of firms in Taiwan. From the perspective of a resource based view of 
the firm, the argument favours the system of family control rather than find this a weakness as 
in the Anglo-American context. However, these firms depend on foreign expansion to 
maintain competitiveness and to grow in a market that is generally mature. The decision to 
invest abroad is a critical one and the effectiveness of communication, the different objective 
functions of shareholders and the degree of risk aversion all impact how the decision is made. 
Previous findings of the corporate governance effect on various strategy decisions, including 
mergers and acquisitions and diversification have excluded decisions on expansion by 
strategic foreign investment. Thus, this thesis explores this area of international operations, 
through this sample of firms in Taiwan. 
Dunning's Eclectic Paradigm was the foundation. of much of the analysis on 
internationalisation, although the different historical and, cultural context provided some 
alternative conclusions from the empirical" work on ' developed industrial nations. The 
ownership advantages and attractiveness of investment location is clearly significant in 
achieving a strategic outcome. But an additional aspect of this study is the separation of 
China from the rest of the . world when 
decisions about location are concerned. The 
familiarity of similar markets is obvious, but so too are tax havens and countries perceived as 
a link between domestic and overseas operations. ý- 
This thesis has revealed specific characteristics of corporate governance in Taiwan that 
have a significant effect on corporate performance and the strategic positioning of these fines, 
both domestically and internationally.. The remaining sections in this chapter briefly 
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summarise the approach and the major findings; discuss the limitations and suggest future 
research. 
Summary and Major Findings 
The first chapter reviewed the economic development and the commercial environment of 
Taiwan. This is important, since Taiwan is an emerging economy with a relatively short 
history of liberalised capital markets, which is a departure from the previous studies of this 
sort. The establishment and subsequent reform and deregulation of the TSE was reviewed, as 
well as the cultural traditions and family hierarchical structure that have such an influence on 
the approach to commerce in Taiwan. This highlights the differences in the systems of 
discipline in the marketplace and places a contextual outline for an examination of corporate 
governance. 
This chapter also provides A he starting point for further discussions on the 
internationalisation of Taiwanese firms. Trade has been highly important in the nation's 
growth and export promotion policies have been in place since the 1960s. This has now 
moved to a strategy of foreign investment and the extent of FDI has increased rapidly since 
the late 1980s, mainly to gain access to low cost production and also to provide a direct 
service for customers in overseas markets. Thus, the decision to undertake PDI reflects the 
strategic decisions of the firm and the way these are formulated is influenced by the 
characteristics of the board of directors and the power of the dominant family. 
The next chapter described the institutional , aspects of the system of corporate 
governance in Taiwan and made some international comparisons. It began by describing the 
framework of legal structures that are drawn from both company, law and securities and 
exchange law. An important focus of this discussion was to clarify the organisational model, 
that is, the two-tier board structure with a. board of directors = and ` individual supervisors. 
However, while this places Taiwan in the same grouping as Japan, France and Germany, there 
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are also major differences, many of which are unique to Taiwan and inform much of the 
analysis in this thesis. Perhaps the most important feature of the security and exchange 
law is 
the stipulation that directors and supervisors hold a given proportion of shares, which 
is a 
function of the market capitalisation of the firm. Thus, there is no possibility that any director 
or supervisor is independent and purely objective. 
Chapters Three and Four reviewed the literatures on corporate governance and 
international business, since the empirical chapters rely on this as well as creating linkages 
between them. In Chapter Three, the established theory was found to be an excellent starting 
point, although the East Asian environment was noted and caution injected where appropriate. 
However, conflict between stakeholders can arise whether this is in a principal and agent 
framework or a principal-principal one. - The empirical research does not appear to be limited 
to western economies, both those with insider and outsider traditions of governance, but there 
is little in a system of family controlled but listed firms. This chapter also considered some of 
the methodological debates emanating from this literature. 
Chapter Four reviewed the literature on multinational business, beginning with classical 
and neoclassical theories of international trade. This was followed by the proposed 
explanations of the motives for multinational operations and was set within internalisation 
theory, the resource base view, the Uppsala model and the eclectic paradigm. The chapter 
continued by reviewing strategic decision models and particularly stressed the influence of 
corporate governance in the determination of decision outcomes. The internal governance 
dilemmas of multinational enterprises were also introduced, to provide a conceptual link 
between corporate governance characteristics and internationalisation. Finally, two empirical 
topics on this link are proposed, which are examined in the later chapters of the thesis. 
Chapter Five described the data and the estimation approach. All the information used 
in the thesis was from secondary sources, the vast majority from the Taiwan Stock Exchange 
and from annual reports and accounts of the companies. Series that were constructed were 
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explained, assumptions set out and any manipulation and transformation that was necessary 
were discussed. The econometric methods used for estimation were specified and justified, 
which was particularly important as the research questions in all three empirical chapters were 
different and a range of approaches was required to match the hypotheses tested to an 
appropriate model. This chapter also considered any ' likely problems. Endogeneity is 
potentially the most damaging and methods for testing and dealing with this where discussed 
in detail. Instrumental variables were used where necessary and were subsequently indicated 
in the tables of results where used. 
The next three chapters are the major empirical parts of the thesis investigating how 
corporate governance issues relate to firm : performance,, and FDI decisions. Given the 
particular context of Taiwan, the emphases of these empirical chapters are on the principal. 
principal relationship between the controlling family and the remaining shareholders. As 
indicated in Table 9.1, ownership by a controlling family enhances corporate performance of 
Taiwanese firms. In addition, family-controlled firms ý in Taiwan significantly outperform 
firms with more diffuse ownership. , Thus; where financial resources are provided by the 
controlling family, discipline comes from within the firm, ý rather than an external pressure 
from the market. This is contrary to the arguments of Claessens et al (2000) and La Porta et al 
(1997,1998 and 2000a) and supports the ' suggestion that resources provided by the 
controlling family is important for companies in an emerging country like Taiwan. 
Table 9.1 Summary Results for the Associations of Cnntrnlhnor FAmily 
sociations Y A&- Performance FDI Decisions FDI Location 
China Overseas China I Locations Overseas Locations 
q"Irmg Family 
Family Control Status Positive Positive Positive Positive l. Citie: Positive 1 Tax Haven 
----- 
i2. MiddleCoast j2. USIJPIEU 
j3. Southeast Asia 
Family Shareholding Iasi cud Positive Insignificant Positivem 1. Fujian 
j2. Cities 
Po stive j 1. Tax Haven 
__ 
Family Cool on Board Negative Negative Negative Positive ! 1. North Coast Positive 1 Tax Haven 
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Moreover, ownership by a controlling family increased the likelihood that Taiwanese 
firms undertake FDI, possibly because of self-interest and the need to increase the size of the 
firm for future generations. This further supports the resource-base perspective, which is 
entirely expected in Taiwan where the family is the major provider of funds, even for listed 
firms. With respect to the FDI location decision, the parallel estimations model FDI in China 
and elsewhere and found the controlling -family is significantly related to FDI spatial 
distribution outcomes. Particularly, when it comes to foreign market choices, familiarity is 
crucial and thus locations with similar culture and traditions were' found to be very attractive 
for controlling families as a less risky venture. Meanwhile, the controlling family encourages 
ambitious expansion in the advanced markets in an attempt to earn some of surplus gains in 
the highly-competitive arena. This reflects a long-term vision on corporate development to 
expand in both secure and risky markets. 
However, consolidating their foreign expansions by investing where extended family 
networks can provide local support may be beneficial to the family, but also exacerbates the 
potential for self-interest and is detrimental to minority shareholders. Apart from family ties, 
tax-havens were found to be attractive locations, confirming the results reported by Tsang 
(2002) that Chinese family businesses tend to keep knowledge and networks gained through 
overseas operations within the family. 
The results of this thesis also confirm that where the board is dominated by the 
controlling family, the interests of minority shareholders are often ignored. This validates the 
principal-principal agency problem and supports the suggestion that this can lead to an abuse 
of managerial power, in the spirit of Morck et al (1988) and Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999). 
Perhaps surprisingly, family control over the board can lessen the probability that firms 
expand by international investment. This responds to the existing literature that owners in 
senior positions tend to be conservative and hesitate to change current strategy to respond to 
new and competitive environments (see Rutledge & Karim, 1999; Harrison & Harrell, 1994; 
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Harrell & Harrison, 1993). - 
Table 9.2 summaries the results of the association of ownership by institutional investors 
with firm performance and FDI decisions. While previous research (for example: Maug, 1998; 
Pound, 1988; Short, 1994) present ambiguous effects between institutional investors and firm 
performance, this thesis confirms a positive relationship. In this sample, the institutions 
provided an effective antidote to the principal-principal agency problems within family- 
controlled firms. On the other hand, ownership by institutional investors influences FDI 
decisions, although in opposing directions, depending on the country of origin. In this study, 
domestic institutions were found to favour FDI while foreign institutions did not. This poses 
a dilemma, as in much of the work on corporate governance, the institutions are found to 
lessen the impact of agency conflicts. An explanation canbe' found if the involvement by 
foreign institutional investors in Taiwanese firm can be seen as an international venture in its 
own right and further foreign risk is not welcome. Domestic institutions, however, may be 
willing to undertake overseas investment, and are familiar with the - 
firm undertaking it. 
Therefore, if the firm is performing well, and needs to expand in a market that provides 
opportunities, they are supportive of FDI. 
Table 9.2 Summary Results for the Associations of Institutional Investor 
Associations with Performance FDI Decisions FDI Location 
China Overseas China Overseas 
Institutional Investor 
Foreign Investing Fund Positive Insignificant Insignificant Iosigificant Insignificant 
Foreign Bank Positive - Negative Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Domestic Bank Insignificant Insignificant Positive Insignificant Insignificant 
Domestic Investing Fund Positive Positive Positive Insignificant Insignificant 
In a departure from the findings in the previous chapters, the institutional investors 
played no role in location choice of FDI. This reflects adistancing of neutral stakeholders 
from the coalition of control where strategic decisions are concerned. ' Within the corporate 
I 
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governance literature, the effect of institutional investors is debated at length. However, in 
this particularly circumstance, these block shareholders choose to invest in firms that are both 
diversified internationally or largely domestic, but do not influence the decision about the 
location of that investment. 
As indicated in Table 9.3, the results of this , 
thesis also show that some board 
characteristics can be significantly, related to ' their performance and foreign investment 
decisions. Specifically, the number of directors can be a negative aspect of board structure 
associated with firm value, although the proportion of total equity owned by this group 
appeared to ensure good performance. 
Table 93 Summary Results for the Associations of institutional invectnr 
Associations with. FWarmance FDI Decisions FDI Location 
China Overseas China j Locations Overseas j Locations 
Board Characteristics 
Independent CEO - 
Negative Insignificant Insignificant t-Y Insigýnficant 1- 
Independent Chairman lnsign5cant Insigni&ant Negative Positive 1. North Coast 
------ 
Insignificant 
-j2. Middle Coast 
CEO also Chairman I signficant Negative Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Total Board Sire Negative - - 
Directors Size Insignificant Negative Negative 1. Cities Insignificant - 
Supervisor Size - Insignificant Positive Insignificant Positive 11. SE Asia 
i2. Tax Haven 
Board Shareholding Positive Insignificant Positive ! 1. F4an Positive ! 1. Tax Haven 
- -- - tNegative 
1. Cuaagdow 
Board characteristics can be linked to FDI decisions too, - with the 
most 
significant 
association being the size of the board. Evidence from this sample suggests that the greater 
the number of supervisors, the higher the possibility they favour FDI, unless the expansion is 
to China. In this case, greater numbers of directors are associated with the decision not to 
expand into China. Moreover, this thesis found that board independence has a significant 
association with FDI location decisions. This finding contradicts previous research on the 
positive aspects of independence as a benefit to corporate governance, such as Brickley et at 
(1994) and Xie et al (2003). 
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On the other hand, the higher level of shareholding held by, board members, the more 
attractive were the tax-haven countries. This indicates a high shareholding board is risk- 
adverse and less independent from the controlling family. Finally, the analysis result supports 
the view that that board size determines the effectiveness of decision-making (see Daily et al, 
1999 and Shivdasami and Yermack, 1999). A large number of directors facilitated decision- 
making in uncomplicated environments but hindered where markets are advanced and highly 
competitive. The contrary effect occurs with respect to supervisors. Considering the numbers 
of directors are much higher than supervisor' in the firms in this sample, the finding suggests 
a moderate board size can be optimal for Taiwanese firms with respect to the implementation 
of corporate governance. 
Limitations 
Initially, it must be acknowledged that any investigation of corporate governance in Taiwan 
presents potential criticism about the unsuitability of exporting western theory to other 
countries where it may not be appropriate. The market for corporate control is 
underdeveloped and rarely considered in most newly emerging economies. Given the 
relatively brief history of listed firms in Taiwan, the founding family still firmly controls 
managerial rights. It is true that enterprise is encouraged and there is not the legacy of state 
control of the factors of production as is the case in many European and African countries. 
There are numerous small and medium sized companies operating within a sound legal 
structure such that a stable economic business community can thrive: 
There are limitations relating to the sample. Firstly, - compared " with other corporate 
governance studies, the relatively small sample can be a weakness; although it does include 
the entire population of non-financial firms listed on the TSE in 1995, and unfortunately this 
is a common constraint in emerging markets research. During the period that this thesis was 
written, the economy has been dramatically transformed and the financial markets have 
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expanded considerably as a consequence. The number of listed firms is now close to 700. 
The distribution across sectors has also changed and there is now a much greater 
concentration of electrical firms, mainly in the information, computer and semiconductor 
classifications. Further research will reflect these changes. 
Second, much of the corporate governance data was restricted to a single year. Therefore, 
despite many variables being available in a panel data format, this imbalance meant that the 
analysis was conducted using mean values. Therefore, as well as not being able to take 
advantage of the increased sample size and improved estimation results achieved from panel 
data, it was also difficult to construct instrumental variables where endogeneity was found to 
be a problem. In particularly, the intuition is that sound corporate governance is causally prior 
to performance. Unfortunately, it was not possible to formally test this. 
An implication of this is that it was only possible to construct the ownership series for 
one year, and thus it was assumed that the structure of ownership was constant over the whole 
period of the study. However, this is not such as problem here as it might be in other 
countries. Taiwanese banks accept equity as collateral for loans and as a result, unless the 
firm is in very serious danger of making huge loses or actually failing, the controlling 
managers have no reason to part with their shareholding. Indeed, if the prospects for the firm 
were so dire, it would be difficult to find a buyer for such shares and liquidity would be a 
problem. The data from the SFC shows that 30%: of insider shareholding has been 
collateralised, with the level of collateral highly correlated with gearing ratios. This indicates 
the prevalence of equity collateral among corporate insiders and reduces the concern that 
liquidity reasons are likely to cause changes in the' ownership structure of firms. Thus, 
although Denis & Sarin (1999) find that ownership and board structure of listed firms on the 
New York Stock Exchange change substantially over the course of a year, the changes are 
minor in Taiwan. This reduces any flaws associated with causality or the use of instruments 
in the econometrics. 
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The FDI data is also limited. It was not possible to identify FDI before 1999, whereas 
decisions relating to that investment, including locations issues, were clearly made before that. 
FDI is a long-term strategy and may have been part of the companies development plan for 
some time. But, since Taiwan was traditionally a purely inward FDI country for a long time, 
the decision to undertake outward FDI is a relatively recent one. It seems reasonable to 
assume that the attempts to introduce an effective system of corporate governance preceded 
the period of overseas development and there corporate governance influences should slightly 
lag FDI decisions. 
Future Research 
This study has focussed on large, publicly-listed, non-financial firms. However, the majority 
of businesses in Taiwan are small and medium sized firms, which in general, are exclusively 
family owned. Future research should be conducted in this sector, to identify how strategic 
decisions are generated when there are no external influences. 
A second neglected area is the financial institutions, many of which are known to be 
highly inefficient. According to the statistics published by the Ministry of Finance, bad debts 
in Taiwanese banks reached 8.28% in the second quarter of 2002. It has been predicted that 
the poor performance of this sector is likely to result in a financial crisis in Taiwan, similar to 
that in Thailand in 1997 (July, 2001, Times). Under these circumstances, a study of the 
performance and efficiency of the sector, and the role of corporate governance, would provide 
valuable research that would inform policy on reform and improved bank practice. 
The results of this thesis consistently indicate that state ownership and control has a 
positive impact on governance practice. The number of state-controlled firms is relatively 
small in Taiwan, and they are usually large-scale monopolies such as telecommunications, 
steel and certain civil industries. A study on the process and effectiveness of decision-making 
in a sample of such organisations could be interesting. 
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Finally, this thesis has examined links between corporate governance and firm 
performance and corporate governance and FDI. However, the relationship between the 
internationalisation of firms and corporate performance is still ambiguous. To study the 
simultaneous effects from the triangle of corporate governance, firm performance and 
internationalisation, a future study may be conducted to investigate how foreign expansion on 
the part of firms in Taiwan impacts on domestic performance, or indeed, how domestic 
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